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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON GROWTH COMPLEMENTARITY
BETWEEN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
SEPTEMBER 2015
JOAO PAULO A. DE SOUZA
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SAO PAULO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF SAO PAULO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor J. Mohan Rao
This dissertation examines three aspects of the macroeconomic role of agriculture
in the industrialization of developing countries. In the first essay, I utilize instrumen-
tal variable techniques to empirically identify the effect of growth in agriculture on
growth in manufacturing. Using data for 62 countries and instrumental variable tech-
niques, I find that higher land yields in agriculture raise growth in manufacturing in
the short to medium run. Along with extensions of the basic empirical model, this
finding suggests that land-saving technical change can stimulate demand for industrial
goods, raise fiscal revenues, and provide foreign exchange earnings to finance capital
accumulation. In the second essay, I examine the role of biased-technical change in
agriculture in the formation of aggregate demand for industry. I use a two-sector
growth model to show that, under conditions of low factor substitutability and hid-
den unemployment, land-saving innovations can raise rural employment, enlarge the
vi
domestic market for manufactures, and promote faster industrial accumulation —
in contrast to labor-saving innovations. I also develop saving-constrained and open
economy extensions of the baseline model. The essay casts light on a recent strand
of empirical studies — including the first essay of this dissertation — which have
identified a positive impact of higher land yields on industrial growth. Finally, in the
third essay I develop a political-economic explanation for the labor-displacing trend
that existed across the larger and most dynamic agricultural establishments in Brazil
during the 1950-1980 period. Using primary data and the secondary literature, I
document this trend and argue that it resulted from the interaction between public
policies to promote the use of modern inputs, on the one hand, and size and power
inequality across landholdings, on the other hand. As a result, the pattern of tech-
nical change in agriculture aggravated the problem of underemployment that beset
Brazil’s industrialization, preventing a broader distribution of its benefits.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
These three essays examine different aspects of an overarching question: the
macroeconomic role of agriculture in developing countries. Their main premise is
that agricultural development can promote the expansion of industry and modern
services, and broaden the distribution of aggregate productivity gains.
The essays are self-contained and employ different methodologies. Yet they are
informed by a set of unifying views. The first is the view that ‘surplus’ labor — labor
utilizing subsistence technologies — is a pervasive phenomenon in both rural and ur-
ban areas. The second is the view that agriculture is key to the formation of aggregate
demand for industry and modern services. This role is unlikely to disappear in open
economies, and it complements other macroeconomic functions classically assigned
to agriculture, such as the provision of fiscal revenues and foreign exchange earnings
(Johnston and Mellor, 1961). It follows from these two claims that agriculture can
serve a dual function as a medium-run outlet for surplus labor and a source of demand
for domestic industry.
Technical innovations that raise the productivity of agriculture’s basic factors of
production, land and labor, are key to fulfilling this dual function. But the third view
that informs these essays is that these innovations are most often biased — they affect
the relative productivity of land and labor as much as their absolute productivity.
Under the technical conditions of developing-country agriculture, these biased innova-
tions have asymmetrical effects on output and employment. Land-saving innovations
normally raise both output and employment, whereas labor-saving innovations seldom
raise output and often reduce employment.
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Finally, the fourth view is that, rather than being optimal responses to the relative
scarcity of land and labor, the observed factor-saving biases are most often a result of
the political economy of rural development. The interaction between size and power
inequality across landholdings, on the one hand, and public policies for input prices,
credit, and rural infrastructure, on the other hand, are key to determining the avail-
ability and the adoption of technical innovations. Depending on this interaction, the
pattern of technical change in agriculture may lead to considerable labor displace-
ment, aggravating the problem of surplus labor and narrowing the domestic market
for industrial goods.
In other words, all three essays share a common scope in medium-run scenarios
characterized by surplus labor, and a common focus on how technical innovations in
agriculture can promote or hinder industrial growth in these scenarios. As a corollary,
the essays place little emphasis on long-run scenarios in which labor shortages could
emerge.
The first essay, titled Evidence of Growth Complementarity Between Agriculture
and Industry in Developing Countries, is concerned with the empirical identification
of macroeconomic complementarity between the two sectors. Using dynamic panel
models with data for 62 developing countries, it examines whether growth in agricul-
ture elicits growth in manufacturing. For identification, it uses population-weighted,
average temperature as an instrument for growth in agriculture, exploring exogenous
variation in land yields that resemble the effects of land-saving innovations. It finds
large short-run effects: a one-percentage point increase in growth in agriculture is
estimated to raise growth in manufacturing by 0.47-0.56 percentage point (baseline),
and 0.28-0.47 percentage point (conservative). Extensions of the empirical model
suggest that growth in agriculture benefits the manufacturing sector by improving its
domestic terms of trade, by increasing the share of investment and saving in GDP,
and by increasing the capacity to import industrial inputs. Together, these findings
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lend support to the notion that agriculture plays key macroeconomic roles in the
industrialization of developing countries by relieving aggregate demand, fiscal, and
foreign exchange constraints on the industrial sector.
The second essay, titled Biased Technical Change in Agriculture and Industrial
Growth, is primarily concerned with the role of biased-technical change in agricul-
ture in the formation of aggregate demand for industry. It presents a two-sector
growth model in which industrial accumulation is sensitive to the factor-saving bias
of technical change in agriculture. By embodying structural characteristics common
to several developing countries — especially low factor substitutability and hidden un-
employment in agriculture — the model shows that land-saving innovations can raise
rural employment and income, enlarge the domestic market for manufactures, and
promote faster industrial accumulation, in contrast to labor-saving innovations. The
essay also presents saving-constrained and open economy extensions of the baseline
model. Together, these contributions cast light on a recent strand of empirical stud-
ies — including the first essay of this dissertation — which have identified a positive
impact of higher land yields on industrial growth. They also cast light on historical
accounts of the role of biased agricultural innovations in the early industrialization of
Japan, East Asia, and Latin America.
Finally, the third essay, titled The Political Economy of Biased Technical Change
in Brazilian Agriculture (1950-1980), contributes a political-economic explanation
for the labor-saving bias of technical change in Brazilian agriculture during a key
period in the country’s industrialization. Using primary data and the secondary
literature, it establishes that a strong labor-displacing trend existed across the larger
and most dynamic agricultural establishments until the 1970s. It then examines
how public policies to promote the use of modern inputs — such as price and credit
subsidies, research and extension, and rural infrastructure — interacted with size
and power inequality across landholdings to impart a marked labor-saving bias to
3
technical change. As a result, Brazilian agriculture failed to provide a productive
medium-run outlet for surplus labor, aggravating the problem of rural and urban
underemployment and preventing a broader distribution of the benefits of industrial
growth.
4
CHAPTER 1
EVIDENCE OF GROWTH COMPLEMENTARITY
BETWEEN AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
1.1 Introduction
There is little doubt that the expansion of industrial activities and their ancillary
services characterizes sustained episodes of economic growth in developing countries.1
But the initial stages of industrialization almost invariably impinge on societies where
agriculture accounts for a large share of output and employment.
Several recent studies have underscored the role of agriculture in generating fa-
vorable initial conditions for modern economic growth. Their dominant theme is the
historical pattern of land ownership and its lasting influence on the distribution of
income and education, on the incidence of social conflict, and on the development of
institutions of economic and political governance.2
And yet, beyond the lasting political-economic influence of agrarian structure,
agriculture also plays macroeconomic roles in industrialization. They include provid-
ing saving and foreign exchange to finance capital accumulation, as well as a home
market for industry (Johnston and Mellor, 1961). Their fulfillment is a key ingredient
of successful industrialization, as recognized by Alice Amsden in regard to Taiwan’s
post-war experience:
1For recent evidence on the relation between structural change and economic development, see
Timmer and Vries (2009), Ocampo et al. (2009), and McMillan and Rodrik (2011).
2For recent examples, see Engerman and Sokoloff (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2000, 2005), Galor
et al. (2009), and Oyvat (2013).
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Agriculture managed to produce a food supply sufficient to meet mini-
mum domestic consumption requirements as well as a residual for export.
[...] Good rice harvests have been a major factor behind price (and real
wage) stability. [...] Agriculture also managed to provide an important
source of demand for Taiwan’s industrial output, particularly chemicals
and tools, and a mass market for consumption goods. [...] In summary,
agriculture in Taiwan gave industrial capital a labor force, a surplus, and
foreign exchange. (Amsden, 1979, p. 363)
This paper estimates whether growth in agriculture elicits growth in manufac-
turing, providing reduced-form evidence of macroeconomic linkages between the two
sectors. Using average temperature to identify changes in agricultural supply in 62
developing countries, I estimate that a one percentage point increase in growth in
agriculture raises contemporaneous growth in manufacturing by between 0.47 and
0.56 percentage point in the baseline specifications, and by between 0.28 and 0.47
percentage point in more conservative specifications that limit influential observa-
tions.
As discussed below, annual variation in temperature is best suited to identify
short-run effects. Still, the implied long-run multipliers show that if the average
country in the sample were to permanently increase growth in agriculture to 4.4%/yr
(the average in China during 1961-2006), growth in manufacturing would eventually
increase by between 0.95 and 1 percentage points. This effect is substantial, as the
sample mean of growth in manufacturing is 4.5%/yr.
Estimating the effect of growth in agriculture using country-level data is chal-
lenging for two main reasons. First, countries differ along time-constant dimensions,
such as natural conditions, that are correlated with growth in agriculture. To address
this problem, I control for country fixed effects, using only relative variation within
countries to identify the coefficients.
Second, regressions relating growth in the two sectors are likely to run afoul of
bias due to reverse causality and omitted time-varying variables. To address these
problems, I control for the previous dynamics of growth in manufacturing, and use a
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population-weighted measure of average annual temperature (from Dell et al., 2012a)
as an instrument for growth in agriculture.
A growing body of evidence has shown that annual variation in average tempera-
ture is an important determinant of crop yields under the technical and geographical
conditions of most developing countries (see section 1.4). This fact makes my empiri-
cal strategy appealing, as it exploits a source of variation in agricultural growth that
resembles the effect of yield-increasing innovations — a type of technical change that
characterized agricultural development during the early industrialization of Japan
and East Asia, and later spread to other countries as part of the ‘green revolution’.
This paper joins a growing literature using climate data to identify supply shocks
in agriculture (see Dell et al., 2013, for a broad review). It is particularly related
to papers that have used this identification strategy to establish causal relations
between agricultural growth and broader economic outcomes, such as local urban ac-
tivity (Henderson et al., 2009), patterns of migration (Bru¨ckner, 2012), and industrial
growth (Shifa, 2015).
This empirical strategy also assumes that annual variation in average temperature
within countries, while exogenously shifting agricultural supply, does not directly af-
fect growth in manufacturing. Section 1.4 below further discusses the appropriateness
of this assumption.
Besides estimating the reduced-form effect of growth in agriculture on growth in
manufacturing, I explore a number of potential mechanisms that could explain it.
I find that growth in agriculture improves the domestic terms of trade of the non-
agricultural sector, increases the share of investment and saving in GDP, increases
the capacity to import industrial inputs, and increases average output per worker.
These two contributions lend support to the notion that agriculture plays key
macroeconomic roles in the industrialization of developing countries by relieving sav-
ing, aggregate demand, fiscal, and foreign exchange constraints on the industrial
7
sector. In particular, they suggest that the assumptions typically required to gen-
erate a trade-off between yield-increasing innovations in agriculture and industrial
development — such as perfect tradability and full employment — are unlikely to
hold in most developing countries, at least in the short to medium run (see sections
1.2 and 1.7 for further discussion).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 motivates the question in relation to
the existing empirical and theoretical literature. Section 1.3 describes the dataset and
introduces the empirical model. Section 1.4 discusses the identification strategy and
presents the main empirical results of the paper: the effect of growth in agriculture
on growth in manufacturing using temperature as an instrumental variable. Section
1.5 examines the effects of controlling for cross-country heterogeneity along several
dimensions — such as the share of agriculture in GDP and the degree of openness to
international trade —, as well as several robustness checks; Section 1.6 examines the
impact of agricultural growth on potential channels through which it would enhance
industrial growth. Section 1.7 discusses the main findings, implications, and limita-
tions of the paper. Appendices A and B provide descriptive statistics and detailed
variable definitions.
1.2 Agricultural Development and Industrialization
Most of the recent empirical literature consists of reduced-form tests of whether
output or productivity growth in agriculture bolster their counterparts in other sec-
tors. To address reverse causality and omitted variable bias, most authors have
deployed time series techniques or instrumental variables.
For example, a group of studies has used cointegration and error correction models
to estimate long-run sectoral balance relations, followed by an examination of sectoral
responses to deviations from this equilibrium. Studies of individual countries have
yielded mixed results: Gemmell et al. (2000) found that manufacturing output and
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productivity in Malaysia were exogenous (in the sense of Granger) to increases in their
counterparts in agriculture. By contrast, Kanwar (2000), and Chebbi and Lachaal
(2007) found that they responded positively in India and Tunisia. A study of panel
cointegration using a sample of 85 countries, however, confirmed the finding of positive
responses for the majority of countries in the sample (Tiffin and Irz, 2006).
By contrast, this paper follows an alternative, but increasingly common strategy:
the identification of exogenous shifts in agricultural value added from variation in
climate variables, such as rainfall and temperature (Dell et al., 2013). Some of these
studies examine the regional impact of growth in agriculture. For example, Henderson
et al. (2009) find that the intensity of city lights at night increases in years of favorable
rainfall in adjacent rural areas. Their results, derived from satellite images of 541
cities in 18 African countries, indicate substantial local complementarity between the
rural and urban economies.
But macroeconomic complementarity can be better discerned at a higher level of
aggregation. To that end, Dell et al. (2012a) build average measures of nationwide
temperature and rainfall, using local population as weights. They find that GDP
growth declines in poor countries when temperature is higher than the historical
average.
Changes in agricultural yields are the channel most likely to explain these reduced-
form relations between climate variables and economic growth. Several authors have
therefore used country-level climate variables as instruments for output and produc-
tivity in agriculture. For example, using precipitation as an instrumental variable
(along with international commodity prices), Bru¨ckner (2012) finds that lower value
added in agriculture leads to distress migration and the expansion of urban informal
activities. In turn, using temperature and precipitation as instrumental variables,
Shifa (2015) finds that higher growth in agriculture elicits sizable short-run increases
in growth in manufacturing in a large sample of countries.
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The empirical findings above raise a natural question: what macroeconomic mech-
anisms explain the observed complementarity between agricultural and industrial de-
velopment? The answer is that agriculture can ease saving, demand, foreign exchange,
and fiscal constraints on industrial accumulation. These roles of agriculture have been
explored in a number of previous contributions.
Traditional development theory, for example, saw the availability of domestic sav-
ing as the main constraint on the rate of capital accumulation. Many authors thus
called on agriculture to elicit higher saving from the private non-agricultural sector,
in particular by lowering unit costs in industry. This understanding of agriculture
as a source of surplus to finance industrialization set the stage for classic debates,
especially on the role of intersectoral terms of trade in Soviet and South Asian in-
dustrialization (see, e.g. Preobrazhensky, 1965; Ellman, 1975; Sah and Stiglitz, 1984;
Mitra, 2005).
Agriculture’s role in increasing the investible surplus in a market economy is pred-
icated on three notions: first, that most saving originates in retained profits and other
non-wage incomes; second, that unit costs are a key determinant of real industrial
saving in terms of its own output; and, third, that in dual economies agricultural
labor productivity is a key determinant of industrial unit costs.
Arthur Lewis laid out the classical model outlining the macroeconomic mecha-
nisms behind this view. By linking money wages in industry to the value of the
average product in agriculture, Lewis suggested that agricultural development will
raise industrial accumulation if the fall in agriculture’s domestic terms of trade domi-
nates the increase in industrial wages in terms of food (Lewis, 1954, p. 173-176). The
presence of Engel’s Law in final demand — the proposition that the share of primary
goods in total expenditure falls as income increases — is crucial to ensure this result
in a market economy (Jorgenson, 1961).
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The notion that private saving is the binding domestic constraint on industrial
growth has been challenged on two fronts: by those emphasizing fiscal constraints
on complementary public investment, and by those emphasizing insufficient domestic
demand.
Public infrastructure and private investment may be bound by direct technical
complementarity in industrializing economies. Expected demand may justify private
projects, yet investors may fail to undertake them in the absence of complemen-
tary public investment in energy or transportation.3 In addition, infrastructure is
often subject to increasing returns to scale and market failures, and it is largely non-
tradable. These characteristics hinder the ability of private investors to sustain the
required level of infrastructural investment (Skott and Ros, 1997).
Agriculture, as it turns out, has often been a prominent source of fiscal revenues in
industrializing economies. For example, the direct taxation of agricultural rents was
key for funding infrastructure investment during the first several decades of Japan’s
industrialization (Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1960). But due to technical or political
constraints, in most post-war episodes of industrialization governments resorted to
instruments of indirect taxation, such as trade tariffs and quotas, multiple exchange
rates, and domestic marketing boards. As a result, wedges between the actual terms
of trade of agriculture and border prices were common, with governments often cap-
turing the implied transfers as fiscal or quasi-fiscal revenues (Peterson, 1979; Oliveira,
1985; Rao, 1989; Schiff and Valde´s, 1998). The importance of these mechanisms in
generating fiscal revenues became evident in the wake of recent episodes of market
liberalization across the developing world, which often worsened fiscal constraints
(Khattry and Rao, 2002; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010).
3For empirical evidence concerning developing countries, see Belloc and Vertova (2006), Romp
and De Haan (2007), and Canning and Pedroni (2008).
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In turn, domestic demand may fail to justify private investment projects, and
international trade may afford scarce possibilities to offset this shortfall, especially
in the short-run. Private investment may thus be deficient even without an ex ante
saving shortfall, causing the economy to come under a Keynesian aggregate demand
constraint.
A number of two-sector models in the post-Keynesian and Structuralist traditions
have shown that technical progress in agriculture can relieve demand constraints on
industrial accumulation. In common, they posit that firms make independent invest-
ment decisions with an eye to expected profitability, and that mechanisms — such
as changes in functional distribution or capacity utilization — exist to endogenously
bring ex-post saving into line with desired investment. Agriculture can be a source of
autonomous demand for industry by purchasing industrial inputs and, in the presence
of Engel’s effects, by reducing the cost to workers of meeting their income-inelastic
demand for food (see, e.g.: Taylor, 1982, 1983; Dutt, 1992; Rao, 1993; Skott, 1999).
The channels of complementarity above, however, have been called into ques-
tion for open economies. Matsuyama (1992) proposed an influential Ricardo-Viner
model of a small open economy characterized by full employment. He shows that
higher productivity in agriculture elicits a reallocation of labor away from industry,
reducing domestic industrial production and, through a standard learning-by-doing
mechanism, the long-run growth of labor productivity in industry.
Matsuyama (1992) only considered neutral technical change. In turn, Bustos et al.
(2012) extended the original framework to consider factor-saving biases, given that
some forms of technical change are primarily land-saving (e.g. multiple cropping,
high-yielding varieties, irrigation, and fertilizers), while other forms are primarily
labor-saving (e.g. the mechanization of sowing, harvesting, and threshing). Where
the stock of effective land is the main constraint on output, and the elasticity of
substitution between land and labor is low, land-saving technical change raises labor
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absorption into agriculture, while the converse is true of labor-saving technical change
(see, e.g., Johnston and Cownie, 1969; Ruttan, 1977; Otsuka et al., 1994; Hossain
et al., 2006, for a discussion of the empirical evidence).
By adding biased technical change to a Matsuyama-type model, Bustos et al.
(2012) show that land-saving technical change causes workers to relocate to agricul-
ture, at the expense of industrial employment and output. By contrast, labor-saving
innovations cause workers to leave agriculture, and a competitive labor market en-
sures that they are taken up by industry. This strand of the literature thus suggests
that innovations biased towards increasing land yields are likely to entrench historical
patterns of comparative advantage in primary sectors, hindering long-term industrial
development.4
In contrast to this prediction, I find that growth in agriculture — identified
through exogenous yield increases — benefits industry, at least in the short to medium
run. This finding suggests that the assumptions required by Matsuyama (1992) and
Bustos et al. (2012) to generate the opposite result are unlikely to hold in the average
developing country over this time frame.
There are three such assumptions. The first is perfect tradability in both agricul-
ture and industry. In a small open economy this assumption fixes the intersectoral
terms of trade exogenously at the level of world prices. And, indeed, if the terms of
trade are unresponsive to agricultural growth, neither supply-side complementarity in
a Lewisian framework nor demand-side complementarity in a Keynesian framework
will obtain. For example, higher labor incomes in agriculture will now directly raise
unit labor costs in terms of the industrial good in a simple Lewisian model, slow-
4Bustos et al. (2012) find empirical support for their model using municipal data for Brazil.
The use of subnational data, however, couches the test under conditions that most closely resemble
those of small open economies (especially with regard to the the exogeneity of intersectoral relative
prices). This fact, along with the results in the present paper, casts doubt on the extent to which
their conclusions could carry over to national economies.
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ing down accumulation (Skott and Larudee, 1998). As Matsuyama (1992) himself
admits, however, perfect tradability is an extreme notion. Detailed case studies of
intersectoral resource flows indeed suggest that, in a world of trade restrictions and
non-tradable subsectors, periods of technical dynamism in agriculture often correlate
with endogenous declines in the sector’s domestic terms of trade (see, e.g. Mellor,
1973; Karshenas, 1995, and section 1.5 below).
The second assumption is that factor substitutability in industry and a competitive
intersectoral labor market lead to full employment. But hidden unemployment in both
rural and urban areas is a defining feature of developing countries, indicating that,
with imperfect factor substitutability in production and labor market failures, the
size of the capital stock in the modern sector is the effective constraint on modern
employment. Thus, greater labor absorption into agriculture in the short to medium
run need not come at the expense of industry.
The third and last assumption is the absence of a foreign exchange constraint
on the ability of domestic industrial investment to absorb ex ante domestic saving.
The Ricardo-Viner trade structure of Matsuyama’s model implies that trade at world
prices remains balanced despite the fact that a reallocation of labor to industry may
cause agricultural exports to contract. As it turns out, however, industrialization in
developing countries is likely to require a high coefficient of imported intermediate
and capital goods. As a result, as the industrial sector grows and diversifies, its net
foreign exchange requirements may rise in the short to medium run. Accumulation
may thus be constrained by insufficient foreign exchange earnings in the face of limited
ability to run persistent current account deficits (Chenery and Bruno, 1962; Bacha,
1990; Taylor, 1994). Moreover, there is no evidence that exchange rate adjustment
can smoothly correct these deficits in the absence of contractionary policies, which
hurt industrial growth (Chinn and Wei, 2013; Ocampo, 2003).
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Under a binding foreign exchange constraint, agriculture can bolster industrial ac-
cumulation by producing crops for export or by reducing food imports. Agriculture’s
ability to relax a foreign exchange constraint is therefore a fourth macroeconomic
channel of complementarity, in addition to its ability to relax saving, demand, and
fiscal constraints. Indeed, by examining intermediate import demand in a dependent
economy framework that eschews the three main assumptions above, Rattsø and
Torvik (2003) show that agricultural development and industrial growth can remain
synergistic in open economies.
To be sure, the evidence produced by my empirical strategy was obtained on
the basis of short-run variation in the instrument. The estimates therefore fail to
account for changes in the relationship between agriculture and industry which could
follow in the wake of prolonged episodes of growth. In particular, the emergence of
labor shortages would eventually call for a labor-saving bias in technical change in
agriculture (although this bias should be seen as induced by industrial growth, not
as an independent cause of it). For further discussion of the scope and limitations of
the findings, see section 1.7.
1.3 Data, Empirical Model, and Benchmark Estimates
My empirical model uses sectoral value added data from the World Development
Indicators (WDI). I exclude developed and transition economies, as well as countries
with less than one million inhabitants. I also exclude countries with less than 25
consecutive observations, to mitigate inference distortions caused by short panels (I
relax some of these constraints to check the robustness of the results, see section 1.5).
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The resulting unbalanced panel boasts 62 countries, spans the 1960-2006 period, and
has on average 36 observations per country5.
As shown in table A.1 in Appendix A, the sample mean of growth in agriculture
is quite low: 2.6%/yr. Agricultural growth is also volatile, with an overall standard
deviation of 8.6%. At 4.5%/yr, the sample mean of growth in manufacturing is higher,
but also volatile, with an an overall standard deviation of 8.5%. Perhaps surprisingly,
a standard decomposition attributes most of this volatility to variation in growth
within countries, as opposed to variation in growth across countries. In other words,
most countries achieve high growth in both sectors, but few sustain it over time.
Growth volatility is especially pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The regressions estimated in this paper follow a dynamic panel specification which
allows for the propagation of short-run variation in agricultural growth over time
∆ln(VAM)i,t = β0 +
p∑
n=1
αn∆ln(VAM)i,t−n +
q∑
j=0
βj∆ln(VAA)i,t−j + γZi,t + i + t + i,t
(1.1)
where VAM and VAA denote real value added in manufacturing and agriculture.
The subscripts i and t index countries and years, ∆ denotes first differences, and Zi,t
denotes a vector of controls. As is standard in panel data analysis, the baseline model
decomposes the unobserved residual into a time-constant portion that is specific to
each country (i), a time-varying portion that is common to all countries (t), and a
time-varying portion that is specific to each country (i,t).
By including lags of the dependent variable, the specification in (2.2) controls for
the past dynamics of growth in manufacturing. Estimating it using the standard
‘within’ estimator thus addresses two sources of bias. First, it controls for idiosyn-
5Although the WDI dataset goes beyond 2006, that is the last year for which measures of
population-weighted temperature are available. To ensure comparability across specifications, I
restrict the sample to 1960-2006 in all models.
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cratic country characteristics correlated with the performance of agriculture; second,
it ensures that growth in agriculture is conditionally uncorrelated with past growth
in manufacturing.
Still, a causal interpretation of the coefficients requires the assumption that growth
in agriculture is uncorrelated to the contemporaneous and lagged error terms, condi-
tional on past growth in manufacturing, the country and year fixed effects, and any
other covariates included in Zi,t:
E[i,t∆ln(VAA)i,s] = 0, ∀ s ≤ t (1.2)
The assumption in (1.2) is likely to fail due to omitted variable bias, motivating the
use of temperature as an instrument for growth in agriculture. Before describing those
estimates, however, it is useful to establish benchmarks — based on the identifying
assumption in (1.2) — against which to compare them. This section describes two
such benchmarks. The first is obtained by estimating equation (2.2) with annual data
and the within estimator. The second is obtained by estimating it with growth in
manufacturing over non-overlapping five-year periods, in order to establish a medium-
term association that does not use annual variation for coefficient identification.
Columns (1)-(3) in table 1.1 show the model in (2.2) estimated with annual data
and the within estimator. Each specification includes two lags of growth in manu-
facturing6. Column (1) only includes contemporaneous growth in agriculture which,
as we can see, has a positive and statistically significant association with growth in
manufacturing. But this contemporaneous effect is small: an increase in agricultural
growth by one percentage point is a associated with an increase in growth in man-
ufacturing of only 0.10 percentage point. Columns (2) and (3) include up to three
6Deeper lags were never statistically significant, and their inclusion did not alter the results.
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lags of growth in agriculture. Only the first two lags are positive and individually
significant (deeper lags are also insignificant, but they are not reported).
The dynamic specifications in columns (1)-(3) allow us to compute cumulative
effects by assuming a permanent increase in growth in agriculture.7 As table 1.1
shows, the estimated long-run multipliers are statistically significant — the multiplier
in column (2) implies that a permanent increase in growth in agriculture by one
percentage point is associated with an increase of 0.32 percentage point in growth in
manufacturing after enough years elapse.
The empirical model allows for both fixed effects and lags of the dependent vari-
able. The within transformation therefore creates a mechanical correlation between
the lagged dependent variable and the error term (Nickell, 1981). The resulting bias
converges to zero as the number of time periods increase, so it is unlikely to be large
given the average of 36 observations per country. Still, to address this potential
problem, column (4) shows the specification in column (2) estimated using a system
GMM procedure in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover
(1995). The procedure applies forward orthogonal deviations to the variables in order
to eliminate panel-specific fixed effects, using lags of the untransformed variables as
instruments for the transformed variables. The identifying assumption is:
E[∗i,t+1(∆ln(VAM)i,s−1,∆ln(VAA)i,s)
′] = 0, ∀ s ≤ t (1.3)
where ∗i,t+1 indicates the forward orthogonal deviation of i,t.
8 If there is no
autocorrelation in the error term of second (or higher) order, the first (and deeper) lags
7The long-run multiplier that embodies this assumption of a permanent increase is given by∑q
j=0 βj(1−
∑p
n=1 αn)
−1
, where βj and αn are the coefficients on growth in agriculture and manu-
facturing, and q and p are the respective number of lags, as defined in (2.2).
8The time subscript reflects the practice of storing orthogonal deviations one period late, for
consistency with other commonly used transformations, such as first differences (Roodman, 2006).
In other words, ∗i,t+1 = ci,t(i,t − Ti,t−1
∑Ti,t
j=t+1 i,t), where Ti,t indicates the number of available
future observations, and ci,t =
√
Ti,t/Ti,t + 1 is a scaling factor.
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of the variables in levels are valid instruments for the transformed lagged dependent
variables.9 The existence of second-order autocorrelation in the error term can be
tested using the data, but a causal interpretation of the coefficients on agricultural
growth still hinges on the assumption in (1.2). The coefficients on agricultural growth
show a small decline with the system GMM procedure, but growth in manufacturing
shows greater persistence, so that the long-run multiplier declines only slightly.
Columns (5)-(7) present the second set of benchmark estimates, which modify the
empirical model in two ways. First, I measure growth in manufacturing over non-
overlapping five-year periods, starting with 1960-1965 (I annualize the result for ease
of interpretation). Second, I decompose the right-hand-side variables into two types: a
set of ‘flow’ variables measured as annual averages over each growth period, including
growth in agriculture; and a set of ‘stock’ variables measured at the beginning of each
growth period (see Caselli et al., 1996, for further discussion of this specification).
Since the transformed dataset has few time periods, I estimate all the specifications
using the Arellano-Bond-Bover procedure. The specification in column (5) includes
only period dummies and one lag of the dependent variable, in addition to growth in
agriculture. In turn, the specifications in columns (6) and (7) attempt to attenuate
omitted variable bias by including two different sets of flow and stock variables. These
variables capture external and domestic macroeconomic conditions, such as the initial
level of GDP per capita and the external terms of trade (for a detailed description of
the variables in each set, see table B.1 in Appendix B). As we can see, the estimates in
columns (6) and (7) imply that an increase by one percentage point in average growth
in agriculture is associated with an increase in annual growth in manufacturing of
9The system GMM approach also estimates equations with the untransformed variables, now
using lags of the transformed lagged dependent variables as instruments. These instruments are
by construction purged of correlation with the unobserved fixed effects, and it is also assumed that
they are uncorrelated with other components of the contemporaneous error term. The use of these
additional moment conditions to estimate a ’stacked’ system is shown to increase efficiency (Arellano
and Bover, 1995).
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Table 1.1: Benchmark estimates without temperature as an instrument.
Model with five-year averages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE SGMM SGMM SGMM SGMM
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.116*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 0.116** 0.592*** 0.491*** 0.527***
(0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.143) (0.137) (0.161)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−1 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.094***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−2 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.051**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.022)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−3 0.031
(0.023)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N N set 1 sets 1+2∑
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.116 0.312 0.361 0.261 0.592 0.491 0.527
p-value 0.007 0 0 0.001 0 0.001 0.002
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 1 1 1∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.054 0.028 0.048 0.082 0.187 0.130 0.084
p-value 0.331 0.615 0.269 0.145 0.032 0.118 0.280
Long-run Multiplier 0.123 0.321 0.380 0.284 0.728 0.565 0.576
p-value 0.008 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.004
Num. of GMM Instruments 52 14 20 33
Lags of GMM Instruments 2 2 2 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.331 0.343 0.323 0.168
Hansen test (p-value) 0.182 0.158 0.683 0.242
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 55 55
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 35.952 35.194 35.952 6.226 6.309 6.309
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is growth in real value added in the manufacturing sector. Standard errors robust to
arbitrary forms of correlation within countries are in parentheses. Columns labeled ”OLS/FE” indicate the fixed-effects
estimator, while columns labeled ”SGMM” indicate the Arellano-Bover-Bond system GMM estimator (see description in
the text). All specifications include a set of year or period dummies. The specifications in columns (6) and (7) also include
the sets of control variables described in the text (for detailed variable definitions for each set, see Appendix B). The
SGMM estimates of the specifications in columns (5)-(7) were obtained using two lags of the lagged dependent variable and
of all all endogenous flow variables (with the exception of the external terms of trade) as instruments for the transformed
equation. The instrument matrix was collapsed to avoid instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2009).
between 0.49 to 0.52 percentage points over a five-year period. These medium-run
estimates exceed the corresponding short-run OLS estimates obtained using annual
data, as well as the sum of lagged coefficients in columns (2) or (4). I consider these
to be the benchmark medium-run estimates obtained without external instrumental
variables.
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1.4 Instrumental Variable Estimates
The benchmark estimates above address important sources of bias, but in order to
obtain causal estimates one needs a source of variation in agricultural output that is
uncorrelated with relevant omitted variables. Dell et al. (2012a) provide a candidate
instrumental variable for growth in agriculture: annual variation in country-level
average temperature.
To construct their measure, Dell et al. (2012a) aggregated monthly local temper-
ature measurements available in the larger Terrestrial Air Temperature and Precip-
itation Gridded Monthly Time Series dataset (Matsuura and Willmott, 2009). The
original measurements were interpolated from a number of weather stations, and then
made available on a spatial grid with a resolution of 0.5ox0.5o of latitude and lon-
gitude (at the equator, each grid node corresponds to approximately 56km2). Dell
et al. (2012a) weighted these local measurements by local population, using a survey
conducted by the Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project in 1990 (CIESIN et al., 2004).
This weighting scheme rests on the assumption that land near populated areas is cul-
tivated more intensively than land in remote areas. Other weighting schemes yielded
little change to the authors’ estimates of the reduced-form impact of temperature on
a number of economic outcomes (Dell et al., 2012b).
The evidence shows that higher-than-average temperature hurts crop yields under
the geographical and technical conditions of most developing countries. Controlled
agricultural experiments found that increased air temperature shortens crucial crop
growth stages, and increases evapotranspiration and water use (see, e.g. Adams et al.,
1990; Mendelsohn et al., 2000; Parry et al., 2007). Although these effects are non-
linear, most of the countries in the sample are located in the intertropical region, where
average temperature is relatively high.10 In addition, many developing countries
10Indeed, the geographical centers of 70% of the countries in the baseline sample are located in
the intertropical region, and the geographical centers of all but one of the remaining countries are
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have used relatively backward technologies in agriculture, curbing farmers’ ability to
respond effectively to climate variation.
As a result, studies linking temperature to crop yields through reduced-form spec-
ifications — which, unlike controlled experiments, allow for short-run adaptation on
the part of farmers and policy-makers — suggest a negative causal relation between
higher-than-average temperature and crop yields in developing countries. This rela-
tion is often muted or absent among developed countries (Deschenes and Greenstone,
2007; Guiteras, 2009; Dell et al., 2012a). My findings described below are in line with
this broader literature.
Furthermore, in light of the evidence above my empirical strategy explores a source
of variation in agricultural growth that resembles the effect of yield-increasing techni-
cal innovations, such as irrigation and water control, multiple cropping, high-yielding
varieties, and fertilizers. My results thus suggest the benefits that this type of tech-
nical progress can confer on industry (see section 1.7 for further discussion).
The instrumental variable estimates in this section maintain the following identi-
fying assumption:
E[i,t ln(wtem)i,s] = 0, ∀ s ≤ t (1.4)
where ln(wtem)i,s denotes the log of population-weighted temperature, and all
variables embody either the within transformation or forward orthogonal deviations.
Even though there is no question that annual variation in a country’s average
temperature is exogenous to growth in manufacturing and agriculture, one may claim
that it could affect growth in the manufacturing sector through unobserved channels
unrelated to agriculture, violating the exclusion restriction in (1.4).
located in the subtropical region (between the tropics and parallels 38 N and 38 S). See Figure A.1
in Appendix A
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In particular, controlled experiments have documented a decline in measures of
worker productivity in non-agricultural activities with high temperatures (Seppa¨nen
and Vuolle, 2000; Seppa¨nen et al., 2006). These controlled experiments find that
large increases in air temperature are required for perceptible declines in productivity
— for example, a 6oC increase in temperature from a neutrality threshold of 25oC
is required to cause a 10% decline in quantifiable measures of worker performance
(Seppa¨nen et al., 2006).
The empirical model of this paper, however, relies only on deviations of a country’s
annual temperature from its long-term average for coefficient identification. As seen
in table A.1 and figure A.1 in Appendix A, large annual swings in a country’s average
temperature are implausible. The overall within-country standard deviation is only
0.5oC, with imperceptible differences across regions. The average interquartile range,
in turn, is 0.67oC, and the average range between the maximum and the minimum
mean annual temperature recorded is 1.97oC. These figures fall to 0.55oC and 1.67oC
among the warmest countries (those with a median average temperature equal to or
greater than 25oC). Moreover, by virtue of their controlled design, studies of the effect
of temperature on worker productivity fail to account for organizational adaptations
that, over the course of a year, could offset the effects of unusually high temperatures
given a region’s historical record.
To be sure, it is possible that large but localized swings in temperature could have
perceptible effects on local non-agricultural output (see, e.g. Zivin and Neidell, 2010,
for a study using local U.S. data collected at daily frequency). But it is difficult to
claim that aggregate variation in the dataset is systematically driven by such extreme,
localized events.
Given that it is impossible to test the exclusion restriction in (1.4), the results
should be interpreted with caution. Still, in section 1.5 I present specifications that
limit the range of variation in temperature used for identification, in addition to
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specifications that control for other potential violations of (1.4). The main results are
robust to these changes in the baseline model.
1.4.1 ‘First Stage’ and Reduced Form Regressions
Columns (1)-(4) in table 1.2 examine changes in population-weighted average tem-
perature as exogenous shifters of countrywide agricultural supply. They show fixed-
effects regressions of growth in agriculture against up to three lags of the logarithm of
contemporaneous temperature (ln(wtem)i,t). Year dummies and two lags of growth
in manufacturing are also included, since they are part of the structural model of
interest.
All specifications show a negative contemporaneous effect of higher temperature
on growth in agriculture. The effect is practically large and statistically significant.
An increase in average temperature of one ’within’ standard deviation (about 0.025
log points, or 0.5o C) is predicted to cut between 0.82 and 1.17 percentage points of the
contemporaneous growth rate in agricultural value added, according to the estimates
in columns (1) and (2). This is a large short-run decline, as the unconditional mean
of agricultural growth is only 2.6%/yr.
The specifications in columns (2)-(4) add deeper lags of average temperature.
As we can see, as temperature returns to its long-run average after a shock, crop
yields tend to return to normal. This fact is shown in the positive and significant
coefficient of the second lag of temperature — i.e.: holding contemporaneous average
temperature constant, higher temperature in the previous year is expected to increase
agricultural growth in the current year. Deeper lags of average temperature are
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of a one-off temperature shock on
agricultural growth is confined to the short run.11
11Alternative specifications allowing for non-linear effects of temperature or for independent effects
of precipitation did not lead to improvements in the first-stage regressions, and often led to a decline
in the combined explanatory power of the excluded instruments.
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Table 1.2: ‘First stage’ and reduced form regressions
‘First Stage’ Regressions Reduced Form Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE OLS/FE SGMM
ln(wtem) -0.338*** -0.469*** -0.468*** -0.526** -0.234** -0.293*** -0.276***
(0.094) (0.144) (0.141) (0.210) (0.088) (0.088) (0.080)
ln(wtem)t−1 0.354** 0.317* 0.403* 0.112 0.129*
(0.165) (0.170) (0.218) (0.074) (0.076)
ln(wtem)t−2 0.151 0.116 0.085 0.139
(0.106) (0.116) (0.082) (0.091)
ln(wtem)t−3 -0.097 -0.090 -0.007 -0.008
(0.104) (0.127) (0.062) (0.059)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region-Year FE N N N Y N N N
Controls N N N N N N N
F-Stat of ln(wtem) 13.055 6.313 3.301 1.841 7.006 3.379 3.954
p-value 0.001 0.003 0.016 0.132 0.010 0.015 0.006∑
ln (temp) -0.338 -0.115 -0.096 -0.097 -0.234 -0.103 -0.016
p-value 0.001 0.166 0.265 0.412 0.010 0.402 0.332
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.017 0.024 0.025 0.036 0.054 0.085 0.118
p-value 0.550 0.423 0.417 0.243 0.337 0.063 0.037
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.065 36.065 36.032 36.032 36.145 36.113 36.113
Long-run Multiplier -0.247 -0.113 -0.018
p-value 0.011 0.402 0.331
Num. of GMM Instruments 53
Lags of GMM Instruments 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.457
Hansen test (p-value) 0.117
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable in the ”first-stage” regressions (columns 1-4) is growth in real value added in agriculture. The
dependent variable in the reduced-form regressions (columns 5-7) is growth in real value added in manufacturing. Ln(wtem)
indicates the log of population-weighted average temperature. All specifications include a set of year dummies and two lags of
growth in manufacturing. Specification (4) includes a set of region-specific dummies, where the regions are Middle-East and North
Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean; Asia and Pacific Islands. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms
of correlation within countries are in parentheses. Columns labeled ”OLS/FE” indicate the fixed-effects estimator, while columns
labeled ”SGMM” indicate the Arellano-Bover-Bond system GMM estimator (see description in the text).
These results confirm the findings in Dell et al. (2012a) regarding the effects of
average temperature on agricultural growth in poor countries.12 They also resonate
12Dell et al. (2012a) define poor countries as those whose PPP-adjusted GDP per capita is below
the sample median in the first year the country enters their dataset, which includes both developing
and developed countries.
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with the broader literature on the effects of temperature on crop yields, reviewed
above.
Columns (6)-(8) show that higher-than-average temperature hurts growth in man-
ufacturing. In fact, the reduced-form relationship between temperature and growth in
manufacturing resembles the relationship between temperature and growth in agri-
culture, as indicated by the signs of the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients.
This finding is reassuring, since reduced-form estimates are free of the bias inherent
in instrumental variable estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). More importantly, it
suggests that short-run variation in growth in agriculture is driving the reduced-form
effect of temperature on manufacturing.
1.4.2 Baseline Results
Table 1.3 presents different specifications of the empirical model in equation (2.2)
with the log of average temperature as an instrument for growth in agriculture. Col-
umn (1) displays the results of estimating a just-identified version of the model —
with no lags of growth in agriculture, and only contemporaneous temperature as an
instrument. By having as many excluded instruments as endogenous variables, this
specification is least likely to suffer from weak-instrument bias (Angrist and Pischke,
2008). It estimates a positive, large, and statistically significant effect of growth in
agriculture on contemporaneous growth in manufacturing.
Column (2) adds one lag of temperature to the instrument set.13 The estimate
remains large, but about one and a half decimal point lower than in the just-identified
model. An increase in growth in agriculture by one percentage point is now predicted
to increase contemporaneous growth in manufacturing by 0.54 percentage points —
13I estimate the overidentified models by GMM, although the results change little if two-stage
least squares are used instead.
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over five times higher than its counterpart estimated by OLS (compare it with column
1 in table 1.1).
Column (4) adds two lags of growth in agriculture, with a total of three lags of
temperature in the instrument set. The additional lags have positive coefficients,
and these are also higher than their counterparts in the models estimated by OLS.
Conditional on current agricultural growth, however, the effects of past agricultural
growth are too imprecisely estimated to be deemed individually significant. This
fact indicates that annual variation in temperature, with its strong mean-reverting
character, is best suited for identifying short-run effects of agricultural growth. Seen
from a different angle, the coefficients identified on the basis of short-run variation
in temperature do not reflect longer-term changes to the economic landscape — such
as technical change, or trade and macroeconomic policies — that could follow in the
wake of persistent changes in growth in agriculture.
As a result, even though the implied long-run multipliers in the specifications
with lagged agricultural growth are statistically significant, I adopt the short-run
coefficients of the specifications without lags (such as that in column 2), as well as
their associated long-run multipliers, as the baseline estimates. The addition of lags
of agricultural growth hardly changes these contemporaneous coefficients.
Columns (3) and (5)-(7) address two potential shortcomings of the specifications
just described. First, to address concerns with Nickell bias, columns (6) and (7) show
the same specifications as those of columns (2) and (4), but now estimated using
the Arellano-Bover-Bond procedure. As we can see, the estimated short-run effect
of growth in agriculture is about a decimal point lower (but still significant). At the
same time, growth in manufacturing exhibits more persistence, so differences in the
long-run multipliers are small.
In turn, the specifications in columns (3) and (5) are estimated by the Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) method, to address concerns with weak
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Table 1.3: Baseline estimates with temperature as instrument for agricultural growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GMM GMM LIML GMM LIML SGMM SGMM
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.) 0.684** 0.547*** 0.559*** 0.581*** 0.581*** 0.476** 0.455***
(0.280) (0.185) (0.190) (0.182) (0.185) (0.185) (0.157)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−1 0.157 0.157 0.201
(0.193) (0.200) (0.191)
∆ ln (Agr. V.A.)t−2 0.112 0.112 0.046
(0.145) (0.147) (0.166)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lags of ∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 2 2 2 2 2 2 2∑
∆ ln (Man. V.A.) 0.043 0.045 0.045 0.030 0.030 0.102 0.089
p-value 0.423 0.399 0.394 0.629 0.631 0.050 0.274
Long-run Multiplier 0.714 0.573 0.586 0.876 0.876 0.530 0.771
p-value 0.015 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.036
Lags of ln(temperature) 0 1 1 3 3 1 3
Anderson-Rubin Stat 7.127 14.457 14.457 14.060 14.060
p-value 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.007
Stock-Wright Stat 6.354 10.078 10.078 10.150 10.150
p-value 0.012 0.006 0.006 0.038 0.038
Kleibergen-Paap Stat. 13.062 6.316 6.316 2.388 2.388
Cragg-Donald Stat 14.489 14.131 14.131 6.678 6.678
10% Max Size Crit. Val. 16.380 19.930 8.680 n/a n/a
15% Max Size Crit. Val. 8.960 11.590 5.330 n/a n/a
Hansen test (p-value) 0.479 0.481 0.998 0.998 0.444 0.253
Num. of GMM Instruments 51 53
Lags of GMM Instruments 2 2
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.636 0.564
Countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 62
Avg. Obs. per Country 36.048 36.048 36.048 35.919 35.919 36.048 35.919
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is growth in real value added in the manufacturing sector. Standard errors robust to arbitrary forms
of correlation within countries are in parentheses. Columns labeled ’GMM’ indicate that the GMM method was used for estimating
the models with more instruments than endogenous variables. Columns labeled ’LIML’ indicate that the Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood method was used instead. Columns labeled ’SGMM’ indicate the use of the Arellano-Bover-Bond system
GMM method (for a description, see the text). The Stock-Yogo critical values for maximal size distortion were computed for the
Cragg-Donald F statistic, which assumes i.i.d. disturbances. They were reported only when available.
instrument bias. These estimates are close to those obtained in columns (2) and (4),
providing clear evidence against bias. Simulations show that LIML brings significant
improvements in median bias relative to standard standard methods in finite samples
with multiple weak instruments. As instrument strength improves, the difference in
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median estimates between LIML and standard methods declines, indicating a decline
in median bias in the latter (Flores-Lagunes, 2007).
Formal tests of weak identification confirm these findings. These testing proce-
dures, originated by Anderson and Rubin (1949), are based on the joint significance
of the external instruments in reduced-form regressions like those of table 1.2.14 Table
1.3 reports an Anderson-Rubin Wald statistic that is robust to autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity, as well as a closely related LM statistic proposed by Stock and
Wright (2000). As we can see, both statistics lead us to reject the null hypothesis of
weak identification in all specifications.
The LIML method also improves inference in the presence of weak instruments
by reducing size distortions (Stock and Yogo, 2005). To illustrate this property, table
1.3 reports the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic, which is based on the joint significance
of the excluded instruments in explaining the endogenous regressors. The computed
values should be measured against the critical values obtained by Stock and Yogo
(2005), which indicate cutoffs for maximum levels of size distortion. These critical
values were reported only when available. Both the Cragg-Donald statistic and the
critical values, however, assume i.i.d. disturbances.15 A comparison of columns (3)
and (2) reveals lower critical values for the model estimated by LIML, indicating
that, given the strength of the instruments, LIML suffers less size distortion than the
standard GMM estimator.
In sum, the instrumental variable estimates reveal a large and statistically signifi-
cant short-run effect of growth in agriculture on growth in manufacturing. If we take
14If the exclusion restriction is valid, the reduced-form coefficients can be considered a function
of both of the effect of growth in agriculture on growth in manufacturing (i.e. the coefficients of the
structural equation of interest) and of the effect of temperature on growth in agriculture (i.e. the
coefficients on the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression). A weak first-stage relation
would thus lead to insignificant coefficients in the reduced-form regression (for more details, see
Baum et al., 2007).
15I also report the closely related Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic, which is robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation, but without accompanying critical values.
29
the parsimonious LIML and system GMM estimates in columns (3) and (6) as the
baseline, an increase in growth in agriculture by one percentage point is expected to
raise contemporaneous growth in manufacturing by between 0.47 and 0.56 percentage
points.
The calculated long-run multipliers are also statistically significant and of similar
magnitude (0.53 and 0.58). They suggest that if the average country in the sample
were to permanently increase the rate of growth in agriculture by 1.8 percentage
points (reaching the same rate exhibited by China during the sample period), the
predicted long-run increase in growth in manufacturing would range between 0.95
and 1 percentage point. Such a sustained effort to raise growth in agriculture would
be a remarkable achievement, as the sample mean of growth in agriculture, as seen
in section 1.3, is only 2.6%/yr. Even though the long-run multipliers should be
interpreted with caution — as they were estimated on the basis of short-run variation
in the instrument —, they suggest that the payoff of sustained increases in agricultural
growth would be substantial.
1.5 Interactions and Robustness Checks
This section tests whether the results are robust to cross-country heterogeneity,
non-macroeconomic effects of growth in agriculture, changes in the sample, and the
influence of outliers. It also provides further discussion on the validity of the exclusion
restriction in (1.4).
The sample used in this paper includes only developing countries, as opposed to
the related studies of Dell et al. (2012a) and Shifa (2015). Yet growth in agriculture
may affect the manufacturing sector differently depending on country characteristics
such as the share of agriculture in GDP, or the degree of openness to trade. In table
1.4, I explore potential sources of heterogeneity in two ways.
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First, I estimate the baseline specification (including only contemporaneous growth
in agriculture) with a full set of year dummies interacted with quartile rank dummies.
Each quartile rank dummy indicates whether, at the time it entered the sample, a
country belonged to that quartile of the distribution of a given characteristic of inter-
est. The characteristics include PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, the share of agricul-
ture in GDP, the share of imports and exports in GDP, and the share of agricultural
exports in GDP (for detailed sources and definitions, see table B.1 in Appendix B).
These year-rank interactions absorb variation across countries belonging to differ-
ent quartiles; as a result, the coefficients are estimated only on the basis of variation
within each quartile. In other words, only similar countries (in terms of initial condi-
tions) provide a yardstick to evaluate the effect of agricultural growth in each country.
Columns (1)-(4) show that little is changed by adding year-rank interactions to the
baseline LIML specification.16 The only noticeable change occurs when the charac-
teristic of interest is the share of agricultural exports in GDP, leading to an increase
in the point estimate to 0.62.
Second, I add the interaction between growth in agriculture and a dummy indi-
cating whether, at the time it entered the sample, a country was above the median
in the distribution of each of the characteristics above. Columns (5)-(8) show the
results (’poor’ indicates a below-median initial GDP per capita).17 As we can see,
the interaction terms are too imprecisely estimated to be statistically significant. Col-
umn (6) suggests a stronger effect of agricultural growth in countries with a higher
share of agriculture in GDP. In turn, columns (7) and (8) suggest a weaker effect in
countries that are more open, or more oriented towards primary exports. One could
16Due to the limited number of countries, it is not possible to repeat this exercise with the Arellano-
Bover-Bond system GMM estimator, as the total number of instruments far exceeds the number of
cross-sectional units (Roodman, 2009).
17To estimate these specifications, I used the fitted values of a first-stage regression as the instru-
ment for growth in agriculture (for a discussion, see Wooldridge, 2010).
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find justification for these differentials in the theoretical literature: as discussed in
section 1.2, demand-side complementarity between agriculture and industry hinges
on the response of intersectoral relative prices to increases in agricultural output. In
small economies, greater openness to trade may link many domestic relative prices
to their counterparts in world markets, thereby narrowing the scope for demand-side
complementarity. But the available data warrants no firm inference in this respect.
Table 1.5 shows the remaining robustness checks, with LIML estimates in the top
panel, and Arellano-Bover-Bond estimates in the second panel. Column (1) repro-
duces the baseline specification for ease of comparison.
I first examine two potential violations of the exclusion restriction. The first are
the political effects of climate variation. An influential literature has shown that
climate shocks increase the likelihood of civil unrest and regime changes, especially
in least developed countries (Miguel et al., 2004; Hidalgo et al., 2010; Bru¨ckner and
Ciccone, 2011). These forms of conflict emerge because climate shocks hurt crop
yields and rural livelihoods, so they are not independent of agricultural growth. But
the accompanying unrest may confound the more strictly macroeconomic effects that
motivate this paper.
To address the problem, in column (2) I extend the baseline specification by
adding up to two lags of an indicator of civil conflict of any type and extent; it is
based on Marshall (2013), who codes the severity of episodes of civil violence, civil
war, ethnic violence and ethnic war. The coefficients on the conflict dummies are
negative and statistically significant, but column (2) shows that the coefficient on
agricultural growth remains similar to the baseline levels.
The second potential violation is the effect of variation in temperature on energy
markets: the same climate phenomena causing fluctuations in temperature may be
causing fluctuations in precipitation. In countries that rely on hydropower production,
higher temperature may hurt manufacturing growth by driving up energy prices, quite
33
apart from its effect on agriculture. In column (3), I control for the growth rate of
national hydropower production, again without substantial changes to the coefficients
of interest (see table B.1 for variable definitions).18
The specifications in columns (4) and (5), in turn, limit the variation in temper-
ature used for identification, in an attempt to curb possible direct effects of large
temperature swings on the manufacturing sector (see the discussion in section 1.4).
The estimates in column (4) exclude countries with an interquartile range in average
temperature above above the 90th percentile (about 1.06oC). In turn, the estimates
in column (5) exclude observations with average temperature above the 95th country-
specific percentile, or bellow the 5th country-specific percentile. As we can see, with
the exception of the LIML estimate in column (5), which is a decimal below the
baseline level, the point estimates change little.
The specifications in columns (6) and (7) examine the sensitivity of the results
to influential observations. The specification in column (6) excludes the observations
whose residuals (obtained from the baseline specification) are in the top or bottom
percentiles. In turn, the estimates in column (7) are obtained with a Winsorized
(at 1%) dependent variable. As expected, these procedures reduce the influence of
outliers and lead to an overall reduction of about a decimal point in the estimates.
In the models estimated by LIML, however, the decline in the short-run coefficients
is partly compensated by higher persistence of growth in manufacturing, leading to
only modest changes in the long-run multipliers. The largest reduction occurred in the
specification with excluded outliers estimated by the Arellano-Bover-Bond procedure,
with the contemporaneous effect dropping to 0.28.
These results suggest that, to some extent, the baseline estimates are sensitive
to influential observations, and columns (6) and (7) thus provide more conservative
18This conclusion holds if up to two lags of the level of hydropower production are used instead
of its growth rate.
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estimates of the average impact of growth in agriculture. In all cases, however, the
estimates remained practically large and statistically significant.19
1.6 Potential Mechanisms
In section 1.2, I discussed several channels through which the agricultural sector
could relieve macroeconomic constraints on industrial growth, namely saving, de-
mand, foreign exchange, and fiscal constraints. In this section, I provide suggestive
evidence on the impact of growth in agriculture — still instrumented by temperature
— on proximate measures of these channels. I therefore replace other outcomes of
interest for industrial growth in the empirical model in (2.2).
I estimate all specifications by system GMM using the Arellano-Bover-Bond mo-
ment conditions, including four lags of the dependent variable in the case of variables
defined as ratios, and two lags in the case of variables defined as growth rates.20 With
one exception, I add no other controls, so as not to restrict the channels through which
growth in agriculture can affect the outcome variables. 21 For detailed variable defi-
nitions, see table B.1 in Appendix B.
Table 1.6 summarizes the results. Column (1) shows that a one-off increase in
agricultural growth leads to a decline in the terms of trade between agriculture and
the total economy. As described in section 1.2, a reduction in the intersectoral terms
19The set of countries with at least one excluded observation in column (6) includes 25 countries, 15
of which are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. But no country has more than 3 excluded observations.
It must be noted that, even though the results are sensitive to the excluded observations, no a priori
reason exists to believe that the information these observations convey is less legitimate than that
of the remaining ones.
20I also report a single-tailed test of the hypothesis that the sum of lagged coefficients is less than
one, to address concerns with the stationarity of the variables in ratios.
21The exception is the model with the terms of trade between agriculture and the total economy
as a dependent variable. That model controls for up to two lags of real GDP growth, so the
counterfactual is characterized by a given rate of GDP growth. All else equal, higher growth in the
non-agricultural sector would be expected to turn the terms of trade in favor of agriculture under
imperfect tradability (see, e.g. Ros, 2001, chapter 3).
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of trade indicates that higher growth in agriculture can serve as an autonomous
source of demand for industrial goods (for example, by lowering the cost to workers
of meeting their inelastic demand for food, and thus liberating income to be spent on
industrial goods).
Columns (2) and (3) show that higher growth in agriculture raises the shares of
gross capital formation and gross domestic saving in GDP. These results indicate that
higher resource utilization in industry not only lead to higher output, but also induce
firms to step up the rate of accumulation.
Column (4), in turn, shows that higher growth in agriculture raises the growth
rate of real GDP per worker. These short-run effects are unlikely to reflect technical
change, but rather a higher utilization of labor within sectors, on the one hand, and
the reallocation of workers to sectors with higher value added per worker. This finding
suggests that underemployment is pervasive in developing countries, as higher yields
in agriculture are likely to raise labor requirements in a sector generally characterized
by low value added per worker.
Columns (5) and (6) show that higher growth in agriculture raises the growth rate
of agricultural exports, and lowers the share of food in total merchandise imports.
Both effects indicate that agricultural development can raise a country’s capacity to
import industrial inputs, easing potential foreign exchange constraints on industrial
accumulation. Column (7) also suggests that higher growth in agriculture raises the
share of merchandise trade in GDP, but the effect is imprecisely estimated.
Finally, column (8) shows that higher growth in agriculture has no impact on the
share of trade tax revenues in GDP, indicating that, as agricultural growth accelerates,
trade tax revenues increase on a par with GDP. As described in section 1.2, indirect
instruments such as trade tariffs and quotas have commonly allowed agriculture to
ease fiscal constraints on the state.
37
In general, the coefficients suggest that large shocks to growth in agriculture are
required to produce noticeable effects on most of these outcome variables. Large
short-run shocks, however, are empirically plausible, given the within-country volatil-
ity exhibited by agricultural growth. For example, an increase in agricultural growth
by one ‘within’ standard deviation (8.5 percentage points) is expected to contempo-
raneously lower the sector’s domestic terms of trade by 5.8%, raise the share of gross
capital formation in GDP by 1.82 percentage points, and lower the share of food in
merchandise imports by one percentage point.
This section suggests that the theoretical literature has emphasized plausible chan-
nels of complementarity between agriculture and industry. At the same time, however,
the regressions above do not isolate the contribution of each mechanism, nor do they
identify the constraints on industrial growth experienced by specific country groups
at specific times.22 In particular, the estimates may also reflect short-run changes in
other macroeconomic variables that are responsive to growth in agriculture. With
these caveats in mind, it is reassuring to find that growth in agriculture improves
indicators of different constraints that could bind industrial growth.
1.7 Conclusion
Development economists have long examined macroeconomic channels through
which development in agriculture can support the expansion of high-productivity ac-
tivities, particularly in manufacturing. The complementarity between the two sectors
has also been a centerpiece of historical studies of industrialization. Efforts to iden-
tify causal effects using country-level datasets, on the other hand, are comparatively
recent. This paper makes a contribution to this literature.
22Still, one may speculate that the short-run impact of growth in agriculture operates primarily
through the demand channel, with higher industrial growth reflecting greater utilization of produc-
tive capacity. The reason is that foreign exchange constraints do not actuate at the level of individual
firms and, along with fiscal constraints, they require a policy response before becoming effective.
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Using population-weighted average temperature as an instrumental variable, my
baseline estimates show that an increase in annual growth in agriculture by one per-
centage point is estimated to raise contemporaneous growth in manufacturing by
between 0.47 and 0.56 percentage point in the baseline specifications, and between
0.28 and 0.47 percentage point in conservative specifications that limit influential
observations.
Baseline estimates of the long-run effects of a permanent increase in agricultural
growth are also large (between 0.53 and 0.58 percentage points) although, as argued
above, the frequency of variation in the instrument is better suited to capture short-
run effects.
As discussed in section 1.4, several studies have established the sensitivity of crop
yields to temperature variation under the technical and geographical conditions of
most developing countries. My empirical strategy therefore explores a source of vari-
ation in agricultural output that is similar to yield-increasing technical innovations,
such as irrigation and water control, multiple cropping, high-yielding varieties, and
fertilizers.
As such, this paper contributes to the debate on whether this type of technical
change in agriculture promotes industrialization. As described in section 1.2, an influ-
ential strand of the literature has argued that yield-increasing innovations may hurt
the industrial sector in small open economies by increasing labor absorption in agri-
culture and bidding up unit labor costs in industry (Matsuyama, 1992; Bustos et al.,
2012). My findings suggest that the underlying assumptions required to generate
these negative effects, such as full employment and perfect international tradability
in both sectors, are unlikely to hold in most developing countries in the short to
medium run.
On the contrary, my findings support the strands of the literature which emphasize
agriculture’s classic roles as a source of saving, foreign exchange, fiscal revenues, and a
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home market for industry. Extensions of the basic empirical model indeed showed that
growth in agriculture favorably affects indicators of these channels of complementarity
.
The paper also suggests large benefits of reducing output volatility in agriculture
— a characteristic of many developing countries, as seen in section 1.3. Technical
progress can indeed be doubly beneficial: it can raise average growth in agriculture
while reducing the sector’s vulnerability to weather shocks.
In light of these findings, one can better appraise historical narratives that em-
phasize the contribution of yield-increasing innovations to the early industrialization
of Japan and East Asia (see, e.g. Smith, 1959; Ishikawa, 1967; Amsden, 1979; Kay,
2001). Many of these innovations later spread to other countries in the region as
part of the ‘green revolution’ and, according to some, they currently appear poised to
transform agriculture in a set of developing countries in Africa (Larson et al., 2010).
This paper suggests that the potential benefits of combining yield-increasing technical
progress in agriculture with other industrial policies can be substantial (see Rao and
Caballero, 1990, for further discussion of such policy combinations).
But two caveats related to the role of agriculture in long-term development pro-
cesses are in order. First, as mentioned in section 1.2, once sustained industrial growth
is underway, the emergence of labor shortages will eventually require that technical
change in agriculture have a labor-saving bias. The effects of this pattern of technical
change, however, are not analyzed in this paper.
Second, even though agricultural exports can relax foreign exchange constraints on
industrial accumulation, primary export booms often stifle the long-run development
of industry by causing real exchange overvaluation and the associated ‘Dutch disease’
(Krugman, 1987; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). Moreover, excessive reliance on
primary exports may render an economy vulnerable to external terms of trade shocks
(Deaton, 1999; Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001). Again, complementary macroeco-
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nomic and sectoral policies are needed to mitigate these problems and promote the
diversification of exports.
This paper does not speak directly to these long-run issues. Despite its dynamic
structure, the empirical model uses short-run variation in the instrument to estimate
the coefficients. It therefore does not account for changes in the sectoral composition
of employment, for the effects of long-lasting booms in primary exports, or for other
long-run systemic changes that can shape the relationship between agriculture and
industry.
Finally, the increases in agricultural yields used in the empirical model were gener-
ated by a bounty of nature. In reality, however, technical change is not free: it requires
credit, research and extension services, and rural infrastructure. Due to well-known
market failures, the state has played a crucial role in the provision of these inputs
(de Janvry and Dethier, 1985). The state’s fiscal resources have alternative uses in
the non-agricultural sector which have to be weighed against the benefits of using
them to promote agricultural development.
In other words, agricultural development is one ingredient among a set of policies
to foster industrialization, and its role is likely to change as industrialization advances.
A judicious examination of agricultural development as part of country-specific in-
dustrial policies is an exciting topic for further research.
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CHAPTER 2
BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE IN AGRICULTURE
AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH
2.1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies using data from developing countries have suggested that
growth in agriculture can promote growth in urban activities, notably industry. A
strand of this literature has used climate variables — such as temperature or rainfall
— to identify this positive causal effect (see, e.g. Henderson et al., 2009; Shifa, 2015;
de Souza, 2015). These studies confirm previous findings obtained from time series
techniques (Kanwar, 2000; Chebbi and Lachaal, 2007; Tiffin and Irz, 2006). Together,
these results lend support to the notion that technical progress in agriculture can
contribute to the structural transformation of countries of incipient industrialization.
But in agriculture, perhaps more than anywhere else, technical progress has quite
asymmetrical effects on the relative productivity of the sector’s basic factors of pro-
duction, land and labor. This strong factor-saving bias stems from the nature of
most agricultural innovations. On the one hand, labor-saving innovations — often
embodied in tractors — help to perform tasks that are labor-intensive, such as sow-
ing, weeding, harvesting, and threshing. But they typically have little impact on land
yields. On the other hand, land-saving innovations — such as multiple cropping,
high-yielding varieties, irrigation, and fertilizers — raise land yields, but typically
have little aggregate impact on labor productivity.
Too often, however, calls for agricultural modernization downplay the conse-
quences of the different factor-saving biases of agricultural innovations (see, e.g. World
43
Bank, 2007). This omission is not inconsequential. Indeed, labor-saving innovations
seldom raise output, but often reduce labor demand in agriculture (see, e.g. Bin-
swanger, 1978, 1986; Agarwal, 1980b,a; Ali and Parikh, 1992, for empirical evidence).
By contrast, land-saving innovations normally raise both output and labor demand,
as evidenced by record of the ‘green revolution’ (Johnston and Cownie, 1969; Ruttan,
1977; Otsuka et al., 1994; Hossain et al., 2006). These asymmetrical effects bear wit-
ness to two technical features of agriculture in developing countries: the low elasticity
of substitution between land and labor, and the primacy of the stock of effective land
in determining the level of output (Ishikawa, 1967; Boyce, 1986b; Banerjee, 2010).
It is therefore encouraging that a recent contribution has examined how biased
technical change in agriculture affects growth in the industrial sector. In a model
embodying the two technical features above, Bustos et al. (2012) extended the in-
fluential analysis of Matsuyama (1992) to account for biased innovations. Like their
predecessor, Bustos et al. (2012) assumed a small open economy characterized by
perfect tradability in both sectors, competitive labor markets, and full employment.
Not surprisingly, in this context land-saving innovations raise labor demand in agri-
culture and bid up industrial wages, reducing industrial employment and output. By
contrast, labor-saving innovations lower labor demand in agriculture, and the com-
petitive labor market ensures that the displaced workers are taken up by industry.
Bustos et al. (2012) find empirical support for these predictions using municipal-level
data for Brazil.
The theoretical and local-level empirical results of Bustos et al. (2012), however,
are in conflict with the aforementioned studies that have used national-level measures
of climate variables to identify exogenous increases in agricultural supply (in partic-
ular, Shifa, 2015; de Souza, 2015).1 As it turns out, these studies have explored a
1See also Dell et al. (2012a) for reduced-form evidence of the macroeconomic impact of climate
variables on growth.
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source of variation in the data that resembles the medium-run effects of land-saving
(and thus labor-absorbing) innovations. Indeed, controlled experiments and reduced-
form estimates show that, under the technical and geographical conditions of most
developing countries, annual fluctuations in climate variables affect growth in agri-
cultural output precisely by affecting land yields (Adams et al., 1990; Mendelsohn
et al., 2000; Parry et al., 2007; Dell et al., 2013). And contrary to what the model
in Bustos et al. (2012) would predict, at the aggregate level higher land yields do
increase industrial growth.
These results show that the two main assumptions required to generate a trade-
off between employment creation in agriculture and industrial growth — namely, full
employment and perfect international tradability in both sectors — are unlikely to
hold in most developing countries. This paper presents an alternative medium-run
growth model that eschews these two main assumptions. Instead of full employment
and competitive labor markets, the model assumes the existence of hidden unemploy-
ment in rural areas; and instead of full international tradability, the model assumes
that the domestic terms of trade between agriculture and industry respond to the
level and composition of domestic demand.
The baseline specification assumes that accumulation in the industrial sector is
constrained by aggregate demand. It provides the main result of the paper: land-
saving technical change will promote industrial accumulation by raising the incomes
of rural workers and enlarging the domestic market for manufactures. As a result of
hidden unemployment, industrial growth accelerates even as agriculture absorbs more
labor. By contrast, labor-saving innovations may aggravate the problem of hidden
unemployment, bid down rural wages, and narrow the domestic market for industrial
goods. This outcome is more likely if agriculture possesses a dual structure whereby
a class of smallholding peasants and landless workers provides labor to a class of large
landowners.
45
The baseline specification thus has affinities with post-Keynesian and Structural-
ist two-sector models in which industrial accumulation is constrained by aggregate
demand (see, e.g. Taylor, 1982, 1983; Dutt, 1992; Rao, 1993; Skott, 1999; Rada, 2007).
But the paper complements this literature in four main ways. First, it explicitly fo-
cuses on factor-saving biases in technical change in agriculture. Second, in addition
to a demand-constrained growth regime, it also examines saving-constrained growth
regimes in a unified framework. Not surprisingly, the main conclusions change ac-
cording to the regime. Third, the model examines how agrarian class structure shapes
the impact of technical change on rural incomes, and thus on aggregate demand for
industry. And, fourth, unlike most of the literature, the model focuses on medium-run
warranted growth paths where capacity utilization is at the level desired by firms. To
do so, it extends the Harrodian model of Nakatani and Skott (2007) to a two-sector
framework.
The focus on modeling medium-run growth accelerations is justified by the em-
pirical studies that, as just described, used climate variables to identify the impact
of growth in agriculture on industry. Indeed, despite estimating dynamic empirical
models, these contributions used annual variation in climate variables. As a result,
the estimated coefficients did not account for long-run systemic changes — such as
the emergence of labor constraints — that can modify the relationship between tech-
nical change in agriculture and industrial growth. In accordance with this focus on
explaining medium run growth accelerations, the model’s long-run properties are kept
at maximum simplicity (see sections 2.2.5 and 2.4 for further discussion).
The paper closes with an open-economy extension characterized by full tradability
in both sectors — as in Matsuyama (1992) and Bustos et al. (2012) —, but without full
employment. This extension shows that, even without demand-side complementarity,
land-saving technical change in agriculture can still allow for greater accumulation in
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industry by relaxing the foreign exchange constraints that often beset semi-industrial
economies.
The paper thus provides plausible explanations for the empirical findings of com-
plementarity between increases in agricultural land yields and growth accelerations
in the industrial sector. Specifically, these empirical findings indicate that, in the
average developing country, the industrial sector can benefit from a relaxation of de-
mand constraints and foreign exchange constraints on accumulation. As classically
proposed by Johnston and Mellor (1961), agriculture can play a role in relaxing these
constraints.
In addition to illuminating empirical findings for large panels of countries, the
paper also illuminates growth accelerations that followed in the wake of well-known
spells of land-saving technical change in agriculture. For example, studies of the
early industrialization of Japan point to the importance of irrigation and multiple
cropping in mobilizing rural surplus labor, fostering a home market for manufactures,
and generating a surplus liable to be appropriated by direct or indirect taxation
(Smith, 1959; Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1960; Ishikawa, 1967; Kay, 2001; Karshenas,
2004). In the post-war period, South Korea and Taiwan displayed a similar pattern
of technical change and intersectoral resource flows (Lee, 1971; Amsden, 1979). After
the spread of the green revolution in the 1960s and 1970s, land-saving innovations
that raised output and created rural employment were also documented in areas
of India, the Phillippines, and Thailand (Hossain, 1988; Bantilan and Deb, 2003;
Estudillo and Otsuka, 2006). Recently, authors have suggested their potential for
aiding development in Africa (Larson et al., 2010).
These experiences contrast with the post-war industrialization of some Latin
American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, where technical change in agri-
culture exhibited a marked labor-saving bias (De Janvry, 1978; Sanders and Ruttan,
1978; Santos, 1986). This bias aggravated the problem of underemployment in rural
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and urban areas and narrowed the domestic market for manufactures. As a result,
some have argued that it contributed to prematurely steering industrialization to-
wards satisfying the demand of the upper brackets of income distribution (de Castro,
1975).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a
medium-run model of warranted growth that encompasses both demand-constrained
and saving-constrained regimes. The impacts of land-saving and labor-saving techni-
cal change in agriculture are examined in each regime. Section 2.3 presents the open
economy version of the model mentioned above. Section 2.4 concludes the paper,
and Appendices C and D present proofs of the main propositions and the short-run
dynamics of the model.
2.2 A Medium Run Growth Model
2.2.1 Production and Wages
As discussed in section 2.1, agricultural technology is unique in that, first, there are
scarce possibilities for substitution of labor for land and, second, packages of capital
and intermediate inputs are typically adept at raising the productivity of only one of
these primary factors. To capture these characteristics with maximum simplicity, a
Leontieff function represents production in agriculture, and exogenous changes to the
each production coefficient represent biased innovations.
A = Min(σa, qala) (2.1)
where σa and qa are exogenous output-land and output-labor coefficients. I nor-
malize the total land stock and the total labor force to unity, so that la is the share
of the labor force that is employed by agriculture on a full time basis.
The stock of effective land is the binding constraint on agricultural output:
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A = σa → la = σa
qa
(2.2)
With hidden unemployment, la is in general less than the total rural labor force
(i.e.: la < 1− lm, where lm is the employment share of the industrial sector).
The product wage in agriculture (the real wage in agriculture in terms of the
agricultural good) is proportional to the average output in the sector.
ωa = β
σa
1− lm (2.3)
where ωa is the product wage in agriculture, 0 < lm < 1 is the share of workers
employed in the industrial sector, and 0 < β < 1. This specification embodies the
notion that agriculture is a traditional sector: work and income sharing institutions
permit workers not employed by industry to obtain a share in the sectoral product
(Lewis, 1954; Cohen and Weitzman, 1975; Rao, 1994). In all scenarios discussed
below, labor incomes in agriculture are high enough to allow for the consumption of
industrial goods.
With this specification, it is easy to model how class structure shapes the impact
of technical change on rural wages. Consider two polar scenarios. In the first, large
surplus-extracting farms coexist with a smallholding subsector. This dual scenario is
a stylized representation of many Latin American countries, especially during their
post-war industrialization (see, e.g. Garc´ıa, 1966; Barraclough and Domike, 1966;
Dillman, 1976). The two subsectors produce the same good, and the smallholders
generate a marketed surplus beyond subsistence. The parameter σa thus represents
a weighted average of the land productivities in each subsector. In turn, β is the
share of labor incomes in total output — a distributional parameter which responds
to technical change in the manner described momentarily. Rentiers save all of their
income, and workers — both wage workers and smallholders — consume all of theirs.
The propensity to save out of total rural income is thus 1− β.
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In the second scenario, agriculture is comprised of a homogeneous class of owner-
cultivators. It is a stylized representation of most East Asian countries, again espe-
cially during their post-war industrialization (Lee, 1971; Amsden, 1979; Lee, 1979).
Now the product wage is simply the average income set aside for consumption; and,
as in the dual case, 1-β can be regarded as the sector-wide propensity to save.
In both scenarios, the behavioral propensities to save are constant. As a result,
technical change only affects β through income redistribution, and income redistri-
bution is only possible in the dual scenario. Labor-saving and land-saving technical
change will affect β in the manner specified below:
dβ
dqa
qa
β
=

−φ (dual scenario)
0 (owner-cultivator scenario)
dβ
dσa
σa
β
=

θ (dual scenario)
0 (owner-cultivator scenario)
(2.4)
where θ and φ are the absolute values of the elasticities of β with respect to
proportional changes in σa and qa. They are functions of parameters and other
variables of the model, but under general conditions, φ > 0 and θ > 0 (see below).
Purely labor-saving technical change leaves average incomes unaltered in the
owner-cultivator scenario — the same number of workers will simply share a lower
work requirement. By contrast, it increases the rentier share of total income in the
dual scenario. The reason is that wages in surplus-extracting farms are tied to aver-
age earnings in the smallholdings. When surplus-extracting farms adopt labor-saving
innovations, the newly redundant workers are pushed to the smallholdings, lowering
average earnings therein and, therefore, the average product wage in agriculture. This
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fall is captured by a decline in the share of total output appropriated by workers, β.
Section C.1 in Appendix C formally illustrates this point.2
Land-saving technical change, by contrast, raises the total work requirement in
both scenarios. For as long as underemployment exists (i.e. la < 1−lm), the additional
requirement will be met from within agriculture. In the owner-cultivator scenario,
workers enjoy a higher average income in terms of the agricultural good, but since
the behavioral propensity to save is assumed constant, β does not change.
In the dual scenario, uniform land-saving technical change raises wages in two
ways: first, by increasing output in the smallholding subsector and, second, by re-
ducing the amount of underemployment.3 The sector-wide wage share, β, rises if
the proportional increase in average income in the smallholding subsector dominates
the proportional increase in the sector-wide average income. This requirement will
be met under general conditions: the surplus-extracting subsector only needs to be
above a minimum size. Again, section C.1 in Appendix C formally illustrates these
points.
A Leontieff function also describes production in the industrial sector, with the
stock of utilized capital as the binding constraint on output.
M = σmKm → lm = σm
qm
Km (2.5)
where M is industrial output, Km is the (non-depreciating) industrial capital
stock, 0 < lm < 1 is the share of the labor force employed in industry, σm is the
output-capital ratio, and qm is the output-labor ratio in industry.
2I assume that changes in the technical parameters of production in the dual scenario reflect
uniform changes taking place in both subsectors. As discussed in section C.1 in Appendix C,
the substantive results don’t change if the aggregate changes are assumed to only reflect changes
occurring in the surplus-extracting subsector.
3If land-saving technical change only takes place in the surplus-extracting subsector, only the
second effect occurs.
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The model yields a positive, but not necessarily constant wage premium between
agriculture and industry. As long as wages in industry are not lower than consumption
wages in agriculture, the participation constraint of industrial workers will be met:
wm ≥ ωapa (2.6)
where wm is the nominal wage in industry. Like rural rentiers, industrial capitalists
save all of their income; by contrast, industrial workers consume all of theirs.
2.2.2 Wage Bargaining in Industry
Wage bargaining shapes the relationship between fluctuations in aggregate de-
mand and changes in functional distribution in the industrial sector, giving rise to
demand-constrained and saving-constrained growth regimes. As in the classic ex-
position of Marglin (1984), industrial workers bargain over nominal wages with a
distributional norm as reference. Since labor productivity is a fixed parameter, it is
a matter of indifference whether we express this distributional norm as a reference
wage share or as a reference real product wage.
Unlike in Marglin (1984), however, bargaining is decentralized. In other words,
workers expect to achieve a target product wage, but the actual product wage will
also depend on the realized price level of the manufactured good, known only ex post.
Therefore, the best workers can do is factor their expectations into their nominal
demands. These assumptions imply the following expression for the rate of growth of
nominal wages:
wˆm = B
(
wm
pm
)−1 [(
wm
pm
)∗
− wm
pm
]
+ pˆem (2.7)
where B > 0 is a constant, (wm/pm)
∗
is the reference product wage, wˆm is the rate
of growth of the nominal industrial wage, and pˆem is the expected rate of inflation
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of the industrial price. Subtracting the actual rate of industrial price inflation (pˆm)
from both sides gives:
ŵm
pm
= B
[(
wm
pm
)∗
− wm
pm
]
+
wm
pm
(pˆem − pˆm) (2.8)
With constant labor productivity, a stationary distribution of income in the indus-
trial sector requires a stationary product wage. Imposing ŵm
pm
= 0 above and solving
for the rate of price inflation gives
pˆm = pˆem −B +B
[
(1− pi∗)
(1− pi)
]
(2.9)
where pi is the industrial profit share, which is uniquely related to the product
wage through wm/pm = (1− pi)qm.
For a given rate of expected inflation, equation (2.9) gives a schedule of actual
rates of inflation and actual profit shares along which the real wage is stationary. I
call it the wage bargaining equilibrium (WBE) schedule.
If the actual profit share exceeds the norm, wage bargaining equilibrium requires
that workers fail to fully anticipate the rate of price inflation (i..e pˆm > pˆem ). Changes
in unanticipated inflation are therefore the mechanism through which changes in the
industrial profit share can occur.
Seen from a different angle, a macroeconomic equilibrium requiring pi > pi∗ can
only be sustained if inflation expectations are repeatedly frustrated. But if inflation
exceeds expectations period after period, shouldn’t workers update their nominal
demands? A way out of this conundrum was classically proposed by Rowthorn (1977):
workers are unlikely to fully incorporate their expectations into the bargaining process
unless actual inflation is high.
Thus, if prices are growing slowly, workers find the costs of acting upon their expec-
tations — e.g.: collective action problems, contentious negotiations with management—
too large relative to the benefits. In Rowthorn’s terminology, low inflation may be
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expected (correctly held as a belief), but not anticipated (incorporated into the bar-
gaining process).
If prices are rising fast, however, the cost of not acting upon expectations is
too high. Workers will push harder to incorporate expectations into the bargaining
process, for example by requiring shorter contracts or provisions for wage indexation.
In light of the experience of advanced economies in the 1970s, Rowthorn (1977)
posited that the transition to this behavior is likely to happen quickly as inflation
exceeds a threshold beyond which it is deemed to be high.
To introduce Rowthorn’s ideas into the bargaining framework above, re-write the
WBE schedule (equation 2.9) as
ŵm
pm
= 0⇔

pˆm = pˆem −B +B
[
(1−pi∗)
(1−pi)
]
, if pˆm < pˆ∗m
pˆm = pˆem , if pˆm ≥ pˆ∗m
(2.10)
The WBE schedule can be depicted in the (pˆm, pi) space as a discontinuous function
with a threshold at pˆ∗m. For a given rate of anticipated inflation (pˆ
e
m), actual inflation
can act as a redistributive mechanism, being positively associated with a higher profit
share in industry. But only if it remains below the threshold pˆ∗m. Beyond that point,
inflation is fully anticipated in bargaining, losing its ability to redistribute income —
and the profit share is pinned down at pi∗.
2.2.3 Warranted Growth
Industrial firms operate in imperfect competition and make production decisions
on the basis of conjectured individual demand curves, which may or may not ma-
terialize. They regard excess capacity as instrumental to their profit-maximizing
strategies, as it grants them flexibility to respond to short-term demand fluctuations
when expanding output is costly and time-consuming.
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I assume that firms have a well-defined desired rate of capacity utilization. Too
little utilized capacity gives ample flexibility to respond to unforeseen demand fluc-
tuations, but at the cost of unduly depressing the output-capital ratio and, all else
equal, the profit rate. By contrast, too much utilized capacity renders firms unable
to adjust output quickly enough to attain their preferred levels of production.
To be sure, firms may adjust their desired rate of utilization in the face of pro-
longed periods during which they are unable to attain it. But as argued by Harrod
(1939), it makes most behavioral sense for individual firms to adjust their rate of
accumulation in order to attain the desired rate of utilization (see also Skott, 2012).
Sustained departures of actual utilization from the target rate would thus lead to a
strong cumulative response of investment decisions, so that the long-run sensitivity
of utilization to variations in aggregate demand would be low. Little generality is
lost by approximating this stable long-run rate of utilization by an exogenous desired
rate.
As discussed in section 2.1, the paper focuses on expectations-consistent — or
‘warranted’ — growth paths along which actual utilization is equal to desired utiliza-
tion. Of course, at any point in time the two may differ, and Appendix D examines
the short-run dynamics through which equality can be restored.
The notion of warranted growth implies equality between the rates of capital
accumulation (Kˆm) and output growth (Mˆ). Thus:
Kˆm = Mˆ = g(pi, pˆm), g1 > 0, g2 < 0 (2.11)
The output growth function g(.) embodies firms’ decisions in the face of short-run
production rigidities. As in Skott (1989) and Nakatani and Skott (2007), industrial
output is a state variable with a predetermined level at any point in time. Instead
of instantaneously choosing a level of output, firms rather choose the growth rate of
output.
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The profit share — which at any point in time is uniquely related to the profit
rate — signals the benefits of expanding output. But, as mentioned above, doing so
is not costless. In particular, the cost of adjusting to changes in output is convex —
beyond a point, it becomes progressively difficult to expand or contract production.
As a result, the output growth function is non-linear in the profit share, with a high
sensitivity at intermediate values, low sensitivity at extreme values, and upper and
lower bounds (for a thorough discussion of the output growth function, see Skott,
1989, and also Appendix D).
Inflation is also likely to shape firms’ output growth decisions independently from
its redistributive role. At low rates of inflation, this influence is likely to be low.
But high rates of inflation may reduce the confidence with which firms hold beliefs
about relative prices and income distribution, and the general deterioration in the
business climate may stifle capitalist animal spirits. More importantly, high rates
of inflation are likely to trigger contractionary policy responses which themselves
dampen accumulation. The growth function in (2.11) captures these possibilities in
stylized fashion by including inflation as an argument alongside the profit share.4 As
discussed below, the feedback from inflation to growth plays no important role in the
demand-constrained regime, but it is important for allowing for the possibility of a
saving-constrained regime in a context of independent investment decisions.
Along the warranted growth path, goods market equilibrium is ensured by
4The use of inflation as an argument of the accumulation function captures the direct and policy-
induced effects mentioned above with maximum simplicity. The disadvantage of this specification,
however, is that it includes both a jump variable (the profit share) and a component of its rate
of change (the rate of change in the industrial price) as arguments of the accumulation function.
A possible interpretation is that firms only take into account the equilibrium rate of inflation that
emerges from the model, thus ignoring the fleeting spike in inflation that comes from assuming that
the profit share as capable of adjusting instantaneously — a modeling device to capture relative
adjustment speeds that has no counterpart in the real world. For further elaboration of the short-
run dynamics of the model, see Appendix D.
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σa = f(ωa, p)(1− lm) + f
(
wm
pm
1
p
, p
)
lm (2.12)
and
σdpi +
1
Km
(1− β)σap = g(pi, pˆm) (2.13)
where f(.) is the per-worker demand for agricultural goods, with f1 > 0 and
f2 < 0. In turn, p = pa/pm is the relative price of the agricultural good, and σ
d is the
output-capital ratio desired by firms.
Equation (2.12) is the equilibrium condition for the agricultural market, while
equation (2.13) is the economy-wide saving-investment balance. As long as (2.12)
holds, equation (2.13) implies equilibrium in the market for industrial goods.
These two equilibrium conditions jointly determine the intersectoral terms of trade
(p), and they give rise to a schedule in the (pi, pˆm) space along which market equilib-
rium is attained in both sectors. The associated slope is
dpˆm
dpi
=
σdm +
1
Km
(1− β)σa dpdpi − gpi
gpˆm
(2.14)
The numerator in the expression above is the effect of an increase in the profit
share on saving minus its effect on output growth. As shown in Appendix D, it has to
be positive for the warranted growth path to be stable. Given the aforementioned non-
linearity of the growth function in the (pi, g) space, multiple equilibria are a possibility,
with stability being attained where the response of output growth to changes in the
profit share is relatively low relative to the response of saving (see Nakatani and Skott,
2007, and Appendix D). This stability condition is a correlate of the assertion that
saving reacts more strongly to changes in the profit share than investment, known as
Robinsonian stability in neo-Keynesian growth models (Robinson, 1962; Marglin and
Bhaduri, 1990). I assume throughout that it holds.
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Given that gpˆm < 0, under stability the warranted growth schedule is downward-
sloping in the (pi, pˆm) space, as shown by the WG schedule in figure 2.1. It is almost
vertical at low levels of inflation, since firms’ accumulation decisions are insensitive
to changes in inflation when the level of inflation in low. Figure 2.1 also plots the
discontinuous wage bargaining equilibrium schedule (from equation 2.10 above).
Figure 2.1: Growth regimes
Demand-constrained
regime
Saving-constrained
regime
(a) A demand-constrained regime
Demand-constrained
regime
Saving-constrained
regime
(b) A saving-constrained regime
Notes: The panels show the Wage Bargaining Equilibrium (WBE) and Warranted Growth (WG) schedules. Higher
aggregate demand for industrial goods shifts the WG schedule to the right. In panel (a), market equilibrium is
restored at a higher profit share and rate of accumulation in the industrial sector. Growth in this regime is therefore
constrained by aggregate demand. In panel (b), the profit share is unresponsive to aggregate demand, since inflation
fails to elicit higher saving by redistributing income. As a result, market equilibrium is restored at the conventional
profit share and at higher inflation; higher demand thus fails to elicit a higher rate of accumulation.
The figure encapsulates the two basic growth regimes of the model. Higher aggre-
gate demand for industrial goods — i.e. an ex ante shortfall of saving with respect
to investment — will shift the WG schedule to the right. For any given rate of infla-
tion, a higher profit share will be required to restore saving-investment balance and
equilibrium in the market for industrial goods. This forced saving mechanism will
operate as long as inflation remains below the threshold pˆ∗m, so that it can effect the
required redistribution of income from industrial workers to capitalists. This case is
depicted in panel (a): an increase in aggregate demand for industrial goods will lead
both to a higher profit share, which increases accumulation, and to a higher rate of
inflation, which reduces accumulation. From (2.11), the net effect will be positive if
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gpi > −gpˆm
dpˆm
dpi
(2.15)
This condition is especially plausible in the demand-constrained regime, in which
the sensitivity of growth to inflation, as well as inflation itself, are likely to be low.
Moreover, this condition is required for the stability of the warranted growth path
under both growth regimes (see Appendix D). I assume throughout that it holds.
As a result, any equilibrium featuring a higher profit share will also feature higher
accumulation in industry. Panel (a) thus shows a demand-constrained regime where
industrial accumulation rises with aggregate demand for industrial goods.
If inflation is above the pˆ∗m threshold, however, it will be fully anticipated in wage
bargaining, and the profit share will become unresponsive to increases in aggregate
demand for industrial goods. In particular, increases in aggregate demand resulting
from technical change in agriculture will only raise inflation without raising the profit
share. As a result, they will hurt industrial accumulation. In this saving-constrained
regime (illustrated in panel b), aggregate demand fails to increase accumulation be-
cause it cannot endogenously elicit higher saving.
The empirical results described in the introduction suggest that, in developing
countries, technical change in agriculture is an important source of fluctuations in
aggregate demand for industrial goods. The next section examines the macroeconomic
mechanisms behind these fluctuations.
2.2.4 The Effects of Technical Change in Agriculture on Industrial Ac-
cumulation
In this section, I examine the effects of land-saving and labor-saving innovations
on aggregate demand for industrial goods. Using the analysis of the previous section,
I then show how these demand fluctuations affect capital accumulation under each of
the two growth regimes.
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I assume throughout that the warranted growth equilibrium is stable (see Ap-
pendix D). Under these conditions, equation (2.13) shows that technical change in
agriculture will generate ex ante excess demand for industrial goods if it lowers the
term (1 − β)σap, which is the value of agricultural saving in terms of the industrial
good.
With regard to land-saving technical change, the following proposition can be
established:
Proposition 2.2.1. Land-saving technical change in agriculture (an increase in σa)
will raise domestic demand for industrial goods if
η < 1−  (owner-cultivator case)
η <
1
Z
{
1− 
[
1− (1 + θ)β
1− β
]}
(dual case)
(2.16)
where
Z =
1− β + θ(α− β)
1− β < 1
and
0 < α =
f(ωa, p)(1− lm)
σa
< 1
In the expressions above, η > 0 and  > 0 are the income and price elasticities of
the demand for agricultural goods. For simplicity, I assume that both elasticities are
constant regardless of the level and composition of consumption. As before, Θ > 0
is the elasticity of the distributional parameter β with respect to an increase in σa in
the dual scenario. Finally, 0 < α < 1 is the share of agricultural workers in the total
consumption of the agricultural good.
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The assumption that labor incomes in agriculture are high enough to allow for the
consumption of industrial goods ensures that α < β and, therefore, Z < 1 (reasonable
parameter values also ensure that Z > 0).5
Proof. See Appendix C.
Engel’s law — the widely documented fact that the share of agricultural goods
in total consumption declines with the level of income — implies a value of η below
one. Since demand for food is likely to be price-inelastic (i.e. with a low ), plausible
Engel effects are strong enough to enforce the inequalities above.
The case of owner-cultivator agriculture provides the clearest intuition for these
results. Land-saving technical change increases agricultural output and, for a given
β, the value of agricultural saving in terms of the agricultural good. Agricultural
saving in terms of the industrial good, however, will fall if the decline in agriculture’s
terms of trade is large enough. Engel effects ensure that this is the case.
In the dual scenario, this basic result is enhanced by the redistribution of rural
income from landlords to workers (i.e. if Θ > 0), as workers have a higher propensity
to consume.
With regard to labor-saving technical change in agriculture, the following propo-
sition can be established:
Proposition 2.2.2. Labor-saving technical change in agriculture (an increase in qa)
will lower domestic demand for industrial goods in the dual case as long as rural
consumption of industrial goods is positive (i.e. α < β), and will have no effect in
the owner-cultivator case.
5The assumption that rural workers consume industrial goods implies that f (ωa, p) < ωa. Using
the fact that ωa = βσa/(1− lm), it follows that the share of rural workers in total consumption of
agricultural goods is lower than the wage share in the agricultural sector:
1
σa
f (ωa, p) (1− lm) = α < β
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Given the stylized assumptions about technology in agriculture, purely labor-
saving technical change will have no effect on agricultural output. In the owner-
cultivator case, moreover, it will have no effect on average incomes and saving behavior
— it only changes the allocation of labor. As a result, no changes in rural demand
for either good will ensue.
In the dual case, by contrast, labor-saving technical change in the surplus-extracting
sector forces a reallocation of workers from the surplus-extracting to the smallholding
subsector, depressing average incomes therein and lowering the overall agricultural
wage share, β. The decline in β lowers the sector’s propensity to consume and places
a drag on aggregate demand for industrial goods. At the same time, however, lower
rural demand for agricultural goods turns the terms of trade in favor of the industrial
sector, lowering the cost to urban workers of meeting their income-inelastic demand
for food. The higher real income is more than proportionately spent on the industrial
good, providing partial compensation for lower rural demand. As shown in Appendix
C, however, as long as rural consumption of industrial goods is positive (i.e. α < β),
the contractionary effects of the redistribution to the rentier class will prevail, and
total demand for industrial goods will fall.
In light of the warranted growth regimes described in section 2.2.3, a strong labor-
saving bias in agricultural technical change is likely to hurt industrial profitability
and accumulation in a demand-constrained regime. Its effect could be illustrated by
a downward shift of the WG schedule in Figure 2.1.
By contrast, a land-saving bias will expand the domestic market for industrial
goods and lead to higher profitability and accumulation. Its effect could be illustrated
by an upward shift of the WG schedule in Figure 2.1. Seen from a different angle,
as long as hidden unemployment exists, land augmentation can allow agriculture to
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fulfill a dual role as a medium-run outlet for surplus labor and as a source of expansion
of the domestic market for industry.
These effects, however, require that income distribution in the industrial sector
respond endogenously to aggregate demand. If the industrial sector is characterized
by real wage resistance, demand-side complementarity ceases to exist even in a closed
economy. Now a land-saving bias in agriculture will exert upward pressure on the
industrial profit share and cause inflation to accelerate, hurting accumulation in order
to reconcile higher consumption demand with an unyielding distributional norm. By
contrast, a strong enough labor-saving bias in agriculture will reduce inflation and
allow for higher accumulation in industry, at the cost of a temporary rise in rural
underemployment.
Not surprisingly, the results depend heavily on the growth regime that character-
izes the industrial sector, although the empirical results mentioned in the Introduction
suggest that a demand-constrained regime is the typical scenario among developing
countries in the medium run.
2.2.5 The Model in the Long Run
As the capital stock in the industrial sector expands, new workers are drawn out
of rural areas and into the urban workforce. Demand for food will thus rise for
two reasons: first, the workers recently employed by industry will start earning the
urban wage premium; and, second, rural product wages rise as the degree of rural
underemployment is reduced.
Given the model’s central concern with modeling medium-run growth acceler-
ations, the long-run scenario is kept at maximum simplicity by assuming that all
parameters are constant. In this case, the additional demand for food will turn the
terms of trade against industry and reduce aggregate demand for industrial goods.6
6Differentiation of equation (2.12) yields:
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The economy will eventually transition to a demand-constrained regime and, from
that point onwards, growth will decline as the economy transitions to a stationary
state.
Assuming a demand-constrained regime with hidden unemployment is maintained
throughout, one-off land-saving innovations will lead to temporary growth accelera-
tions and the attainment of a higher capital stock in the stationary state.
2.3 Land-Saving Technical Change in a Small Open Economy
As discussed in the Introduction, some authors have challenged results like the
above on the grounds that they don’t carry over to small open economies with full
tradability in both the industrial and the agricultural sectors (Matsuyama, 1992).
Indeed, full tradability in a small open economy fixes the intersectoral terms of trade
at the level of world prices, thus preventing changes in the level and composition of
domestic demand from translating into changes in industrial profitability and accu-
mulation.
The clearest challenge comes from Bustos et al. (2012), who like the present paper
allow for biased technical change in agriculture. They assume factor substitutability
in industry and a competitive intersectoral labor market leading to full employment.
Under these conditions, land-saving technical change induces workers to relocate to
agriculture at the expense of industrial employment and output. By contrast, labor-
saving innovations induce workers to leave agriculture, and the competitive labor
market ensures that they are taken up by industry.
dp
dlm
=
[
fM − (1− η)fA
σa + ηfM lm
]
p > 0
where fM and fA denote the per-worker demand for agricultural goods in the agricultural and
the industrial sectors, respectively. Since η > 0, the expression is positive even if the urban wage
premium is zero. From equation (2.13), it can be seen that an increase in lm will increase the value
of rural saving in terms of the industrial good and, therefore, reduce aggregate demand for industry.
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As discussed in the Introduction, the present paper eschews the full employment
assumption. But doing so is not sufficient to guarantee demand-side complementar-
ity: as seen above, it also requires endogenous movements in the terms of trade. It
is unclear that perfect tradability in both sectors is a realistic assumption, as Mat-
suyama (1992) himself admits. Still, given the influence of this assumption in the
recent literature, an interesting question emerges: is there ever a case for land-saving
technical change in a small open economy where the two sectors are fully tradable?
The short answer is yes, but only if the economy faces a binding balance-of-
payments constraint on industrial accumulation. By only considering final demand
in a Ricardo-Viner model of trade, the model in Matsuyama (1992) implies that
trade at world prices remains balanced despite the fact that a reallocation of labor to
industry may cause exports to contract. In semi-industrialized developing countries,
however, the net foreign exchange requirements of the industrial sector may grow
as the sector expands, due to the need to import intermediate and capital goods.
Industrial accumulation may thus be constrained by insufficient foreign exchange
earnings if the economy’s ability to run persistent current account deficits is limited.
In this section, I adapt the framework used so far to analyze a small open economy
with surplus labor and independent investment decisions, but possibly beset by a
binding balance of payments constraint on industrial accumulation.
The literature on ‘gap’ models provides a useful entry point. These models identify
the main equality constraints that have to be satisfied as accounting identities in
equilibrium. The literature’s central contribution is the notion that one of these
constraints will determine the feasible level of investment. The difference between this
binding ex ante constraint and its less stringent counterparts is called a ‘gap’. Since
all equality constraints have to be satisfied ex post, the literature has posited a range
of mechanisms through which all gaps are eventually eliminated (see, e.g. Chenery
and Bruno, 1962; Bacha, 1990; Taylor, 1994). I examine the interaction between two
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macroeconomic equality constraints: the aggregate goods market equilibrium and the
balance of payments identity.
For simplicity, consider only the case of an endogenous premium between ur-
ban and rural wages (which corresponded to the demand-constrained growth regime
above). The original model is modified in the following ways. First, both sectors
now produce tradable goods with exogenous world prices, and no trade barriers exist.
These assumptions fix the intersectoral terms of trade:
p = p¯ =
p∗a
p∗m
(2.17)
where p∗a and p
∗
m are the exogenous world prices of the agricultural and the indus-
trial goods.
Second, since industrial firms are now price-takers, they choose to work with
full capacity utilization (the output-capital ratio is now just a technical coefficient).
Third, the industrial good is an ‘importable’ good (i.e. tradable and typically im-
ported), and the agricultural good is an ‘exportable’ good (tradable and typically
exported). This assumption is meaningful for a number of semi-industrial countries
where agricultural goods still make up the bulk of export receipts.
Fourth, the capital stock in industry (Km) is a composite of the industrial good
that is domestically produced (Kd) and of an investment good that can only be
imported (Ki). These goods are utilized in fixed proportions, with 0 < m < 1
denoting the share of the imported investment good. The value of the capital stock in
domestic currency is given by equation (2.18) below, where e is the nominal exchange
rate.
pkKm = pmKd + ep
∗
kKi (2.18)
For maximum simplicity, I follow Taylor (1989) and assume that p∗k = p
∗
m, which
implies that pm = pk. Doing so allows us to treat the industrial capital stock as if it
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were homogeneous. In other words, the economy’s imports are comprised two goods:
the manufactured good that is also domestically-produced (it can be used either for
consumption or investment), and the complementary capital good, which can only
be used for investment. The economy’s exports, in turn, are equal to the difference
between domestic output and domestic consumption of the agricultural good.
Since the focus is on the contribution of technical change in agriculture to relaxing
external constraints, I will not examine exchange rate movements as an instrument to
reconcile accumulation targets with external balance. This assumption does not deny
the usefulness of this instrument, but I note that, in general, endogenous exchange
rate variation is not a substitute for contractionary policies in the face of external im-
balances (see Chinn and Wei, 2013, for empirical evidence). This section suggests that
technical change in agriculture can reduce the need for such contractionary policies.
Now the market equilibrium conditions are:
σa = f(ωa, p)(1− lm) + f
(
wm
pm
1
p
, p
)
lm +Xa (2.19)
and
σmKm = [ωa − f(ωa, p)] p(1−lm)+
[
wm
pm
− pf
(
wm
pm
1
p
, p
)]
lm+(1−m)Im−Mm (2.20)
where Xa denotes agricultural exports, Mm denotes imports of the industrial good
that is also produced domestically, and Im denotes industrial investment.
To derive the balance of payments identity, let mk denote the imports of the
capital good as a fraction of the industrial capital stock. Using the fact that mk =
(mIm)/Km = mg, the balance of payments identity is:
g =
1
m
(κ+ pxa −mm). (2.21)
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where xa denotes agricultural exports, mm denotes imports of the industrial good
that is also produced domestically, and κ denotes net capital inflows — all expressed
as a ratio of the industrial capital stock.
To analyze the contribution of agriculture to relieving a foreign exchange con-
straint on industrial accumulation, it is useful to work with separate functions for
saving and investment. The saving-determined rate of growth of the capital stock is
given by:
gs = σpi +
1
Km
(1− β)σap+ κ (2.22)
The independent investment function, in turn, responds to the same determinants
as before: profitability and inflation. But to show how a foreign exchange constraint
can emerge and be corrected, assume that the investment function also responds
positively to a shift variable z, which captures a policy-determined autonomous com-
ponent of investment.
gi = gi(pi, pˆm, z), g1 > 0, g2 < 0, g3 > 0 (2.23)
To analyze the model graphically, it is easiest to to use the balance of payments
identity in (2.21), and the saving and investment functions in (2.22) and (2.23).
Equilibrium in the market for the agricultural good determines the level of agricultural
exports (using equation 2.19). Given the so-determined level of agricultural exports,
the joint satisfaction of equations (2.21)-(2.23) imply both external equilibrium —
i.e. equality between uses and sources of foreign exchange — and equilibrium in the
market for the industrial good.
Panel (a) in figure 2.2 plots the saving function (S), the balance of payments
identity (BP ), and the accumulation function in the (κ, g) space. Both the S and the
BP schedules are upward-sloping, but the BP schedule is unambiguously steeper,
as 0 < m < 1. In turn, the accumulation function is independent of κ; it is drawn
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for predetermined values of its arguments, including the industrial profit share. All
accounting identities and equilibrium conditions are initially satisfied at point A.
Disturbances to this initial equilibrium will elicit compensatory macroeconomic
adjustment. In the spirit of the gap literature, I consider two adjustment scenarios. In
the first scenario, capital inflows adjust to cover any shortfall of agricultural exports
with respect to industrial imports.
This scenario is illustrated in panel (a) of figure 2.2. Consider an increase in z (to
z′ > z), which shifts the accumulation function upwards. Since domestic industry is
operating at full capacity, saving-investment balance now requires a higher level of
capital inflows, as in point B. Given the new and higher values of g and κ, and the
predetermined value of xa, the balance of payments equation determines the new value
of imports of the industrial good as a share of the capital stock (mm). The higher
mm shifts the BP schedule to the right until it passes through the new equilibrium
at point B. In the new equilibrium, accumulation and capital flows are both higher.
In other words, since agricultural exports are given and domestic industry is op-
erating at full capacity, higher capital inflows are needed to finance higher imports of
the two types of industrial goods — both of which are required in proportion to the
additional investment. Since excess demand for the domestically produced industrial
good is cleared by imports, the industrial profit share remains at its initial value.
In the second scenario, by contrast, limited external financing constrains the rate
of feasible capital accumulation. This scenario illustrates the fact that most devel-
oping countries face restrictions in international capital markets if the ratio of net
borrowing to GDP rises above a perceived threshold of sustainability. To capture
this possibility in stylized fashion, assume that κ cannot exceed κmax.
Panel (b) of figure 2.2 illustrates this scenario. In the initial equilibrium at point A,
capital inflows are at the threshold of sustainability. Now consider again an increase
in z. At the new point of goods market equilibrium (B), the trade deficit due to
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higher industrial imports requires external financing in excess of the threshold of
sustainability. Given that balance of payments constraints do not actuate directly at
the level of firms, the typical response in this scenario includes contractionary policies
which lower domestic absorption. These policies can be captured with maximum
simplicity by a decline in z back to its original level. As we can see, in contrast to
the first scenario, the binding foreign exchange constraint prevented an initial shift
in the investment function from sustainably increasing the rate of accumulation.
Figure 2.2: Technical change in agriculture in a two-gap model of a small open
economy
(a) A Demand
Constraint
(b) A Foreign Exchange
Constraint
(c) Technical Change
in Agriculture
Finally, panel (c) shows that land-saving technical change in agriculture can relax
this foreign exchange constraint. With exogenous terms of trade, equation (2.22) im-
plies that land-saving technical change will raise rural saving in terms of the industrial
good if (1 + θ)β < 1. Thus, the S schedule will shift to the left unambiguously in
the owner-cultivator case (where θ = 0) and, for plausible parameter values, in the
dual scenario as well (movements in the terms of trade, which in the closed economy
caused the value of agricultural saving to fall in terms of the industrial good, are
ruled out in the small open economy).
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Since the industrial market clears with variations in imports (i.e. without changes
to the profit share), and κ = κmax, equation (2.22) shows that to the higher rural
saving there corresponds a higher rate of accumulation compatible with market equi-
librium. This new rate is shown at point C, where the S ′ schedule intersects the
κ = κmax line.
Land-saving technical change also raises agricultural exports, as rural demand for
the agricultural good will increase less than output under general conditions — chiefly
as a result of Engel’s effects.7 This new level of agricultural exports (obtained from
equation 2.19), along with the new feasible rate of accumulation (obtained from equa-
tion 2.22) and the κ = κmax condition, can be plugged into the balance of payments
identity (equation 2.21) to endogenously determine the level of imports of the indus-
trial good (mm) that is compatible both with external balance and (per Walras law)
with equilibrium in the market for the industrial good. Finally, the feasible rate of ac-
cumulation can be plugged into the accumulation function in (2.23) to endogenously
determine the feasible level of the policy variable z.
Point C in panel (c) illustrates a possible configuration in which the new feasible
level of investment is such that z = z′ and g = g(pi, pˆm, z′). In other words, a suitable
increase in land productivity allowed the originally intended rate of accumulation —
which previously violated the κ = κmax condition — to be compatible with external
balance. Note that, without the expansion of agricultural exports, it would be impos-
sible to sustain this higher rate of accumulation without κ > κmax, that is, without
a rate of external borrowing in excess of the threshold of sustainability. It is in this
sense that land-saving technical change can relax a foreign exchange constraint on
industrial growth.
7Indeed, from equation (2.19), it can be readily seen that rural exports will rise if η < 1α(1+θ) .
Recall that α = f(wa,p)(1−lm)σa is the ratio of rural demand to domestic output of the agricultural
good. With positive agricultural exports, 0 < α < 1 in the open economy model as well as in the
closed economy model. Engel’s effects imply that η < 1. In the owner-cultivator scenario, Θ = 0.
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2.4 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper embodied structural characteristics common
to several developing countries, including low factor substitutability and hidden un-
employment in agriculture. It illuminated the effects of biased technical change in
agriculture on industrial accumulation in the short to medium run.
The model showed that, if the industrial sector is constrained by domestic demand,
land-saving technical change in agriculture — such as irrigation, fertilizers, and mul-
tiple cropping — can promote industrial accumulation by raising rural employment
and labor incomes, and thus enlarging the domestic market for manufactures. Hid-
den unemployment allows industrial growth to accelerate even as agriculture absorbs
more workers.
By contrast, labor-saving technical change — such as the mechanization of sow-
ing, harvesting, and threshing activities — may aggravate the problem of hidden
unemployment, bid down rural wages, and narrow the domestic market for industrial
goods. This outcome is more likely if agriculture possesses a dual structure whereby
a class of smallholding peasants and landless workers provides labor to a class of large
landowners — as exemplified by the minifundio-latifundio system in Latin America
(Garc´ıa, 1966; Barraclough and Domike, 1966). The negative effects of excessive
mechanization in unequal agrarian structures are concerning, since a number of stud-
ies suggest that inequality in land ownership may itself promote labor-saving biases in
technical change (De Janvry, 1978; Sanders and Ruttan, 1978; Sen, 1981; Rao, 2005).
These findings contrast with a recent strand of the literature which has argued
that greater labor absorption into agriculture — such as that resulting from land-
saving technical change — hurts industrial growth (Matsuyama, 1992; Bustos et al.,
2012). The authors’ conclusion stems from positing a small open economy with full
tradability in both sectors, as well as competitive labor markets and full employment.
By linking the intersectoral terms of trade to world prices, the small open economy
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framework eliminates demand-side complementarity between agriculture and indus-
try. In turn, the full employment assumption ensures that greater labor absorption
into agriculture comes at the expense of higher unit costs and lower employment in
industry.
The empirical evidence that motivates this paper, however, shows that these as-
sumptions are unlikely to hold in the average developing country, at least in the short
to medium run. These studies have used climate variables for statistical identification,
exploring variation in the data which resulted from exogenous changes in land yields
(Henderson et al., 2009; Shifa, 2015; de Souza, 2015). They find robust evidence that
higher land yields on average elicit a short- to medium-run growth acceleration in the
industrial sector.
By contrast, the alternative framework in this paper eschewed full employment
and placed the role of domestic demand center-stage. In addition, an extension of the
model showed that, even in a small open economy, land-saving technical change may
foster accumulation in industry by relaxing foreign exchange constraints which often
beset semi-industrial economies. In light of these two contributions the empirical
evidence suggests, first, that the industrial sector in most developing countries stands
to benefit from lower demand and foreign exchange constraints on accumulation and,
second, that technical change in agriculture can ease these constraints.8
These findings also illuminate the role of waves of land-saving innovations in the
early stages of the industrialization of Japan and East Asia — examining some of
the macroeconomic channels of complementary previously noted by scholars in the
field (Smith, 1959; Ohkawa and Rosovsky, 1960; Amsden, 1979; Kay, 2001). Simi-
lar innovations have spread to other countries in Asia and elsewhere as part of the
8As we can see, these combined results validate some of the insights of the literature on the
macroeconomic role of agriculture in development, as classically summarized by Johnston and Mellor
(1961).
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‘green revolution’, with possibly significant effects on rural employment and domestic
demand for industrial goods in those areas as well (Hossain et al., 2006).
Finally, the paper delimited the conditions under which different innovations are
synergistic with industrial growth. It did so by showing that the effects of technical
change in agriculture depend on the industrial growth regime. In particular, real
wage resistance in industry may undermine demand complementarity between the two
sectors — extending to a two-sector framework a classical result of post-Keynesian
growth theory (Robinson, 1962; Marglin, 1984).
But in accordance with its aim of explaining the aforementioned empirical findings,
the paper focused on explaining growth accelerations in the short to medium run. It
has thus ignored long-run scenarios in which particular factor-saving biases would
support industrialization. An important long-run scenario is the emergence of labor
shortages in the wake of sustained industrial growth and urbanization, which would
call for labor-saving innovations in agriculture. But labor-saving innovations are best
seen as induced by the development of this favorable scenario, not as its independent
cause.
Another important long-run scenario may follow from growth strategies centered
on the expansion of primary exports. Though in the short-run these strategies may
relax external constraints on capital accumulation, in the long-run they may hurt
domestic industry by causing real exchange rate appreciation and by rendering the
economy vulnerable to terms of trade shocks (Krugman, 1987; Rajan and Subrama-
nian, 2011; Deaton, 1999; Bleaney and Greenaway, 2001).
These scenarios, and the appropriate macroeconomic policies to address them,
should be considered in appraisals of the long-run role of agriculture in development.
Still, the paper’s medium-run scope is useful in cautioning against policies that pro-
mote the excessive mechanization of agriculture before labor shortages develop. At
the same time, the paper suggests that many developing countries stand to gain from
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policies that promote agriculture’s dual role as a medium-run outlet for surplus labor
and as a source of demand and foreign exchange for industry.
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CHAPTER 3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BIASED TECHNICAL
CHANGE IN BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURE (1950-1980)
3.1 Introduction
The pattern of technical change in agriculture during the golden age of Brazil’s
industrialization exhibited a marked bias towards labor-saving innovations relative
to land-saving innovations. Since agriculture is typically characterized by a low elas-
ticity of substitution between land and labor, as well as by a large contribution of
effective land to agricultural output, this bias led to a considerable degree of labor
displacement.
Traditional theory explains the direction of technical change in agriculture as a
response to the evolution of relative factor scarcities (see, e.g. Hayami and Ruttan,
1970). In the absence of severe market failures, a labor-saving bias would reflect the
need to release labor from agriculture in the extent necessary to avoid the development
of labor supply bottlenecks in the expanding urban sector. In Brazil, by contrast, the
labor-displacing character of technical change in agriculture was autonomous with
respect to factor prices and far in excess of the labor-absorption capacity of the
modern sector.
In light of the need for an alternative explanation for this fundamental bias, this
paper contributes a narrative that places center-stage the action of structural and
institutional features of Brazil’s agriculture. It makes two main contributions. First,
using primary and secondary sources it documents the evolving pattern of employment
across agricultural establishments, the use of modern labor-saving and land-saving
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inputs, and the problem of labor displacement that accompanied the modernization
of the dominant segments of Brazilian agriculture.
Second, it examines the role of public policy in shaping the rate and direction of
technical change. Particular attention is paid to public policy concerning credit and
input prices, research and extension, and rural infrastructure.
Attention to Brazil’s dual distribution of operational units, whereby land-abundant
units (latifundios) have coexisted with land-scarce and labor-abundant units (mini-
fundios), permeates both contributions. This dual structure casts light on the origin,
benefits, and effects of policies concerning technical change.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, with respect
to employment trends, I find that the absolute number of wage employees and (within-
establishment) sharecroppers fell between 1950 and 1970. This decline resulted from
substantial labor shedding among medium and large establishments (from 10 to 10,000
hectares). The decline in employment reflected a lower use of labor per hectare of
cultivated land (which declined by 50% among establishments above 100 hectares),
and a lower use of labor per establishment.
Second, I find that, as a counterpart to labor displacement among larger establish-
ments, the smallholding sector swelled between 1950 and 1970. Indeed, establishments
with less than 10 hectares accounted for 51.2% of all establishments in 1970, up from
34.4% in 1950. Accordingly, the average area per establishment in this category fell
from 4.25 to 3.6 hectares.
Third, with respect to the use of modern inputs, I find that, while the adoption
of mechanized techniques accelerated sharply in the early 1950s, the use of land-
saving techniques lagged behind, only accelerating after the mid 1960s. As a result,
aggregate land yield grew slowly throughout the 1950-1980 period. Although non-
traditional export crops posted yield gains in the 1970s, these gains were partly offset
by declining land yields among domestically-oriented food crops.
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In other words, the employment losses verified until the 1970s were a consequence
of a labor-saving bias embodied in the combinations of modern inputs adopted by the
larger establishments. The 1970s saw a partial recovery of measures of labor absorp-
tion among larger establishments, which resulted from the more intensive cultivation
practices of non-traditional export crops. Still, this recovery was insufficient to run
down the stock of hidden unemployment in agriculture and elsewhere.
Finally, with respect to the policies influencing technical change, I find no evidence
that the main policy instruments used to foster the modernization of agriculture dur-
ing the 1950-1980 period — the concession of implicit price subsidies and of subsidized
credit — discriminated in favor of labor-saving inputs.
Rather, I argue that the biases were introduced for two main reasons. First, the
subsidy policies disproportionately benefited larger producers who, at any point in
the period analyzed, used land far more extensively, and wage and tenant labor far
more intensively than smallholdings. To the extent that a trade-off exists between
the adoption of land-saving and labor-saving inputs, larger producers stood to reap
greater benefits by adopting combinations that economized primarily on labor. In
addition, larger establishments faced higher labor disciplining costs in a context of
incomplete contracts, and many derived both local monoposonistic power over labor
— and political power in general — from control over large tracts of land. These
structural features of dualist agriculture provided further impetus for a labor-saving
pattern of technical change (Griffin, 1974; Rao, 2005; De Janvry, 1978).
The second reason is the high degree of technical complementarity among land-
saving inputs. In general land-saving innovations are brought about by packages
of chemical innovations (e.g.: pesticides, chemical fertilizers), biological innovations
(e.g.: biological fertilizers, high-yielding varieties), intensive practices (e.g.: multiple
cropping), and rural infrastructure (e.g.: irrigation, water control). These individ-
ual components are highly complementary (De Janvry, 1978). For example, under
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many climatic and soil conditions, crop response to fertilizers is low without water
control infrastructure; multiple cropping is inviable without artificial fertilization;
high-yielding varieties are vulnerable without the the use of pesticides, etc.
Moreover, the benefits of developing and adapting key components of the required
packages are not liable to be appropriated by private entrepreneurs, and as a result
the State has played a crucial role in their development and provision. Historically,
this role has been manifested in the development of public research and extension
agencies, and in public investment in rural infrastructure — such as irrigation and
electrification. This paper shows that, during most of the 1950-1980 period, the
Brazilian government neglected research, extension, and rural infrastructure.
At the same time, labor-saving innovations (especially tractors) are much less
afflicted by market failures, and thus the private sector has historically played a
more prominent role in their development and dissemination. Thus, by focusing only
on subsidizing the prices of private inputs and credit, the state indirectly promoted
a labor-saving bias in technical change, even though the subsidies were themselves
neutral.
This paper relates to two branches of the large literature on Brazil’s agriculture
during the 1950-1980 period. The first branch is comprised of studies that, drawing
on the seminal work of Binswanger (1974), have econometrically estimated a sharp
decline in the share of labor in total farm costs even after controlling for the evolution
of factor prices. This finding is evidence of a Hicks-biased pattern of technical change
geared towards economizing on labor (see, e.g. Sanders and Ruttan, 1978; Santos,
1986). The second branch is comprised of numerous papers — described in the section
below — that have focused on particular aspects of government policies that impinge
on the development or the adoption of agricultural technologies. The present paper
makes a contribution to both of these literatures by providing an integrated vision of
the relevant policies, and by making explicit their relation to technical change biases.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides back-
ground on the agrarian structure of Brazil at the time, and on the use and distribution
of land. Section 3.3 documents the decline in employment among larger establish-
ments. Section 3.4 describes the main public policies concerning credit and input
prices, research and extension, and rural infrastructure. It establishes the unequal
distribution of their benefits and their consequences for technical change. Section 3.5
documents the use of modern labor-saving and land-saving inputs during 1950-1980,
along with the evolution of land yields across different crops. It documents the labor-
saving bias embodied in the composition of these inputs during most of the 1950-1980
period. Section 3.6 concludes the paper, and an Appendix includes additional data
tables and figures.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Latifundio-Minifundio System
The agrarian structure that characterized Brazil during 1950-1980 is rooted in the
latifundio-minifundio system. Three main features have been traditionally associated
with minifundios. The first is absolute land scarcity, which often results in the un-
deremployment of the labor capacity of their occupants and compels them to seek
complementary sources of income elsewhere. The second are relations of dependence
with respect to large landholdings — the latifundios —, in a context in which the
latter have privileged access to physical and institutional resources. And the third
is the lack of support from public institutions regarding technical assistance, credit,
and integration into the national marketing system (Garc´ıa, 1966).
The forms of labor provision to larger properties are shaped by the degree to
which the minifundios are integrated with the latifundio system in a given region.
In this respect, Garc´ıa (1966) classifies minifundios into four strata. The first stra-
tum includes the minifundios that are located inside the traditional large properties.
80
Typical arrangements include the formation of ’colonies’ of agricultural workers who
are allowed to live in designated plots and to cultivate subsistence goods, either in
exchange for labor services or in exchange for the agreement to provide a share of the
surplus to the latifundio proprietor.
The second stratum includes the ’frontier’ minifundios, which are located outside
the large properties, but which are often dependent on access privileges to certain
physical resources (such as crop processing facilities, pastures, and water). Such
access is granted in exchange for work obligations, or for a share in the smallholder’s
output.
The third stratum include minifundios that are independent of these obligations,
but which are nonetheless unable to fully employ their resident workforce. They thus
often hire out labor to large properties or become sharecroppers therein. Finally, the
fourth stratum includes minifundios with some degree of capitalization and stable
relations with the market, thus being halfway between small agricultural enterprises
and subsistence holdings.
In Brazil, the latifundio-minifundio system crystallized with the decline of the
slavery system in the second half of the 19th century. But the historical literature
reveals that even the colonial and early independent economies — characterized by
the dominance of export-oriented plantations and by slavery — already portended
traits associated with the latifundio-minifundio system. Indeed, even though formal
ownership titles were only available to a limited number of wealthy individuals, the
norms and conventions governing the usufruct of land were far more permissive. They
allowed free workers to settle in unclaimed land or to dwell in and around large
properties under a variety of associative arrangements, such as labor obligations,
tenancy, and sharecropping (Linhares and da Silva, 1981; da Costa, 1992).
The literature has spawned many examples of these arrangements, including de-
scriptions of small producers using the processing facilities of large sugarcane estates
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in the 18th century in exchange for a share in the output (Antonil, 2007; Ferlini, 1986);
descriptions of small landholders providing temporary wage labor to neighboring cof-
fee plantations in 19th-century Sao Paulo (Lamounier, Lamounier); and descriptions
of the role of non-slaveholders in the supply of food for local markets in the late 18th
and early 19th centuries (da Costa, 1992). In addition to the activities carried out by
free workers, research has also cast light on the ‘peasant practices’ of slaves belong-
ing to export-oriented plantations. These activities were geared to the production of
subsistence goods and the sales of surpluses in local or even central urban markets
(Cardoso, 1979, 1987; Castro, 1980; Linhares and da Silva, 1981; Schwartz, 1983).
New national legislation regulating land ownership was enacted in 1850, at a
time when slave labor was increasingly replaced by free workers. It ruled out the
possibility of granting ownership titles to those occupying and cultivating homesteads
on public and/or unclaimed land, while at the same time making the acquisition of
those lands by independent producers virtually impossible, due to the imposition of
minimum prices and high registration fees (Dean, 1971; Buainain and Pires, 2003). By
preventing the development of a strong, independent family-farming sector, the 1850
legislation also gave new impetus to the forms of labor relations and rent extraction
of the minifundio-latifundio system.
Large field studies of land use and labor relations conducted in the 1960s show
that, at the height of industrialization in Brazil, the latifundio-minifundio system was
still dominant in the countryside. For example, a study by the Brazilian Institute of
Agrarian Reform (IBRA) revealed that a total of 6.3 million workers were involved
in the various forms of labor arrangements described above, often occupying more
than one of these positions over the course of a year (ICAD, 1966; Barraclough and
Domike, 1966; Dillman, 1976).
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3.2.2 Land Distribution and Land Use
The decennial agrarian censuses carried out by the Brazilian national statisti-
cal agency (IBGE) help to illuminate important aspects of the country’s agrarian
structure in 1950-1980, including land distribution, employment, and the use of in-
termediate and capital inputs.
The units of observation in the census are agricultural establishments. An estab-
lishment is defined as any continuous area dedicated to agricultural activities and
subject to a single administration.1 It may be constituted by the administrators’
own land, by third-party land, or by a combination of the two. Importantly, areas
cultivated by sharecroppers are considered unique establishments when the sharecrop-
pers are responsible for their administration; but they are considered only part of an
establishment when they are subject to an administrator other than the sharecropper.
Table 3.1 shows that, in accordance with the descriptions of the latifundio-minifundio
system described above, Brazil has been characterized by extreme land inequality
across agricultural establishments. In 1950, establishments with less than 10 hectares
(ha) accounted for 34.4% of all establishments, but for only 1.3% of the total agricul-
tural area. By contrast, establishments with more than 1,000ha accounted for just
under 1.6% of all establishments, but for 50.9% of the total agricultural area.
Table 3.1 also reveals a swelling of the smallholding sector between 1950 and
1970 which, as further discussed below, is a counterpart of the labor-saving bias
that characterized technical change in the larger establishments. Indeed, by 1970
establishments with less than 10ha accounted for 51.2% of all establishments, up
from 34.4% in 1950. Accordingly, the average area per establishment fell from 4.25ha
to 3.6ha.
1Agricultural activities include crop production, livestock breeding and feeding, forestry, and bee
and silkworm keeping.
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Table 3.1: Share of total establishments, and share of total establishment area, by
area group (%)
< 10 ha 10-100 ha 100-1,000 ha 1,000-10,000 ha > 10,000 ha
Estab. Area Estab. Area Estab. Area Estab. Area Estab. Area
1920 – – – – 24.4 27.6 3.8 37.4 0.26 26.0
1950 34.4 1.3 51.0 15.3 13.0 32.5 1.5 31.5 0.08 19.4
1960 44.8 2.2 44.7 19.0 9.4 34.4 0.9 28.6 0.05 15.6
1970 51.2 3.1 39.3 20.4 8.4 37.0 0.7 27.2 0.03 12.3
1980 50.4 2.5 39.1 17.7 9.5 34.8 0.9 28.7 0.05 16.4
Notes: The table shows the share of establishments of each area group in the total number of establishments (‘Estab.’
columns), and in the total area of all establishments (‘Area’ columns). All numbers are in percent of the total. The
area groups include establishments with a total area of less than 10 hectares (< 10 ha), of between 10 and 100 hectares
(10-100 ha), of between 100 and 1000 hectares (100-1000 ha), of between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares (1,000-10,000 ha),
and of more than 10,000 hectares (> 10,000 ha). Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
Inequality in the size distribution of establishments is reflected in inequality in the
intensity with which land is used. The census defined the following categories of land
use: cropland (for permanent or seasonal crops), pastures (cultivated or natural),
forests (cultivated or natural), and unused but potentially productive land. Figure
E.1 in the Appendix shows that establishments with less than 10ha allocated most of
their land to crop production (60% in 1950). Cropland retains a sizable share of total
land among establishments in the 10-100ha group, but its share steeply declines with
establishment size. For example, in 1950 less than 3% of total land in establishments
of the 1,000-10,000ha group was dedicated to crop production (among establishments
larger than 10,000ha, this proportion was less than 0.1%).
By contrast, the share of natural pastures, forests2 and unused land rises with
establishment size. In 1950, these categories amounted to 90% of total land in estab-
lishments of the 1,000-10,000ha group, and to 97.6% of total land in establishments
2Cultivated forests made up a small proportion of the total land across establishment groups,
and were thus aggregated with natural forests.
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larger than 10,000ha. It stands to reason that a small fraction of natural pastures in
these establishments are likely to have been used for livestock production.
The share of land used productively retained a remarkable degree of stability
between 1950 and 1970. During the 1970s, in turn, this share expanded, particularly
among establishments in the 10-10,000ha size groups. This expansion is consistent
with a more intensive use of land (and a partial reversal of the labor shedding trend)
that occurred in that decade, as further discussed below.
3.3 The Employment Problem
The census defined five main categories of employment in each establishment: the
administrators themselves, permanent employees, temporary employees, sharecrop-
pers and, starting in 1960, workers under ‘other employment arrangements’. Those
receiving either all or most of their compensation in cash were considered employees.
Within this group, those working under contracts longer than a year were classified as
permanent, while the remainder was classified as temporary. Those classified under
other employment arrangements after 1960 included dwellers performing direct labor
services in exchange for abode and land usufruct privileges in the establishment. This
category became less and less important between 1960 and 1980, with its share in
total employment falling from 2.9% to 0.42%. For simplicity, I aggregated them with
the sharecropper category. Importantly, all employment categories included unpaid
family members aiding those directly responsible for performing the work.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of total employment across establishment area
groups in 1950. As expected given Brazil’s dual agrarian structure, establishments
with less than 10ha accounted for a large share of rural employment (20.4%) relative
to their share in total area (1.3%). But most rural employment was generated by
establishments between 10ha and 1,000ha: 72.4% of the total. Establishments above
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1,000ha, in turn, accounted for only 7.2% of total employment, despite occupying
50.9% of total area.
The 10-1,000ha group also accounted for most of wage employment (72% of perma-
nent and 75.7% of temporary employees) and for most of sharecropping arrangements
subordinated to the establishments’ administration (85.4%). As expected, most ad-
ministrators and their family members found employment in establishments with less
than 100ha (84.1%).
Table 3.2: Share of employment categories in 1950, by area group (%).
< 10 ha 10-100 ha 100-1,000 ha 1,000-10,000 ha > 10,000 ha
Total Employment 20.4 46.1 26.3 6.4 0.8
Administrators 29.9 54.2 14.2 1.6 0.1
Permanent Employees 3.5 24.6 48.1 19.8 3.9
Temporary Employees 14.7 41.1 34.6 8.8 0.7
Sharecroppers and Others 3.8 40.8 44.6 10.0 0.7
Notes: The table shows the share of establishments of each area group in the total number of workers of various
employment categories in 1950. The workers in all employment categories also include unpaid family members. All
numbers are in percent of the total of each employment category. The area groups include establishments with a
total area of less than 10 hectares (< 10 ha), of between 10 and 100 hectares (10-100 ha), of between 100 and 1000
hectares (100-1000 ha), of between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares (1,000-10,000 ha), and of more than 10,000 hectares
(> 10,000 ha). Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
Table 3.3 shows the evolution of total agricultural employment and of the shares
of each employment category. The unequivocal trend between 1950 and 1970 is of a
decline in the relative share of wage employment — both permanent and temporary
—, and of a decline in the share of within-establishment sharecropping arrangements.
The counterpart of this decline is an increase in the share of establishment adminis-
trators, which mirrors the relative expansion of smallholdings noted above in Table
3.1. In fact, in can be inferred from Table 3.3 that the absolute number of perma-
nent and temporary employees, as well as of within-establishment sharecroppers, fell
between 1950 and 1970, with the bulk of the decline occurring in the 1960s.
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Together, these aggregate trends suggest intense labor shedding in the medium
and upper strata of establishment sizes — between 10ha and 10,000 ha — which,
despite increasing in absolute number and absolute area, employed less employees
and tenants in 1970 than in 1950. The expansion of the smallholding sector, in turn,
suggests that it acted as a repository for many of the released workers.
Table 3.3: Total employment across farm establishments and distribution by category
Total Permanent Temporary Sharecroppers
Employment Administrator Employees Employees and Others
(in millions) (% of total) (% of total) (% of total) (% of total)
1950 11.0 54.8 12.9 21.0 11.3
1960 15.6 63.0 9.1 19.1 8.8
1970 17.6 80.2 6.6 8.5 4.7
1980 21.2 73.9 10.3 13.1 2.8
Notes: The table shows the total number of persons engaged in Agriculture (first column), and
their distribution by categories of employment. The workers in all employment categories also
include unpaid family members. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
This inference is supported by Figure E.2 in the Appendix, which shows the aver-
age number of workers of each category per establishment, by area group. The first
fact that stands out is a decline in the average number of workers per establishment,
which went from 5.3 in 1950 to 3.6 in 1970 (panel f , first column). This decline was
marked in the establishments above 100ha, and entirely accounted for by the decline
in the relative employment of wage workers and sharecroppers (as seen in panels
b-e). The smallholding sector, in turn, barely showed a decline in employment per
establishment (panel a).
The growth of the larger establishments was also intensive in the “labor-land”
space, as attested by figure 3.1. The figure shows the number of workers (of all types)
per 1,000 hectares of cropland and pastures, by establishment size group. Panels (b)-
(e) show a marked decline in the average labor-land ratio across the larger establish-
ments between 1950 and 1970. The decline approximated 50% among establishments
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above 100ha. The smallholding sector also saw a decline in the ratio, although of
only 8%. The 1970s saw a partial recovery of the ratio in the larger establishments
which, as further discussed in section 3.5, is partly explained by higher yields among
export-oriented crops.
Figure 3.1: Labor-land ratios by size group (in persons per 1,000 hectares of cropland
and pastures).
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Notes: The figures show the ratio between total persons employed and total area of cropland and pastures, by
establishment size group. Total employment includes unpaid family members, permanent employees, temporary
employees, and sharecroppers and other arrangements. Total land includes permanent cropland, temporary crop-
land, natural pastures, and planted pastures. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
Figure 3.1 also shows sharp differences in the level of the labor-land ratio across
size groups. In 1950, for example, the ratio exceed 1,000 workers per 1,000 hectares
among establishments with less than 10ha, but was only 16 among establishments
with 1,000-10,000ha, and 4.5 among establishments with more than 10,000ha. This
unequal distribution of labor-land ratios by establishment size shows that market
transactions fail to eliminate the link between an unequal distribution of land owner-
ship, on the one hand, and an unequal distribution of both land and factor proportions
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across operational units, on the other hand (Sen, 1981; Rao, 1986; U¨nal, 2009). It
also fully explains why, despite the fact that the ratio fell across all size groups be-
tween 1950 and 1970, the sector-wide average actually rose, as seen in panel (f). This
increase is fully accounted for by the relative expansion of an increasingly land-scarce
smallholding sector which provided an outlet for the labor made redundant elsewhere.
3.4 Government Policy and Technical Change
3.4.1 Credit, Price, and Trade Policies
Throughout the period analyzed, the state aimed to shape two fundamental sets
of prices relevant for technical change in agriculture: the prices of modern inputs and
the price of credit. Until the mid 1960s, the multiple exchange rate regime was the
linchpin of both policies. This regime was adopted in 1953, in response to severe
foreign exchange shortages that had beset the country in the post-war years. It
discriminated against both non-essential imports and traditional exports. Importers
of non-essential goods, which included most consumer goods, needed to purchase
limited foreign exchange quotas at auctions operated by the Bank of Brazil. The
resulting premiums led to depreciated exchange rates. By the same token, traditional
exports — primarily coffee and other agricultural commodities — faced appreciated
exchange rates.
In return, the regime subsidized non-traditional exports and ‘essential imports’.
Those importing goods that were considered essential for the industrialization pro-
cess, but not produced domestically, faced highly appreciated exchange rates. These
goods included machinery and intermediate inputs, whose demand had soared with
industrialization. Though not used by industry, tractors and chemical fertilizers were
also classified in this category.
Figure 3.2 shows estimates of the rate of implicit taxation of agricultural exports,
and the rate of implicit subsidization of tractors and fertilizers between 1953 and
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1966; these rates were calculated with reference to a purchasing-power parity rate
based on the 1938 nominal exchange rate.3 As we can see, relative to this benchmark
agricultural exports were highly taxed during the 1950s, whereas agricultural inputs
were highly subsidized.
The input subsidies served a political aim, as they compensated the agricultural
sector — in particular the larges farmers, which came to use modern inputs more
intensively — for the indirect taxation of export producers. But they also served
an economic aim, as they made modern inputs available at a lower price relative to
the domestic prices of land and labor. As argued forcefully by Smith (1969), these
subsidies were one of the two main instruments on which policy-makers pinned their
hopes for the modernization of agriculture.
Figure 3.2: Implicit tax (<0) or subsidy (>0) due to effective exchange rates (in %)
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Notes: This figure shows the degree to which the effective exchange rates for exports of agricultural goods, imports of
fertilizers, and imports of tractors deviated from an estimated purchasing power parity rate using the 1938 nominal
exchange rate as reference. Positive values indicate that trade and exchange rate policies granted an implicit subsidy
to those transactions, while negative values indicate that they exacted an implicit tax. Source: Homem de Melo
(1979).
The other instrument was subsidized credit. Throughout the period analyzed, the
public sector provided the bulk of agricultural credit, with a key role played by the
3For more details, see Homem de Melo (1979) and the references therein.
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Bank of Brazil. The agricultural credit system was organized in 1937. Until the early
1950s, it focused almost entirely on providing working capital to finance the agricul-
tural production cycle; accordingly, it was managed as a short-run policy instrument.
But in 1952 a large reform created long-term credit lines for capital investment —
mainly for establishing permanent crops and for machinery —, and secured expanded
sources of funding. These sources included mandatory contributions from pension
funds and a share of compulsory bank reserves (the Bank of Brazil had monetary
authority privileges until the creation of the Central Bank in 1964).
The main source of funding for the reformed system, however, came from the
multiple exchange rate system. Even after accounting for the subsidization of non-
traditional exports and essential imports, the Bank of Brazil — which was given the
monopoly of foreign exchange transactions — earned large quasi-fiscal net revenues
from operating the system. The 1953 law destined the bulk of these revenues to
finance capital investment in agriculture at low interest. For the remainder of the
decade, these revenues provided most of the funding for agricultural credit, often
exceeding the Bank’s financing needs for that purpose (Munhoz, 1982).
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of agricultural credit extended by the Bank of
Brazil.4 The solid line in panel (a) shows the stock of real agricultural credit from
1944 to 1980, in log scale. To help identify different subperiods of credit expansion,
I used a goodness of fit procedure to endogenously estimate the number and location
of structural breakpoints in the growth rate of series (see Bai and Perron, 1998,
2002).5 The procedure identified four subperiods: 1944-1951, 1952-1967, 1968-1974,
4See the notes to figure 3.3 for detailed sources and definitions of agricultural credit
5I modeled the growth in real agricultural credit using an exponential model of the form:
ln(cred)t = ai + git + t, where cred denotes the stock of real agricultural credit by the bank
of Brazil, t denotes years, and the subscript i denotes different sub-periods. Subject to a minimum
segment length and a goodness of fit criterion — both chosen by the researcher —, the Bai-Perron
procedure estimates the optimal number of sub-periods i, and the years in which the breaks oc-
curred. As is standard, I chose a minimum segment length of 6 years (the next integer to 15% of
the sample size), and used the BIC information criterion.
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and 1975-1980. I then fit linear trend models to each subperiod, in order to estimate
the within-period growth rate in real agricultural credit. The vertical lines in panel
(a) show the breakpoints, while the dashed lines show the linear trend models. The
numbers above the dashed lines show the average growth rate of real agricultural
credit in each sub-period (in % per year).6
Figure 3.3: Total agricultural credit by the Bank of Brazil.
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Notes: The figures show the evolution of agricultural credit extended by the Bank of Brazil. In all years, the
measure of agricultural credit is defined as the outstanding balance of total agricultural credit. The breakdown of
total agricultural credit available in the Statistical Yearbook of Brazil varied over the years. The total for 1951-1967
is the sum of current account loans and discounted notes, for both crop and livestock agriculture. The total for
1968-1972 is the sum of production and commercialization credit, for both agriculture and livestock. The total
for 1974-1980 is the sum of credit for production, commercialization, and investment in the Portfolio of General
and Rural Credit (“Carteira de Credito Geral e Rural”) of the Bank of Brazil. The Statistical Yearbooks did not
report credit numbers for 1973 and 1977, which were linearly interpolated. The solid line in Panel (a) shows the
logarithm of real agricultural credit. The vertical lines indicate the years in which a structural break in the growth
rate of real agricultural credit was identified by the Bai-Perron procedure. The dashed lines show the linear models
fit for each of the resulting subperiods. The numbers above the dashed lines show the slope of the linear model,
i.e. the average growth rate of real agricultural credit in each sub-period (in % per year). The linear models and
growth rates were estimated using the procedure in Boyce (1986a). Sources: IBGE Statistical Yearbook of Brazil,
various years (for agricultural credit); Fundacao Getulio Vargas, for the general price index (IGP-DI); and IBGE,
for agricultural GDP.
6To avoid discontinuity biases, after the estimating the breakpoints, I re-estimated the trend
models with a restriction to ensure that the trendlines meet at each breakpoint (see Boyce, 1986a,
for more details).
92
As we can see, after a moderate decline in 1944-1951, a period of sustained growth
in agricultural credit began in 1952, coinciding with the reform of the system and the
subsequent inflow of operational funds from the multiple exchange system. From
1952 until 1967, the average rate of expansion in real credit exceeded 6% per year.
Accordingly, the ratio of rural credit to value added in agriculture rose from just over
7% in 1951 to almost 20% in 1967, as shown in panel (b).
In addition to expanding the volume of credit, the state used its control over
the Bank of Brazil to grant sizable subsidies to agriculture by charging negative
real interest rates. Granted, nominal rates throughout the 1950s and early 1960s
were subject to government controls. As a result, effective real interest rates for
both depositors and borrowers were often negative, despite the additional fees and
commissions charged by private banks (Christoffersen, 1969; Syvrud, 1972). Still, the
existing evidence suggests that interest rates for agriculture received further subsidies
and remained consistently below average market lending rates.
Table 3.4 shows the nominal and real rates charged by the Bank of Brazil for
tractor acquisition, along with the WPI inflation rate. As we can see, real rates were
consistently negative, especially in the first half of the 1960s and second half of the
1970s. Even though data for the 1950s are not available, a conservative upper bound
can be obtained by examining average market lending rates, which were also negative
during most of the decade.
A number of policy changes in the early 1960s led to a reform of the rural credit
system, and to yet another growth acceleration in the volume of subsidized credit.
First, as part of an effort revert the anti-export bias of trade and exchange rate
policies, the multiple exchange system was abolished in 1961. At once, this change
reduced a source of subsidies for imported agricultural machinery and inputs, and
deprived the Bank of Brazil from its main source of funding for rural credit.
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Table 3.4: Bank of brazil interest rates for tractor acquisition and average market
lending rates (%/year)
Interest Rates for Average Market
Tractor Acquisition Lending Rates Inflation
Nominal Real Nominal Real
1952 14 2.4 11.4
1953 13 -7.1 21.6
1954 13 -9.6 25.1
1955 13.8 1.4 12.2
1956 14.5 -9.2 26.1
1957 15.1 9.2 5.4
1958 16 -8.0 26.1
1959 17.5 -14.7 37.7
1960 18.6 -9.3 30.7
1961 8 -28.1 18.2 -21.3 50.2
1962 9 -29.3 21 -21.5 54.1
1963 11 -39.0 27.5 -29.9 82.0
1964 11 -40.5 33.2 -28.6 86.5
1965 17.25 -13.8 36.9 0.6 36.1
1966 17 -14.6 32.7 -3.2 37.0
1967 18 -5.1 34.1 7.9 24.3
1968 15 -7.6 33.7 7.4 24.5
1969 15 -3.4 30.9 10.0 19.0
1970 15 -3.7 19.5
1971 15 -3.8 19.5
1972 15 -0.6 15.7
1973 15 -1.1 16.3
1974 15 -14.2 34.1
1975 15 -11.5 29.9
1976 15 -21.6 46.7
1977 15 -16.7 38.1
1978 15 -18.7 41.5
1979 38 -23.1 79.4
1980 38 -34.5 110.6
Notes: The table shows (i) the mandated nominal interest rates — with the corresponding real
interest rates — charged on loans for tractor acquisition through the national system of rural
credit centered on the Bank of Brazil; and (ii) the average market lending rates charged by private
banks (inclusive of fees and other charges), also with the corresponding real interest rates. The
real rates were computed with reference to the general price index (IGP-DI). Sources: Sanders
(1974) and Sayad (1984), for nominal interest on loans for tractor acquisition; Christoffersen
(1969) (until 1967) and Syvrud (1972) (after 1967) for average market lending rates; Fundacao
Getulio Vargas, for the general price index (IGP-DI).
Second, as part of the overall model of import substitution industrialization, do-
mestic production of tractors was established between 1959 and 1961 (Amato Neto,
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1985). The models produced domestically were instantly given tariff protection from
similar, imported models. As a result, for the remainder of the 1960s tractor im-
ports were restricted to high-horsepower models, and by 1970 they had declined to
negligible levels (Sanders, 1974).
Domestic production of tractors benefited from pecuniary and non-pecuniary ex-
ternalities bestowed by the growing domestic automotive industry, which led to the
attainment of fast reductions in unit costs. In addition, in 1967 the government ex-
empted the tractor industry from the industrial products tax, and from tariffs on
capital good imports. As a result, before the end of the decade domestic tractor
prices had converged to international levels (Homem de Melo, 1979; Graham et al.,
1987).
The early 1960s also saw an effort to promote domestic production of fertilizers.
The exchange rate reform of 1961 was followed, in 1966, by the introduction of tariffs
and other import restrictions. Unlike tractor imports, however, fertilizer imports
remained considerable throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Until the mid 1970s, the share
of domestic fertilizers in total apparent consumption of chemical (NPK) fertilizers
remained similar to its level in the 1950s. Domestic production remained concentrated
in simpler varieties of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers; the production of more
concentrated varieties only began in the 1970s, and by the end of the decade domestic
production of potassium fertilizers had yet to begin (Ferreira and dos Anjos, 1983).
Data from the State of Sao Paulo indicates that the policy shift led to a sharp in-
crease in the average real price of chemical fertilizers in the initial years after 1961 —
by 1965, this average price had more than doubled relative to its value in 1960. Start-
ing in the mid 1960s, however, international fertilizer prices declined substantially,
undoing most of the negative impact of the policy shift. Average prices returned to
the levels they had in the 1950s until the energy shocks of the mid 1970s brought a
worldwide increase in fertilizer prices (Ferreira and dos Anjos, 1983).
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The third policy change was the implementation of a system of incentives for
promoting the growth and diversification of agricultural exports. The main aims
were to diversify the export portfolio away from coffee — which had seen a boom
in the post-war years and accounted for the bulk of agricultural exports —, and to
increase the share of processed as opposed to raw agricultural exports.
The government thus adopted a set of policies designed to offset the anti-export
bias that had weighted on the agricultural goods. Importantly, however, the bulk of
the benefits accrued to producers of processed agricultural goods, as opposed to the
agricultural producers themselves. Processing industries were given direct premiums,
tax exemptions, and drawbacks on trade tariffs in return for exports. In addition,
the government implemented quantitative export restrictions on raw goods, leading
domestic producers to supply processing industries at a cost below that of world
markets. As a result, by the mid 1970s the implicit subsidies for raw agricultural
exports had remained negative, while the implicit subsidies for processed agricultural
goods had become positive and large (Graham et al., 1987).
In sum, the end of preferential exchange rates for imported tractors and fertilizers
reduced the implicit financial transfers to agriculture that, until the mid 1960s, had
operated through input prices. In turn, the adverse shift in agriculture’s terms of trade
relative to processing industries failed to undo the implicit taxation of agricultural
exports. In the face of these developments, compensatory transfers to agriculture,
which before occurred through both subsidized input prices and subsidized credit,
now fell almost entirely on subsidized credit. It is not surprising therefore that the
rural credit policy received a major overhaul in 1965, under considerable influence of
rural interests in congress (No´brega, 1985).
This overhaul occurred amid a broad reform of the financial system, which in-
cluded the creation of the Central Bank of Brazil in 1964. Despite efforts to increase
the provision of rural credit by private banks, the Bank of Brazil remained the cen-
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terpiece of the system. The main sources of funding included demand deposits held
with the Bank of Brazil and, increasingly, transfers from the Central Bank. During
the 1970s and 1980s, these transfers were an important mechanism for expanding the
monetary base. Although it is impossible to know the destination of these transfers
exactly (as they were recorded as a single item in the Bank of Brazil’s balance sheet),
rough estimates indicate that sales of public debt instruments and expansion of the
monetary base amounted to between 20% and 30% of total funding for rural credit
until the mid 1970s, and to nearly 50% in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as inflation
accelerated and increased the flow of subsidies to borrowers (Sayad, 1984).
Figure 3.3 shows that a remarkable acceleration in the stock of rural credit by
the Bank of Brazil occurred after the reform. The Bai-Perron test indeed identified
a structural break in 1967, and between 1968 and 1974 the real value of rural credit
grew by an average of 26.5% per year. During 1975-1980 growth slowed down, but
remained respectable at 8.8% per year. Data for the mid 1970s shows that around
25% of the stock of credit was directed for long-term financing of capital formation,
primarily the acquisition of machinery7.
The reform also maintained strict state control over interest rates. As before, both
the Bank of Brazil and private banks were required to charge below-market nominal
interest rates for rural credit. The implied real interest rates remained negative
throughout the 1965-1980 period, especially after inflation began to accelerate again
in 1973. As shown in table 3.4, nominal rates for tractor financing were fixed at
15% per year from 1968 to 1978, while inflation averaged 27% per year. Rates for
the acquisition of fertilizers were even lower during the mid 1970s (Homem de Melo,
1979) .
7Source: Statistical Yearbook of Brazil, 1975-1981 (see also the notes to figure 3.3)
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3.4.1.1 The Distribution of Subsidies
As noted above, the system to subsidized credit and, at least until the early
1960s, the system of subsidized imports of tractors and chemical inputs were the main
mechanisms through which the agricultural sector received compensatory transfers
from the non-agricultural sector. They were also the main instruments deployed by
the State to step up the rate technical progress in agriculture.
The distribution of these transfers, however, was heavily concentrated on the
larger establishments which, in the eyes of policymakers, were poised to lead the
modernization of Brazilian agriculture. They benefited, first, because compared to
smallholdings modern inputs made up a greater share of their total expenditures.
Any price subsidy therefore had a greater proportional impact on their costs. As
suggested by Sanders and Ruttan (1978), the combination of subsidies for modern
inputs, on the one hand, and interregional differences the production techniques, on
the other hand, can explain changes in the pattern of comparative advantage in the
production of important crops during the 1950-1980 period. These changes often hurt
backward regions (such as the Northeastern states), which were characterized by a
greater share of smallholdings and by a lower use of modern inputs.
The larger establishments also benefited from the fact that, throughout the period
analyzed, public rural credit remained concentrated on larger establishments. Panel
(a) of Figure 3.4 shows the share of establishments in each size group that reported
to have received credit from public sources in the indicated years.8 The agrarian
census of 1950 did not include a questionnaire about credit, but one can infer that
the share of establishments receiving credit must have been quite low across size
groups. Indeed in 1960, which is midway through the first expansion period, only
8Public credit was almost entirely dominated by the Bank of Brazil throughout the period ana-
lyzed. Public rural credit also thwarted private rural credit — public sources accounted for 78% of
the total value of credit in 1970, and for 86% in 1980.
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2.8% of establishments in the 10-100ha group reported to have received credit in that
year. The proportion was higher among establishments in the upper size brackets,
but it barely exceeded 10%. In turn, at 0.6% the share of smallholdings receiving
credit was negligible.
By 1970, shortly after the end of the first expansion period, public credit had
become more widely disseminated among the dynamic segments with areas between
10ha and 10,000ha — 13.4% of the establishments in the 10-100ha group, and around
20% of the establishments in the 100-10,000ha groups reported to have received credit
that year. In 1980, after the marked expansion of the 1970s, around 30% of the
establishments in these brackets reported to have received credit. By contrast, at
2.5% in 1970 and 8% in 1980, the share of smallholders with access to credit remained
low.
Panel (b) shows the distribution of the total value of loans in 1970 and 1980
across size groups. The bulk of this value was concentrated in the dynamic segments.
The 10-10,000ha size groups accounted for 48.4% of all establishments in 1970, but
received 92.68% of the total value of public loans that year.
The distribution of loans by value across establishment size groups, despite being
unequal, was stable between 1970 and 1980. But Graham et al. (1987) present evi-
dence that the intraportfolio distribution of loan sizes became more unequal in the
period: loans for crop agriculture classified as large accounted for 20% of the total
loan value in 1966; by 1976, that proportion had risen to 53%.9 By the same token,
the Gini coefficient of loan values across 34 size categories went from .60 in 1969 to
.71 in 1979.
9Loans were classified as large if they exceed 500 times the going value of the monthly minimum
wage.
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Figure 3.4: Dissemination and distribution of credit from public sources.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the share of establishments of each size group that reported to have obtained external credit
from public sources in the indicated year. Data for 1960 refers to 1959. Panel (b) shows the share of each size group
in the total value of loans from public sources in the indicated years. Public sources include state-run banks and
government agencies. They accounted for 78% of the total value of credit in 1970, and for 86% in 1980. Source:
IBGE Agrarian Census.
As shown in figure 3.3, by the end of the 1970s the value of rural credit from the
Bank of Brazil alone had reached around 80% of agricultural value added. This fact,
in conjunction with greater inequality in loan values, suggests that agricultural credit
is likely to have exceeded the financing needs of most of the benefited establishments,
leading to the diversion of internal funds to investment opportunities in assets outside
of agriculture (Sayad, 1984; Graham et al., 1987).
Finally, Helfand (2001) shows that, controlling for establishment area, produc-
ers growing tradable commodities with high world prices were more likely to receive
subsidized credit, indicating discrimination in favor of export commodities — as de-
scribed in section 3.5 below, this discrimination in credit markets correlated with an
uneven evolution of land yields across crops.
This section reviewed the two main policy instruments utilized by the state to
promote the use of modern inputs: the concession, until the mid 1960s, of subsidies
for importing tractors and chemical inputs; and the massive expansion of subsidized
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credit for input acquisition throughout the period of analysis. No evidence exists that,
by themselves, the subsidies granted by these policies introduced particular factor-
saving biases. Indeed, as indicated by the subsidies for the acquisition of tractors
and fertilizers, the subsidies per dollar seem to have been similar for land-saving and
labor-saving inputs.
And yet, as seen in section 3.3 (and in section 3.5 below), technical change in the
sector did exhibit a labor-saving bias. Thus, a plausible explanation for the observed
bias is the very unequal distribution of these subsidies across establishment sizes, loan
sizes, and crops. As a result, the policies disproportionately benefited producers who
were more likely to favor labor-saving innovations as a result of higher supervision
and effort-extraction costs, and to resist land-saving innovations in order to preserve
monoposony power in local labor markets and political influence (Griffin, 1974; Rao,
2005; De Janvry, 1978).
A second reason, as suggested in the Introduction, is the fact that land-saving
innovations require packages of complementary inputs, such as irrigation and wa-
ter control, improved farming practices, etc. In most successful cases of agricultural
transformation, the state has played a crucial role in the provision of these comple-
mentary inputs by investing in research and extension, and in rural infrastructure. It
largely failed to do so in Brazil, as the next two sections show.
3.4.2 Research and Extension
As described in the Introduction, labor-saving innovations are typically embod-
ied in mechanical inputs, whereas land-saving innovations are typically embodied in
packages combining complementary chemical, biological and infrastructural inputs,
as well as blueprints for intensive crop and livestock management practices.
Under most legal systems, the benefits of developing mechanical innovations are
liable to be privately appropriated. Moreover, once developed these innovations are
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embodied in private goods that can be traded internationally and that often, as in
the case of tractors, require little adaptation to local conditions. Finally, by reducing
labor costs without having a strong effect on output, they typically allow for adopters
to privately appropriate most of the cost savings. These characteristics of mechanical
innovation allow for a strong participation of the private sector — including domestic
and multinational firms — in their generation and diffusion.
With regard to land-saving innovations, on the other hand, the benefits of devel-
oping key components of the required packages are not liable to be appropriated by
private entrepreneurs. The resulting market failures have required collective institu-
tions to play a crucial role in their development and provision. These collective insti-
tutions have included international agencies, national and regional agencies funded
by the state, and sectoral agencies funded by interest groups (de Janvry and Dethier,
1985).
To be sure, some of the innovations that comprise land-saving packages can be
profitably provided by private firms. Examples include hybrid seeds whose genetic
characteristics are lost after a single use, or pesticides that can be patented. But
due to the inherently complementary character of land-saving innovations, they must
often be combined with fertilizers, water control infrastructure, and intensive agro-
nomic practices that more closely resemble collective goods. Moreover, even privately
developed land-saving inputs often cannot be traded internationally without adapta-
tion to local conditions. In this case, the incipient indigenous research capabilities
of many developing countries may require public and other collective institutions to
agglutinate the required financial and technical resources to carry out such adaption.
As a response to these challenges, national agricultural research agencies were
instituted by most Latin American countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Al-
though primarily funded by the State, these agencies operated with a fair degree of
autonomy from the government bureaucracy in order to attract qualified researchers
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and engage in long-term projects. In their first decades of operation, their main fo-
cus was on adapting international technologies to local conditions and ensuring their
dissemination through a network of extension stations (Pineiro and Trigo, 1983).
Despite this continental trend, the Brazilian public network of research and exten-
sion remained severely underdeveloped during most of the 1950-1980 period. In fact,
Brazil lacked a national research agency operating according to the aforementioned
model until the establishment of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
(Embrapa), along with its related extension network, in 1974. Although Embrapa
represented a qualitative leap for agricultural research in Brazil, its initial focus on
biological technologies with long gestation periods meant that its projects did not
begin to bear fruit until the late 1970s — essentially falling out of the period of fast
industrialization analyzed in this paper (Gonc¸alves Neto, 1997).
Until then, public agricultural research at the federal level was of small scale and
consensually regarded as ineffective. Most federal research efforts were subordinated
to the Ministry of Agriculture, suffering from low budgets, bureaucratic hurdles on
hiring and compensation, low levels of qualification among researchers, and poor
integration with extension services (Schuh, 1970; Pastore and Alves, 1984). Surveys
indeed revealed that in 1965 the Federal research program employed less researchers
than the program administered by the State of Sao Paulo, which also invested more
on agricultural research than the Federal government until the creation of Embrapa
(Smith, 1969; da Silva et al., 1980).
Federal support for extension has received a more positive evaluation although it,
too, fell short of achieving the required scale of operation. The centerpiece of the
system were the Rural Credit and Technical Assistance Associations (Acars). The
first Acar was created in the state of Minas Gerais in 1948 and initially operated with
joint support from the State government and the American International Association
for Economic and Social Development (AIA). It spawned similar organizations in
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other states, which in 1956 formed a national network (Abcar). In 1964, the Federal
government created an agency designed to promote the Acar system while preserving
its administrative autonomy. By the mid 1960s, the Federal government had become
the main source of funds for the Acars (Schuh, 1970).
As federal involvement in the system increased, the Acars transitioned from a
model focused on providing small loans and technical assistance to small producers
to a model focused on larger farmers (Gonc¸alves Neto, 1997). The shift towards
larger producers was reinforced when, in 1969, the Central Bank conditioned access
to the program of subsidized credit to the use of technical assistance (Galletti, 1974).
As seen above, subsidized credit was heavily concentrated on the more dynamic and
larger establishments.
Despite encouraging evaluations of cases in which Acar’s actions were able to raise
land yields (see, e.g. Ribeiro and Wharton Jr, 1969), the Acar system only reached
a small share of Brazilian municipalities, and in the 1960s it was still smaller than
the extension system administered by the state of Sao Paulo (Smith, 1969). With
the creation of Embrapa in 1974, the Abcars were extinguished and replaced by a
network of state-based extension agencies, coordinated by a central agency.
Given the absence of an effective national research program, the only successful
cases of research and extension until the creation of Embrapa came through the efforts
of crop-specific agencies or through the effort of agencies funded by individual states.
A successful example of a crop-specific agency is the Executive Planning Com-
mission for Cacao (CEPLAC). Created in response to a sectoral crisis in 1957, it was
funded through a federally-enforced export tax on raw and processed cacao beans.
Its operational model integrated research and extension, resulting in impressive yield
gains through the 1960s and 1970s. Another example comes from the corn sector:
in the early 1950s, a joint venture of the International Basic Economy Corpora-
tion (IBEC) and local researchers gave rise to a strong research program under the
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Agroceres corporation. Their development of hybrid seeds in tight cooperation with
producers led corn to be one of the few domestically-oriented crops that saw yield
gains in the 1950-1980 period (see section 3.5).
Regarding state agencies, it is a consensual view that the State of Sao Paulo ran the
only effective programs at a large enough scale. It included a research agency funded
by the state’s secretariat of agriculture (the Agronomic Institute of Campinas, IAC)
and its own extension network (Sao Paulo did not participate in the Acar system).
Its focus was on the State’s main export crops. For example, beginning in the 1930s
the IAC ran a successful cotton research program which led to the development and
dissemination of high-yielding varieties (see Ayer and Schuh, 1972, for a positive
evaluation). A similarly successful program developed a high-yielding variety of coffee
in the 1940s.
Most of these programs exemplify cases of successful collective action by homo-
geneous interest groups who often held a common stake in a crop, were concentrated
geographically, faced an elastic demand for their output, and wielded significant po-
litical power. They were able to form crop-specific private research agencies or, more
commonly, to induce state authorities to create research programs focused on their
activities.
In sum, the development of national institutions of research and extension during
the period was generally slow (even for Latin American standards) and insufficient.
The founding of Embrapa represented a qualitative leap, but its benefits fell largely
out of the period analyzed. Using the terminology of de Janvry and Dethier (1985),
the state failed to ‘act from above’ by designing national-level research programs
reflecting a wide spectrum of priorities. By contrast, most examples of success were
concentrated on a handful of crops, often under the influence of powerful interest
groups of large producers which were able to activate the state ‘from below’.
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3.4.3 Rural Infrastructure and Other Policies
As with research and extension, the development of rural infrastructure was un-
even and generally insufficient, especially until the 1970s. Domestic food supply was
widely perceived to be price inelastic in the short run, a perception that was re-
inforced by episodes of food price inflation during the 1950s and early 1960s. The
policy consensus at the time blamed supply rigidities on poor marketing, storage, and
distribution infrastructure. Accordingly, these areas were the main focus of public
investment.
In the second half of the 1950s, the Brazilian government undertook an ambi-
tious program of infrastructural investment aimed at supporting the deepening of
import substitution industrialization toward consumer durables and capital goods. A
hallmark of this program was the development of a modern road network — a pro-
cess which, along with the development of the local auto industry, continued apace
throughout the rest of the period analyzed (Lessa, 1964). The dramatic expansion of
the road network was supplemented by the development of public and private storage
facilities, and of infrastructure for the wholesale distribution of agricultural produce
in the main urban areas.
The expansion of transportation, storage, and marketing infrastructure has been
credited with reducing wedges between farm gate and urban wholesale prices of agri-
cultural goods (Smith, 1969). At the same time, however, it enabled agricultural
growth to proceed in an extensive manner, further contributing to the maintenance
of the existing pattern of land use (Nicholls, 1975). By contrast, public investment was
insufficient in other types of infrastructure that, due to technical complementarity,
could lead to a greater degree of adoption of land-saving inputs.
Irrigation provides a telling example. Contemporary studies have shown that
a large share of the country’s agricultural area stands to benefit from irrigation
(Christofidis, 1999). Localized studies during the period analyzed had also pointed
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to the benefits of irrigation in several areas, including the semi-arid and densely pop-
ulated areas of the Northeastern states, and rice agriculture in the Southern region
(Schuh, 1970).
Table 3.5: Share of cultivated land under irrigation, by area group (%)
< 10 ha 10-100 ha 100-1,000 ha 1,000-10,000 ha > 10,000 ha
1950 – – – – –
1960 1.13 1.02 0.87 0.89 0.76
1970 1.02 1.29 1.33 1.18 0.98
1980 1.74 1.31 1.34 1.09 0.84
Notes: The table shows the share of cultivated land under irrigation, by establishment area group.
Cultivated land includes permanent cropland, temporary cropland, and cultivated pastures. The
area groups include establishments with a total area of less than 10 hectares (< 10 ha), of between
10 and 100 hectares (10-100 ha), of between 100 and 1000 hectares (100-1000 ha), of between 1,000
and 10,000 hectares (1,000-10,000 ha), and of more than 10,000 hectares (> 10,000 ha). Source:
IBGE Agrarian Census.
Due to the lumpy character of investment projects in irrigation and water control,
the state has often played a role in implementing the required infrastructure. But
despite the potential benefits, investment in irrigation projects had been low before
1950, and remained low throughout the 1950-1980 period. Table 3.5 shows that in
1960 less than 1% of cultivated land (including cropland and cultivated pastures) was
under a system of irrigation of any kind. Interestingly, little variation existed across
establishments of different sizes. This share barely changed in the following twenty
years.
The neglect of irrigation and water control infrastructure is concerning, as studies
in other contexts have suggested that it enhances crop response to fertilizers and
the performance of high-yielding varieties (Ishikawa, 1967; De Janvry, 1971; Boyce,
1986b; Banerjee, 2010).
The low investment in rural electrification until 1970 provides another example
of uneven development in rural infrastructure. Indeed, table 3.6 shows that in 1970
less than 3% of all agricultural establishments purchased electricity from other par-
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ties, such as public utility companies (a much smaller proportion generated its own
electricity). Again, little variation occurred across establishment sizes.
Investment in electrification fared somewhat better in the 1970s, but it the benefits
were concentrated on the larger establishments. By 1980, the share of establishments
in the 10-10,000ha area groups with access to purchased electricity had risen to around
14%, while the figure for smallholdings was only 5%.
Table 3.6: Share of establishments using purchased electricity, by area group (%)
< 10 ha 10-100 ha 100-1,000 ha 1,000-10,000 ha > 10,000 ha
1950 – – – – –
1960 – – – – –
1970 2.5 4.1 4.0 4.9 3.2
1980 5.5 14.0 13.8 15.9 8.5
Notes: The table shows the share of establishments that declared to have acquired electricity from
other parties (including public utility companies). The area groups include establishments with a
total area of less than 10 hectares (< 10 ha), of between 10 and 100 hectares (10-100 ha), of between
100 and 1000 hectares (100-1000 ha), of between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares (1,000-10,000 ha), and
of more than 10,000 hectares (> 10,000 ha). Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
Public investment programs for agriculture focused on transportation, storage,
and commercialization infrastructure, while short-changing irrigation, electricity, and
other complements to private land-saving inputs. As a result, they gave further im-
petus to a land-extensive pattern of growth centered on the larger and more dynamic
establishments. These uneven priorities combined with a generalized underinvestment
on basic and applied education, particularly in rural areas, and further contributed
to hold back the adoption of land-saving innovations.
3.5 Modern Inputs and Land Yields
3.5.1 Use of Tractors and Fertilizers
It is a consensual view that, at the start of the period under study, the use of
modern inputs was extremely low across most of Brazilian agriculture, save for few
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exceptions (see, e.g. Nicholls and Paiva, 1965, for a detailed description based on
extensive fieldwork). The policies just reviewed were successful at igniting a process
of technical modernization although, not surprisingly given the foregoing analysis,
they introduced marked labor-saving biases, especially until the 1970s. This section
documents this uneven process of modernization, showing that, while the adoption
of mechanized techniques responded promptly with a sharp acceleration in the early
1950s, the use of land-saving techniques lagged behind, at least until the 1970s.
Before recent editions, the agrarian censuses brought limited information on the
use of modern inputs at the level of agricultural establishments. Still, it is possible
to discern the main trends in the use of labor-saving and land-saving inputs by the
existing data on the use of tractors and fertilizers.
Table 3.7 shows different indicators of tractorization by establishment size group.
The first set of columns shows the average number of tractors per 1,000 establish-
ments, the second set shows the average number of tractors per 1,000ha of cultivated
land (i.e. excluding natural pastures, forests, and unused land), and the third set
shows the number of tractors per 1,000 workers, excluding the administrator’s family
members. The table shows both the level and the compound annual growth rate of
these indicators.
The table highlights, first, the low utilization of tractors in 1950 across establish-
ment sizes. It can be inferred that only a small fraction of establishments possessed a
tractor, and that tractorization was low even among the larger establishments. The
three decades following 1950, however, witnessed a revolution in the use of tractors.
By 1980, the average number of tractors per establishment had increased over 25
times nationwide, including an increase of over 100 times among establishments of
the 10-100ha area group. Similarly large increases can also be discerned for the the
number of tractors per area of cultivated land and per worker. As shown by Sanders
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and Ruttan (1978), tractorization accelerated in most regions, but it was particularly
strong in the more advanced agricultural areas of the South and Southeast.
Interestingly, establishments above 10ha show a remarkable degree of convergence
regarding the tractor-to-worker ratio. While the coefficient of variation of this ratio
across these area groups was 0.63 in 1950, it had declined to 0.05 in 1970. This
convergence reflects a faster rate of adoption of tractors relative to workers among
establishments of the 100-1,000ha area group and, especially, of the 10-100ha area
group. As seen above, together these establishments accounted for the lion’s share
of wage employees and (within-establishment) sharecroppers in Brazilian agriculture.
The spread of tractorization across these establishments is thus a prime proximate
cause of the relative and absolute declines in labor absorption outside of the small-
holding sector.
This implied convergence in factor proportions in the ‘labor-tractor’ space also sug-
gests that the techniques the were profitably made available to the rapidly-modernizing
segment of medium establishments were similar to those available to the segment of
larger establishments, a phenomenon classically described by De Janvry (1971) and
De Janvry and Mart´ınez (1972) with respect to Argentinean agriculture.
Most soils in Brazil are considered low in nutrients (especially phosphate) and high
in acidity. As a consequence, there is great potential for increasing yields by using
chemical fertilizers and lime. For example, estimates for the early 1960s claimed that
about a third of the cultivated land required the use of lime to lower soil acidity
(Schuh, 1970).
Starting in 1960, the agrarian census began to collect information on the use
of both chemical fertilizers and lime. Unfortunately, the questionnaire only asked
whether establishments used either of these inputs — with no quantitative information
about consumption or area coverage. The information is summarized in Table 3.8.
Despite the limitations of its binary character, the table confirms the notion that,
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Table 3.7: Indices of tractor utilization, by area group
Tractors per Tractors per Tractors per
1,000 Establishments 1,000 Hectaresa 1,000 Workersb
Level Annual Level Annual Level Annual
Growth Growth Growth
< 10 ha 1950 0.1 0.05 0.20
1960 2.0 32.1% 0.70 30.9% 3.67 34.0%
1970 4.8 9.4% 1.91 10.6% 29.47 23.2%
1980 11.3 8.9% 4.45 8.8% 47.82 5.0%
10-100 ha 1950 1.1 0.10 0.64
1960 14.0 29.1% 1.22 28.2% 8.99 30.3%
1970 35.3 9.7% 3.22 10.2% 51.51 19.1%
1980 116.9 12.7% 7.89 9.4% 119 8.7%
100-1,000 ha 1950 15.4 0.31 2.03
1960 87.3 18.9% 1.56 17.4% 13.30 20.7%
1970 153.4 5.8% 2.86 6.2% 48.11 13.7%
1980 414.1 10.4% 4.63 4.9% 94.32 7.0%
1,000- 1950 85.9 0.39 4.37
-10,000 ha 1960 290.9 13.0% 1.06 10.4% 16.82 14.4%
1970 559.5 6.8% 1.70 4.9% 52.82 12.1%
1980 1484.7 10.3% 2.26 2.9% 102.86 6.9%
> 10,000 ha 1950 209.8 0.34 4.15
1960 647.5 11.9% 0.76 8.6% 18.68 16.2%
1970 1385.8 7.9% 0.89 1.6% 53.72 11.1%
1980 4295.5 12.0% 1.28 3.7% 86.01 4.8%
All Size 1950 4.1 0.25 1.68
Groups 1960 18.4 16.3% 1.26 17.7% 10.60 20.2%
1970 33.7 6.2% 2.60 7.5% 47.72 16.2%
1980 105.7 12.1% 4.61 5.9% 98.75 7.5%
aIncludes only permanent cropland, temporary cropland, and cultivated pastures.
bExcludes administrators and their family members.
Notes: The table shows the total number of tractors per 1,000 establishments, per 1,000 hectares of cultivated
land, and per 1,000 workers, by establishment size group. Tractors of all horsepower categories are included.
Cultivated land includes only permanent cropland, temporary cropland, and cultivated pastures. Workers include
only permanent and temporary employees, and sharecroppers and others. The growth rates are compound growth
rates per year. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
by 1960, the use of land-saving inputs was still quite low on average. Less than 3%
of the establishments below 10ha declared to have used chemical fertilizers, and this
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proportion was similar among the establishments above 1,000ha. At 6-8%, the rate
of adoption in the middle strata of 10-1,000ha was only marginally better.
The rate of adoption of chemical fertilizers improved across all strata during the
1960s. The highest rates of adoption were still concentrated in the middle strata,
ranging from 15% to 20% in 1970. By 1980, in turn, over 30% of the establishments
in these strata declared to use chemical fertilizers.
Table 3.8: Share of establishments using chemical fertilizers and lime, by area group
(%)
< 10 ha 10-100 ha 100-1,000 ha 1,000-10,000 ha > 10,000 ha
Chemical Fertilizers
1950 – – – – –
1960 2.6 6.2 7.9 2.8 0.1
1970 7.1 19.4 15.3 14.9 6.5
1980 15.7 37.7 32.9 36.1 30.9
Lime
1950 – – – – –
1960 0.4 0.7 1.6 1.2 0.1
1970 0.6 2.3 3.2 5.4 2.8
1980 2.1 8.4 10.6 14.2 13.4
Notes: The table shows the share of establishments of each area group using chemical fertilizers, and
the share of establishments of each area group using Lime. The area groups include establishments
with a total area of less than 10 hectares (< 10 ha), of between 10 and 100 hectares (10-100 ha), of
between 100 and 1000 hectares (100-1000 ha), of between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares (1,000-10,000
ha), and of more than 10,000 hectares (> 10,000 ha). Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
A similar, though less marked increase was verified in the case of the use of lime,
with the larger establishments reporting the highest rates of adoption. Still, in 1980
the rates of adoption were never above 15% across establishment sizes, and only 2.1%
among smallholders.
To build an approximate measure of fertilization per hectare, I linearly interpo-
lated the census data on cultivated area and combined it with the annual apparent
consumption of nitrogen, phosphate, and potassium (NPK) fertilizers, which is avail-
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able starting in 1954. The linear interpolation of census data on cultivated area is
a reasonable procedure, since only partial surveys on a per-crop (rather than per-
establishment) basis exist for the years between census surveys.
The results are presented in Figure 3.5. As we can see, average fertilization per
hectare remained stagnant during the 1950s and most of the 1960s. Only in 1967,
coinciding with the sharp acceleration in subsidized credit, did the fertilization rate
begin to increase at a fast pace.
Figure 3.5: Apparent consumption of chemical fertilizers by area of cultivated land
(tons/ha)
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Notes: This figure shows the ratio of apparent consumption of chemical fertilizers to total area of cultivated land.
The apparent consumption of chemical fertilizers is defined as domestic production plus imports of nitrogen, phos-
phate, and potassium fertilizers. Cultivated land includes permanent cropland, temporary cropland, and cultivated
pastures. The area of cultivated land between census years was calculated through linear interpolation. Sources: Fer-
reira and dos Anjos (1983) (for the apparent consumption of fertilizers), and IBGE Agrarian Census (for cultivated
land).
3.5.2 Land Yields
The combination of policies and input choices described above gave rise to a
relatively extensive pattern of output growth throughout the period — compared to
yield increases, the expansion of cultivated area accounted for most of the output
expansion recorded by the major crops (Graham et al., 1987).
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Panel (a) in Figure 3.6 presents an aggregate measure of the average land yields
for 17 major crops for which consistent time series exist for the 1950-1980 period.10
To construct the measure, I first created indices of the physical yield measures for
each crop (with 1952=100), and then computed an average weighted by the shares of
each crop in the total harvested area for the group. I then converted the aggregate
index to logarithmic scale in order to estimate linear growth models and apply the
Bai-Perron test for structural breaks described in section 3.4.1. As before, the dashed
lines show the fitted linear trend models, and the vertical lines indicate the estimated
breakpoints, if any. The numbers above the dashed lines show the average growth
rate of aggregate land yields in each sub-period (in % per year).
As shown in panel (a), despite considerable volatility (owing primarily to weather
shocks), the trend growth rate of the aggregate land yield measure was quite slow in
the 1950-1980 period: 0.4% per year. The average of the aggregate index during the
1975-1980 period was only 8.7% higher than the average for the 1950-1955 period.
The Bai-Perron procedure did not identify any structural breaks in the series.
This general trend, however, masks considerable heterogeneity across crops. The
sharpest differences occur between major export crops and domestic food crops. Panel
(b) shows a similarly computed index including only the major export crops (coffee,
cacao, cotton, oranges, soybeans, and sugarcane). The aggregate yield index displays
a somewhat faster rate of growth for the 1950-1980 period: 0.68% per year, resulting
in an average measure that was 17% higher in 1975-1980 compared to 1950-1955
(again, no structural breaks were identified).
Figure E.3 in the Appendix presents crop-specific yield measures for the six major
export crops. Until the mid 1960s, the slow growth in the aggregate measure is due
to the stagnant yields of coffee, in a context in which coffee still accounted for most of
10These crops include bananas, onions, peanuts, tomatoes, beans, cacao, cassava, coffee, corn,
cotton, oranges, potatoes, rice, soybeans, sugarcane, sweet potatoes, and wheat.
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the area cultivated with export crops. In the 1960s, the federal government adopted
a coffee eradication program to combat overproduction and low world prices. At the
same time, it sought to diversify the composition of agricultural exports, directing
considerable efforts to the promotion of exports of processed goods utilizing oranges,
soy, and sugarcane. These crops, along with cacao, recorded increases in both yields
and cultivated area in the 1970s, helping to offset the trends of the traditionally
dominant export crops: coffee (whose yields were stagnant) and cotton (whose yields
declined in the 1960s and 1970s).
Panel (c) in figure 3.6 shows that the aggregate yield for domestically-oriented
crops lagged behind that of export-oriented crops — in 1975-1980 they were only 4%
higher than in 1950-1955. But this picture of slow but positive growth is primarily
due to the effect of corn yields which, as seen in Figure E.4 in the Appendix, grew
throughout the period. Indeed, panel (d) shows that, when corn (a crop utilized
primarily by the processing and the livestock industries) is excluded, the aggregate
yield of domestic food crops was stagnant until the mid 1970s, and declined sharply
thereafter.
As seen in figure E.4, the decline in yields was driven primarily by staple foods
in the diets of the Brazilian poor and working classes: rice, beans, and cassava. As
noted by contemporaneous authors, the diversification of agricultural exports in the
1970s occurred concurrently with a decline in the per-capita output — and, in some
cases, a decline in the absolute output — of domestic food crops (see, e.g. Barros
and Graham, 1978). This decline resulted in a substantial increase in the relative
price of domestically-traded food crops with respect to both export-oriented crops
and domestic industrial goods (Homem de Melo, 1979).
The decline in yields of food crops in the 1970s has been traditionally linked to
the expansion in the area dedicated to export crops and the resulting use of less
fertile land for food production. The preceding analysis suggests that the insufficient
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development of broad-based national research and extension programs also played
a role. Indeed, figures E.3 and E.4 in the Appendix suggest that the crop-specific
research programs described in section 3.4.2 — such as for cacao in the 1960s and
1970s, for cotton in the 1950s, and for corn since the early 1950s — appeared to
have helped these crops to record yield increases during at least part of the period
analyzed. Research and extension efforts for basic food crops were comparatively
underdeveloped.
Despite the good performance of some crops, the aggregate record for Brazilian
agriculture is one of low increase in land yields during the 1950-1980 period, a factor
that, together with the marked increase in the mechanization of labor-intensive tasks,
resulted in declining labor-land ratios among the most dynamic and commercially-
oriented establishments, as described in section 3.3.
3.6 Conclusion
Despite displaying one of the world’s fastest rates of industrialization during 1950-
1980, the Brazilian economy failed to reduce rural and urban underemployment.
Partly for that reason, outstanding growth in per capita income went hand in hand
with persistent poverty indicators (Roma˜o, 1991).
This paper contributed an explanation for the underemployment problem by ex-
amining labor displacement as a hallmark of agricultural modernization in the period.
It examined how government policies to promote the use of modern inputs interacted
with size and power inequality across landholdings to yield a marked labor-saving
bias in technical change.
Even though price and credit policies did not explicitly discriminate in favor of
labor-saving inputs, they disproportionately benefited large establishments. These es-
tablishments, however, were prone to impart a labor-saving bias in their input choices.
The reasons for this bias are rooted in the structure of the latifundio-minifundio sys-
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tem. First, external workers make up a greater share of the costs of large establish-
ments. Second, large establishments face higher labor disciplining costs in a context
of incomplete contracts. Third, large establishments benefit from control over land
to derive monoposonistic power in local labor markets and political power in general.
In addition, public policies neglected key components of land-saving innovation
packages that are subject to severe market failures, such as research and extension,
rural education, and rural infrastructure. As a result of technical complementarity
between these public goods and private land-saving inputs, the adoption of the latter
was sluggish until the 1970s.
Since such market failures did not beset the development of mechanized techniques
and their related capital inputs, the adoption of labor-saving innovations proceeded
at a much faster pace. Moreover, as suggested by De Janvry (1978), since they did
not upset the extensive pattern of land use of the large establishments, they faced no
political resistance.
Encouraging improvements in the action of the state occurred in the 1970s, es-
pecially with respect to research and extension. Their benefits, however, were not
reaped before the interruption of the industry-led growth process in the 1980s. This
tardiness, along with the glaring absence of significant land reform throughout the
1950-1980 period, implied a missed opportunity with lasting consequences for the
Brazilian economy and society.
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Figure 3.6: Area-weighted yield indices (in logarithmic scale)
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Notes: The figures show the evolution of crop yield indices (in logarithmic scale). The indices are a weighted average
of crop-specific indices of physical yield per hectare. The weights are the shares of each crop in the total harvested
area of each of four groups: all 17 major crops (panel a), export-oriented crops (panel b), domestically-oriented crops
(panel c), and domestically-oriented crops excluding corn (panel d). The crop-specific physical yields were computed
as the ratio of annual output (in tons or other crop-specific units) divided by the harvested area (in hectares). The
resulting values were then transformed into crop-specific index numbers, with 1952=100, prior to the weighting.
The plots show the weighted indices in logrithmic scale. The solid lines show the logarithm of the weighted indices.
The vertical lines indicate the years in which a structural break in the growth rate of the yield index was identified
by the Bai-Perron procedure. The dashed lines show the linear models fit for each of the resulting subperiods (if
any). The numbers near the dashed lines show the slope of the linear model, i.e. the average growth rate of the yield
index in each sub-period (in % per year). The linear models and growth rates were estimated using the procedure
in Boyce (1986a). The 17 crops in panel (a) include: bananas, onions, peanuts, tomatoes, beans, cacao, cassava,
coffee, corn, cotton, oranges, potatoes, rice, soybeans, sugarcane, sweet potatoes, and wheat. The export crops
in panel (b) include cacao, coffee, cotton, oranges, soybeans, and sugarcane; the remaining crops are considered
domestic crops. Prior to 1959, physical yields for coffee were reported with reference to coffee beans, and from 1959
they were reported with reference to coffee berries. I converted the former series to the unit of the latter using the
annual growth rates for 1951-1958. Source: IBGE Statistical Yearbook of Brazil, various years.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of growth and temperature
Mean Standard Deviation Countries
Overall Within Between
Growth in Agriculture (%/yr.)
All Countries 2.67 8.62 8.54 1.22 62
Asia and Pacific Islands 3.01 4.78 4.74 0.69 13
Latin America and Caribbean 2.57 6.00 5.92 1.02 17
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.27 9.81 9.74 1.19 24
Middle East and North Africa 3.79 14.16 14.08 1.63 7
Growth in Manufacturing (%/yr.)
All Countries 4.51 8.55 8.17 2.51 62
Asia and Pacific Islands 6.85 7.69 7.23 2.81 13
Latin America and Caribbean 3.29 6.74 6.58 1.53 17
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.68 10.30 10.04 2.28 24
Middle East and North Africa 5.78 7.60 7.49 1.36 7
Weighted Temperature (oC/yr.)
All Countries 21.83 4.48 0.49 4.48 62
Asia and Pacific Islands 22.76 4.90 0.34 5.00 13
Latin America and Caribbean 21.19 4.04 0.51 4.13 17
Sub-Saharan Africa 23.22 3.78 0.48 3.83 24
Middle East and North Africa 17.37 3.83 0.63 4.07 7
Notes: The decomposition of the overall standard deviation was obtained by using the following
transformation: y˜i,t = yi,t − y¯i + y¯. Where y denotes the variable of interest, i denotes countries, t
denotes years, y¯i denotes the average of y across time in country i, and y¯ denotes the overall average
of y. The within-country standard deviation is the standard deviation of y˜i,t, while the between-
country standard deviation is given by the standard deviation of y¯i across all countries. For details
about the data sources, see the Appendix.
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Figure A.1: Latitude of country geographical centers and variability in population-
weighted average temperature
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Notes: The figure shows the variability of annual population-weighted average temperature in each
country plotted against the latitude of the country’s geographical center. Small adjustments (of up
to .5 degree) were made when these latitudes (available without decimal places) overlapped. The
length of the boxes show each country’s interquartile range (iqr). The length of the vertical lines
above the boxes is determined by the smallest value between a country’s highest annual temperature
and the top quartile temperature plus 1.5× iqr. The length of the vertical lines below the boxes is
determined by the smallest value between a country’s lowest annual temperature and the bottom
quartile temperature minus 1.5 × iqr. Outliers are not shown. The solid vertical lines indicate the
latitude of the tropics of Cancer (23.43o) and Capricorn (-23.43o), and the dashed vertical lines
indicate the latitude of the limits of the subtropical region (-38o, 38o). For details about the data
sources, see Appendix B.
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APPENDIX B
DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
List of Countries in the Baseline Sample: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh,
Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile,
China, Colombia, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire,
Cuba, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, The
Gambia, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,
South Korea, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myan-
mar, Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Thai-
land, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
121
Table B.1: Data sources and variable definitions
Source/Definition
General
Sectoral real value added WDI
Population-weighted average temperature Dell et al. (2012a)
Table 1.1
Set 1 : Stocks
Human capital stock PWT 8
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita (log) PWT 8
Set 1 : Flows
Real exchange rate undervaluation (log) Rodrik (2008), calculated with data from PWT 8
External terms of trade (log) PWT 8
Set 2: Stocks
Polity II score Marshall et al. (2013), updated.
Set 2: Flows
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) PWT 8
Real exchange rate volatility PWT 8, defined as standard deviation over each period.
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) PWT 8
Government consumption (% of GDP) PWT 8
Table 1.4
PPP-adjusted GDP per capita PWT 8
Share of agriculture in GDP WDI
Agricultural exports FAO
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) PWT 8
Table 1.5
Civil conflict Marshall (2013)
Hydropower production WDI
Table 1.6
Gross capital formation (% of GDP) WDI
Gross saving (% of GDP) WDI
Labor Productivity PWT 8, defined as real GDP per person engaged
Agricultural exports FAO
Food imports over merchandise imports WDI
Merchandise trade (% of GDP) PWT 8
Trade tax revenues (% of GDP) Baunsgaard and Keen (2010)
Figure A.1
Country geographical centers NGA GEOnet Names Server
Note: WDI: World Development Indicators. PWT 8: Penn World Table version 8.0. FAO: Food and Agriculture
Organization. NGA: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
C.1 The Impact of Technical Change on Income Distribution
in the Dual Scenario
Assume a given distribution of land between the smallholding and the surplus-
extracting subsectors. If total land is normalized to unity, total agricultural output
is thus
A = σrtr + σs(1− tr) (C.1)
where the subscript r denotes the surplus-extracting sector, the subscript s denotes
the smallholding sector, and ti is the share of sector i in total land.
The rural product wage is set by the average output in the smallholding sector:
ωa =
σs(1− tr)
1− lm − lr (C.2)
In turn,
lr =
σrtr
qr
(C.3)
where lr is the share of the surplus-extracting sector in total employment, and lm
is the predetermined share of industrial sector in total employment.
Combining (C.2) and (C.3) with equation (2.3) yields a solution for β:
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β =
σs(1− tr)
1− lm − σrtrqr
(
σs(1− tr) + σrtr
1− lm
)−1
(C.4)
It is straightforward to see that labor-saving technical change (either uniform or
taking place only in the surplus-extracting subsector) will unambiguously lower β. In
turn, land-saving technical change will raise β if:
lr > lsγτ (C.5)
where 0 < ls < 1 is the share of the smallholding subsector in the total labor force,
and 0 < γ < 1 is the share of the surplus-extracting subsector in total agricultural
output (i.e. γ = trσr
A
). Finally, if land-saving technical change takes place uniformly
across both subsectors, τ = 1 − σr
σs
. The widely documented inverse size-yield rela-
tionship suggests strongly that 0 < τ < 1. In turn, if land-saving technical change
takes place only in the surplus-extracting subsector, τ = 1.
Thus, for plausible parameter values — which require that the surplus-extracting
subsector be of a suitably (but reasonably) minimum size —, land-saving technical
change will raise the sector-wide wage share in the dual scenario.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2.1
Given the assumption of stability in the market for industrial goods, a necessary
and sufficient condition for land-saving technical change to raise aggregate demand
for industry is for it to cause a shortfall of ex ante saving with respect to investment.
That is, using (2.13):
d[(1− β)σap]
dσa
< 0 (C.6)
It follows from (2.12) that
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dp
dσa
=
−1 + ηα(1 + θ)
σa[+ η(1− α)]p (C.7)
recall that η > 0 and  > 0 are the constant elasticities of income and substitution
in the demand for agricultural goods, 0 < α < 1 is the share of rural workers in the
total demand for agricultural goods, and θ ≥ 0 is the elasticity of the the wage share
in agriculture with respect to an increase in σa.
Combining (C.6) and (C.7) yields equation (2.16) in proposition 2.2.1 (with θ = 0
in the owner-cultivator scenario).
C.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2.2
Given the assumption of stability in the market for industrial goods, a necessary
and sufficient condition for land-saving technical change to lower aggregate demand
for industry is:
d[(1− β)σap]
dqa
> 0 (C.8)
From (2.12), it follows that
dp
dqa
=
−ηα φ
qa
+ η(1− α)p (C.9)
Combining (C.9) and (C.8) gives:
 > η
(
α− β
β
)
(C.10)
Given that η > 0 and  > 0, the condition above will be trivially satisfied if α < β.
As shown in section 2.2.4, the initial assumption that rural wages are high enough to
ensure positive consumption of industrial goods ensures that α < β.
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APPENDIX D
SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS
This section discusses the short-run dynamics of the warranted growth paths of
both the demand-constrained and the saving-constrained regimes.
D.1 The demand-constrained regime in the short run
As in Nakatani and Skott (2007), I assume that in the short run both the rate of
accumulation (h = I
K
) and the output-capital ratios (σm) are predetermined, and not
necessarily equal to their warranted-growth values — i.e. h 6= g(pi, pˆm), and σm 6= σdm.
Goods market equilibrium in the demand-constrained regime will thus be given by
σmpi +
1
Km
(1− β)σap = h (D.1)
with h and σm predetermined, equilibrium is brought about by endogenous changes
in the profit share; for a given rate of anticipated inflation, the change in the profit
share is accompanied by an increase in the rate of (unanticipated) inflation, accord-
ing to the WBE schedule in (2.9). The profit share that emerges in the short run
induces firms to revise their output expansion plans according to the growth function
in equation (2.11), described in section 2.2.3.
In turn, firms’ investment demand is specified in Harrodian fashion. Firms wish
to operate with a desired level of capacity utilization, and they will step up the rate
of accumulation whenever actual capacity utilization exceeds the desired level. The
equation below describes their behavior.
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h˙ = λ(σm − σdm), λ > 0 (D.2)
For a given profit share, the rates of growth of output and the capital stock will
most likely differ. As a result, the actual output-capital ratio will change as a result
of changes in capital utilization, according to
σˆm = Mˆ − h⇔ σ˙m = σm[g(pi, pˆm)− h] (D.3)
Equations (D.2) and (D.3) define a two-dimensional dynamic system for the ac-
cumulation rate and the output-capital ratio. In stationary equilibrium, industrial
output and the industrial capital stock grow at the same rate, with the output-capital
ratio remaining at the desired level. This warranted growth path was analyzed in sec-
tion 2.2 above.
At the stationary equilibrium, the Jacobian matrix associated with the system
comprised of equations (D.2) and (D.3) is given by
J =
 0 λ
σdm
[
gpi
∂pi
∂h
+ gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂h
− 1] σdm [gpi ∂pi∂σm + gpˆm ∂pˆm∂σm]
 (D.4)
The conditions for local stability are:
Tr(J) < 0⇔
(
gpi + gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂pi
)
∂pi
∂σm
< 0 (D.5)
and
Det(J) > 0⇔ gpi ∂pi
∂h
< 1− gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂h
(D.6)
Starting with the second condition, note that from D.1 it follows that
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dpi
dh
=
1[
σdm +
1
Km
(1− β)σa ∂p∂pi
] (D.7)
The denominator in (D.7) is the change in total saving elicited by an increase in
the profit share. As shown momentarily, dpi
dh
> 0 is a corollary of the local stability of
the stationary point (which requires that the saving rate not only increases with the
profit share, but that it increases by more than output growth). If dpi
dh
> 0, it follows
from the WBE schedule for given inflation expectations (eq. 2.9) that ∂pˆm
∂h
> 0. Under
these conditions, and using the fact that gpˆm < 0, equations (D.6) and (D.7) yield
the following sufficient condition for a positive determinant:
Det(J) > 0⇐ gpi < σd + 1
Km
(1− β)σa ∂p
∂pi
(D.8)
The condition in (D.8) states that the saving function is steeper than the output
growth function in the (pi, g) space. Since gpi > 0, it also ensures that
dpi
dh
> 0.
Condition (D.8) is the correlate in the present setting of the well-known Robinsonian
stability condition of post-Keynesian models, and it gives rise to the downward-sloping
WG schedule described in section 2.2.3 (see equation 2.14 ). As argued in section
2.2.3, the existence of convex adjustment costs implies a non-linear output growth
function, with a high sensitivity to the profit share at intermediate values, a low
sensitivity at extreme values, and upper and lower bounds (see Skott, 1989, for further
discussion). Figure D.1 below represents it as an S-shaped curve bounded from above
and below. The case in which condition (D.8) is satisfied is shown at point B. For
further discussion in a similar setting, see Nakatani and Skott (2007).
Now turn to the condition for a negative trace (equation D.5). From D.1 it follows
that
dpi
dσm
= −
[
pi + 1
Km
(1− β)σa ∂p∂σm
σdm +
1
Km
(1− β)σa ∂p∂pi
]
(D.9)
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Figure D.1: The saving-investment equilibrium with warranted growth.
pi
g, S
Km
g(pi, pˆm)
S
Km
A
B
Notes: The figure shows the saving-investment equilibrium in equation (2.13), which along
with equation (2.12) ensures equilibrium in the market for both goods. The S-shaped curve
depicts the non-linear output growth function g(pi, pˆm), which along the warranted growth
path is equal to the rate of capital accumulation. The reasons for its non-linearity were
discussed in section 2.2.3. The non-linear dashed schedule depicts a possible configuration of
the economy-wide saving rate, S
Km
= σdmpi+
1
Km
(1− β)σap. As drawn, the figure allows for
two equilibria with a non-negative industrial profit share. Point A is an unstable equilibrium
which violates D.6, and point B is a stable equilibrium which satisfies D.6. The comparative
statics carried out in section 2.2.4 assume the economy’s warranted growth path satisfies the
conditions for local stability (see Nakatani and Skott, 2007, for further discussion of multiple
equilibria in a similar setting)
Condition (D.8) ensures that the term in brackets has a positive denominator. In
turn, a sufficient condition for the term in brackets to have a positive numerator is
that ∂p
∂σdm
≥ 0. Totally differentiating equation (2.12) yields:
dp
dσm
=
(fM − fA)Kmp
qmσa[η(1− α) + ] (D.10)
where fM and fA denote the per-worker demand for agricultural goods in the
industrial and the agricultural sectors. As described in the paper, η > 0,  > 0, and
0 < α < 1. Since the urban wage premium is nonnegative (see equation 2.6) and
preferences are identical across all types of workers, it follows that fM ≥ fA and
dpi
dσm
≤ 0.
Using the fact that dpi
dσm
≤ 0 in equation (D.5) yields the following condition for a
negative trace:
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Tr(J) < 0⇔ gpi > −gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂pi
(D.11)
which is condition (2.15) in the main text. As discussed in section 2.2.3, it will be
satisfied if inflation is relatively low, in which case firms’ output expansion plans will
be fairly insensitive to increases in inflation. As argued in section 2.2.3, this situation
is especially likely in a demand-constrained regime.
D.2 The saving-constrained regime in the short run
In the short run, anticipated inflation is also predetermined, and in general dif-
ferent from actual inflation. Unlike the demand-constrained regime, however, I now
assume that actual inflation is above the threshold (pˆ∗m), so that anticipated infla-
tion will adjust to shortfalls with respect to actual inflation. The following equation
describes this adaptive adjustment:
˙ˆpem = ψ(pˆm − pˆem) (D.12)
where ψ > 0. The remainder of the model in the short run is as described in
the previous section. Along with (D.2) and (D.3), equation (D.12) defines a three-
dimensional dynamic system in the output-capital ratio, the rate of accumulation,
and anticipated inflation. In equilibrium, there is warranted growth but at the rate
compatible with the distributional norm in the industrial sector (so that inflation
expectations are met).
The Jacobian matrix at the stationary point is given by
J =

0 λ 0
σdm
[
gpi
∂pi
∂h
+ gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂h
− 1] σdm [gpi ∂pi∂σm + gpˆm ∂pˆm∂σm ] σdmgpˆm
ψ ∂pˆm
∂h
ψ ∂pˆm
∂σm
0
 (D.13)
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And the associated Routh-Hurwitz conditions for local stability are:
1. Tr(J) = σdm
[
gpi
∂pi
∂σm
+ gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂σm
]
< 0
2. Det(J1) +Det(J2) +Det(J3) = −σdmgpˆmψ ∂pˆm∂σm − λσdm
[
gpi
∂pi
∂h
+ gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂h
− 1] > 0
3. Det(J) = λσdmψgpˆm
∂pˆm
∂h
< 0
4. −Tr(J)[Det(J1) +Det(J2) +Det(J3)] +Det(J) > 0
Noting that gpˆm < 0, we see that condition 3 is always satisfied. Satisfaction of
condition 1 requires the same condition for a negative trace in the demand-constrained
regime. In turn, condition 2 will be satisfied if
gpi
∂pi
∂h
< 1− gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂h
− ψ
λ
gpˆm
∂pˆm
∂σm
(D.14)
Since ∂pˆm
∂σm
< 0, condition (D.6) is necessary but not sufficient for condition (D.14)
to be satisfied. Even if, as assumed throughout the paper, the more stringent condi-
tion (D.8) holds — which ensures gpi
∂pi
∂h
< 1—, a sufficiently low suitably low speed
of adjustment of anticipated inflation (ψ) relative to the speed of adjustment of ac-
cumulation (λ) may still be required.
Finally, condition 4 above will be satisfied if the sum of principal minors is greater
than the ratio of Det(J) over Tr(J). Again, a suitably low speed of adjustment of
anticipated inflation (which would increase the sum of principal minors and reduce
the absolute value of Det(J)) can ensure that the required inequality holds.
In sum, even though certain combinations of parameters may render the saving-
constrained regime locally unstable, stability may well be attained.
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Figure E.1: Land use by size group (in % of total land).
7.2 53.0 4.0 12.0 5.7 18.1
11.5 56.9 3.9 13.1 6.3 8.4
12.6 56.7 4.2 11.7 5.5 9.2
13.0 59.8 5.9 11.0 6.2 4.1
1980
1970
1960
1950
 
Pe
rm
. C
rop
lan
d
Te
mp
. C
rop
lan
d
Pla
nte
d P
as
tur
e
Na
t. P
as
tur
e
Fo
res
t
Un
us
ed
 
_
(a) < 10 ha
5.7 20.4 7.9 23.5 17.7 24.8
7.9 21.3 8.6 27.3 19.2 15.7
6.4 21.4 9.6 30.3 16.2 16.2
7.3 28.9 12.8 25.0 18.1 7.8
1980
1970
1960
1950
 
Pe
rm
. C
rop
lan
d
Te
mp
. C
rop
lan
d
Pla
nte
d P
as
tur
e
Na
t. P
as
tur
e
Fo
res
t
Un
us
ed
 
_
(b) 10-100 ha
2.5 6.6 9.8 42.1 20.0 19.1
3.4 7.5 10.8 45.3 20.4 12.6
2.5 6.7 12.3 45.7 20.9 12.0
2.8 13.6 19.8 34.8 22.1 6.9
1980
1970
1960
1950
 
Pe
rm
. C
rop
lan
d
Te
mp
. C
rop
lan
d
Pla
nte
d P
as
tur
e
Na
t. P
as
tur
e
Fo
res
t
Un
us
ed
 
_
(c) 100-1,000 ha
0.7 2.3 6.9 53.9 23.6 12.6
1.1 2.5 9.0 54.9 22.2 10.3
0.8 2.5 12.0 54.2 20.4 10.0
1.0 7.2 22.0 37.3 25.6 6.9
1980
1970
1960
1950
 
Pe
rm
. C
rop
lan
d
Te
mp
. C
rop
lan
d
Pla
nte
d P
as
tur
e
Na
t. P
as
tur
e
Fo
res
t
Un
us
ed
 
_
(d) 1,000-10,000 ha
0.1 0.6 1.6 42.7 46.4 8.5
0.2 0.5 3.0 40.9 46.5 9.0
0.2 0.4 6.0 51.5 32.2 9.8
0.4 2.0 11.7 33.5 44.0 8.2
1980
1970
1960
1950
 
Pe
rm
. C
rop
lan
d
Te
mp
. C
rop
lan
d
Pla
nte
d P
as
tur
e
Na
t. P
as
tur
e
Fo
res
t
Un
us
ed
 
_
(e) > 10,000 ha
2.0 6.8 6.9 42.7 25.8 15.8
3.3 8.8 8.5 43.1 24.4 11.9
2.9 9.3 10.6 44.5 20.7 12.0
3.0 13.7 17.6 33.0 25.5 7.2
1980
1970
1960
1950
 
Pe
rm
. C
rop
lan
d
Te
mp
. C
rop
lan
d
Pla
nte
d P
as
tur
e
Na
t. P
as
tur
e
Fo
res
t
Un
us
ed
 
_
(f) All Size Groups
Notes: The figures show the ratio between total persons employed and total area of cropland and pastures, by
establishment size group. Total employment includes unpaid family members, permanent employees, temporary
employees, and sharecroppers and other arrangements. Total land includes permanent cropland, temporary crop-
land, natural pastures, and planted pastures. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
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Figure E.2: Average number of workers per establishment, by size group (in persons
per establishment).
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(f) All Size Groups
Notes: The figures show the ratio of employed workers per establishments, by establishment size group. The workers
in each category include unpaid family members. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
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Figure E.3: Land yields by export crop (in logarithmic scale).
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Notes: The figures show the ratio between total persons employed and total area of cropland and pastures, by
establishment size group. Total employment includes unpaid family members, permanent employees, temporary
employees, and sharecroppers and other arrangements. Total land includes permanent cropland, temporary crop-
land, natural pastures, and planted pastures. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
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Figure E.4: Land yields by domestic crop (in logarithmic scale).
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(f) Peanuts
Notes: The figures show the ratio between total persons employed and total area of cropland and pastures, by
establishment size group. Total employment includes unpaid family members, permanent employees, temporary
employees, and sharecroppers and other arrangements. Total land includes permanent cropland, temporary crop-
land, natural pastures, and planted pastures. Source: IBGE Agrarian Census.
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